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ABSTRACT 
The present work^^ was a comparative study of the challenges in 
implementation of a new set of capital requirements as recommended by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision with reference to Indian Banking 
System and UAE and its impact thereof 
After a brief overview of the key features of the new Basel Capital 
Accord (Basel II), a systematic legal and economic analysis was carried out in 
order to identify and address the main issues arising as a consequence of 
implementation of the new Basel II Accord in the Banking System. 
The main objective of this work was to identify and note the weaknesses 
among Indian and UAE banks with regard to each of the three pillars as 
recommended in Basel II Accord. The Basel II Accord has got not only a 
statutory relevance rather it is also of great interest to the academic community 
and the business world. The present work tries to explore the emergence of 
relative risks stemming out from the existing practices of businesses and 
production of useful deductive comments-recommendations for improvement, 
which could positively change not only the regulatory environment of UAE 
and India but also the business practices. 
The basic principle is the conviction that the adoption of new practices 
of Basel II in India and UAE should not only take place through prescriptive 
regulations, but also should be identified as need by banks themselves, which 
should see the benefits from the adoption and application of best practices. 
In India, there is dominance of Government ownership coupled with 
significant private shareholding in the public sector banks, which in turn 
continue to have a dominant share in the total banking system. Minimum 
capital adequacy requirement under the Basel standards is 8%; RBI has 
stipulated and achieved a minimum capital of 9%. Basel II mandates Capital to 
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Risk Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR) o\ 8% and Tier I capital ot 6% The RBI 
has stated that Indian banks must have a CRAR ot minimum 9%, etfettive 
March 31, 2009 All private sector banks are already in compliance with the 
Basel II guidelines as regards their CRAR as well as Tier I capital Further, the 
Government of India has stated that public sector banks must have a capital 
cushion with a CRAR of at least 12%, higher than the threshold of 9% 
prescribed by the RBI 
On ^he other hand banks m India are still in the process ot implementing 
capital changes or market risk prescribed in the Basel Document A feature, 
somewhat unique to the Indian financial system is the diversity of its 
composition These public sector banks are listed on the stock exchange and 
their performance is reflected in their P/E ratios The private sector banks 
especially the new ones are world class There are also cooperative banks, 
which are large in number and pose a challenge because of the multiplicity of 
regulatory and supervisory authorities There are also Regional Rural Banks 
with links to their parent commercial banks 
Foreign bank branches operate profitably in India and by and large the 
regulatory standards for all these banks are uniform The process of providing 
financial services is changing rapidly from traditional banking to a one stop 
shop of varied financial services and the old institutional demarcations are 
getting increasingly blurred 
The UAE Banking industry is considered to be a reflection of the 
Middle East banking as UAE had the fastest developments in the financial 
services sector The UAE's banking and financial sectors achieved record 
growth rates m 2005, fuelled by nsing oil revenues as well as the double 
investment value of the securities market on the other 
Implementing the new Basel II Accord in oil based countries is expected 
to have various consequences on a large scale, including some adverse impacts 
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on such as increased costs ol lending, enhancement ot competitive advantages 
of laige banks, increased pro-cychcahty and lewarding ot short teim lending 
Awai ness of these potential consequences could help the banks to better 
prepare themselves and try to diminish the negative impacts 
While banks will not be able to completely avoid some ot the above 
mentioned problems, they are usually believed to have a choice on deciding 
whether and how the new standards should be implemented 
Even though India and UAE are not obliged to comply with provisions 
of the Basel II Accord, the incentives to do so aie stronger than are generally 
recognised Due to pressure from the international financial community, 
prestige, to protect their banking industry, especially since the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund are using Basel Committee standards as 
benchmark, the UAE Central Bank opted for the implementation of Basel II 
accord norms which were carried out in phases starting end of 2007 
The lack of resources, insufficient number of skilled policymakers, 
gathering of data with sufficient detail on losses and creating a data collection 
process are some of the biggest challenges 
Thus, we briefly describe the basic characteristics of the issues that we 
tried to develop within the frames of this doctoral thesis, this encompassed the 
relative research for each one of the three pillars It also comprised the basic 
units of the thesis and the relative deductive comments- recommendations for 
improvement, apart from the development of the theoretical setting with study 
and analysis of international legislation and practices, through the relative 
literature (UAE literature is relatively shorter) 
International literature, apart from UAE, offers a wide range of topics 
with respect to new capital requirements under Basel II, while the relative 
legislations have a lot of discrepancies from country to country Important 
literature sources were the researches of 
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r Bank toi International Settlements (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision) International Convergence ol Capital Measurements and 
Capital Standaids June 2004 
r Bank tor International Settlements 'Principles tor the Management ot 
Credit Risk", Basel Committee Publications No 75, September 2000 
r Bank for International Settlements "Credit Risk Modelling Curient 
Practice and Applications', Basel Committee Publications No 49, April 
1999 BIS (1999), 
r- "A New Capital Adequacy Framework", Basel Committee Publication No 
50,June 
r BIS (2001), "The New Basel Capital Accord", Second Consultative Paper, 
January 
> BIS (2003), "The New Basel Capital Accord", Thud Consultative Paper, 
March 
V Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003a), "Quantitative Impact 
Study 3 -Overview Of Global Results", 5 May 
> Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003b), "Supplementary 
Information on QIS 3", 27 May 
> Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004a), "Modifications to the 
capital treatment for expected and unexpected credit losses m the New 
Basel Accord", January 
> Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004b), "International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards A Revised 
Framework", June 
In the UAE, UNION LAW No (10) OF 1980, FEDERAL LAW NO 6 
OF 1985, 1744/2003, IMF PUBLICATIONS ON UAE, as well as several 
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relevanl studies conducted by banks and other financial institutions were an 
important source 
In India, Reserve bank guidelines, IMF Publication as well as banking 
laws were important source apart from various governmental and RBI 
communications 
International literature offers a wide range of topics about new capital 
requirement under Basel II, however, unfortunately in UAE there aie very 
limited resources, as the literature sources aie constiained 
The scientific research that follows our doctoral thesis is focused on the 
contemporary business environment and comparative analysis of India with 
UAE Banking System that are required during the last years to comply with 
strict codes - rules of corporate governance and behavioral legislations usually 
adopting the minimum requirements, without following the internationally 
accepted good practices 
JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY 
As the Basel-II, PiUar-II implementation is scheduled to be over in 2009, 
while the Pillar-III is concerned with financial communication and market 
discipline only, it is the right time to highlight the status of implementation and 
acceptability and preparedness for the Pillar-III 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Already vast literature on Basel II, a large part of which is actually 
constituted by unpublished reports and newspaper or magazine articles, and for 
that reason, there was no preoccupation in checking and acknowledging 
precedence in any of the points raised m the paper 
Basel II is the latest buzzword m the Risk management arena, both for 
banks, as well as for Information Technology (IT) companies, which specialize 
m this space Due to this, Already vast literature on Basel II is available, a large 
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pari ot which is actually constituted by unpublished reports and ncwspapei oi 
magazine articles, and foi that reason, there was no preoccupation in checking 
and acknowledging precedence in any of the point^ raised in the papei. The 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) has defined, in detail, the banking side 
of Basel II. This includes detailed frameworks, describing Basel II 
requirements, with regular updates to these frameworks. In addition, the 
regulatory authorities of various countries regularly provide detailed guidelines 
to banks on the intricacies of Basel II, from a usk management side. The above 
is further supplemented by the expertise available in banks, through then 
internal risk management groups. 
However, there is one area, where banks have been forced to work on a 
hit and trial method, relying solely on on the job training. It is the area of Basel 
II enterprise architecture, i.e. the changes banks need to make in their 
enterprise architecture to ensure their IT software infrastructure can 
successfully support the business-related risk management aspects of Basel II. 
To clearly comprehend the importance of a robust, extensible and, most of all, 
practically workable Basel II architecture, one needs to understand the costs 
related to any Basel II implementation. 
Therefore in the present study the literature review is provided on the 
three pillars of Basel II which forms the basis to conduct the Research on the 
Challenges faced in Implementation of Basel II Accord, steps taken for 
implementation thereupon and its Implication on Indian and UAE Banking 
Sector 
AIMS & OBJECTIVES 
The present study was carried out with an aim to study the 
Implementation of Basel II Accord and its Implication in Indian and U.A.E. 
Banking Sector 
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For the above aim the /oilowing objectives were framed for the piesent study 
• To study the clanty of the mam spiiit ol the New Basel Capital Accord 
through the three pillars specified in the Accord and their implementation 
in the Banks across India and UAE 
• To study the two economies i e India and UAE in reference to regulatory 
and legal framework and thereby understanding the overall regulatory 
guidance and constraints, 
• To find out dieas of concern /obstacle in respect to implementing the 
Basel II in the Banks with special reference commercial banks in India 
and UAE 
• To study the approach of Indian, Foreign and UAE banks towards various 
risks 
• To find out problems faced by the banks in different environments 
SCOPE OF STUDY 
The present study has a very wide scope from the point of view of 
academicians, bankers and planners 
1 Academicians The academicians will get a chance to understand various 
relationships between banks, environmental impact on transition, impact of 
ownership on transition, relationship between banks and solution providers, 
relationship between banks and regulating authorities, relationship between 
banks and government, implication on various stakeholders, the impending 
fears amongst the banking personnel, and their perceptions regarding 
various issues involved in the transition 
2 Bankers The gap analysis will give the bankers an opportunity to 
understand their strengths and weaknesses in detail and thereby provide 
m 
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them an opportunity to diagnose the problems and take correct measures, 
thereby focusing their eneigies to the correct issues 
3 Policy Makers- The study of differences between environments and 
differences among different ownerships would give the pohcy makers an 
opportunity to mould their policies and regulations in such a way so as to 
facilitate the smooth transition. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The present study was undertaken for a compaiative study of 
Implementation of Basel II Accord and its Implication in Indian and U.A.E 
Banking Sector. After a thorough study of the previous works on the topic, the 
methodology to undertake the present study was on an exploratory design using 
both primary and secondary data sources. 
HYPOTHESIS 
Based on the foregoing objective the following null hypotheses were 
evolved for the present study; 
HI. The readiness for implementation of Basel II is affected by 
environment. 
HI.A. Understanding of Basel II is related with Environment 
Hl.B. Perceptions related to Relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits 
are related with environment 
HI.e. Implementation status and acceptability is dependent on the 
environment. 
Hl.D. Pricing and Implementation Strategy is dependent on the 
environment 
H2. Ability to bear the cost of implementation of Basel-II is related with 
environment. 
[ 8 ] -.^^^ 
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HI Relevance and adequacy ol risk management piocesses is ditteient in 
different environments 
H4 The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of infoimation is 
different in two environments 
H4 A The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information on 
competence is different in two environments 
H4 B The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information on 
reputation is different in two environments 
H5 The amount of resistance to Basel II by the personnel of banks is different 
in different environments 
H6 The perception that successful implementation of Basel II will avert 
financial crises is different m different environments 
H7 The readiness for implementation of Basel II is affected by type of 
ownership 
H7 A Understanding of Basel II is related with ownership type 
H7 B Perceptions related to Relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits 
are related with type of ownership 
H7 C Implementation status and acceptability is dependent on type of 
ownership 
H7 D Pricing and implementation strategies are dependent on ownership 
type 
H8 Ability to bear the cost of implementation of Basel-II is related to type of 
ownership 
H9 Relevance and adequacy of risk management processes is different for 
different types of ownerships 
[9] 
HIO The perception regarding the effect ol disclosure of infoimation is 
different loi different types of ownerships 
HIO A The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information 
on competence is different for different types of ownerships 
H10 B The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information 
on reputation is different for different types of ownerships 
HI 1 The amount of resistance to Basel II by the personnel of banks is different 
for different types of ownerships 
H12The perception that successful implementation of Basel II in will avert 
financial crises is different for different types of ownerships 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
The questionnaire was divided mto three parts, first part consisted of 
questions related to the information related to location of the bank and type of 
ownership, the second part was related with questions related to industry, the 
third part was a scale developed to measure the preparedness, attitude and 
abilities of the participating banks for Basel II After surveying the related 
literature, the questions were framed foUowmg Delphi technique For this 
purpose a team of six persons (from academic, banking and financial sectors) 
was constituted to propose questions related to various issues related to 
preparedness of banks towards Basel II accord and their attitude towards 
vanous issues related to its perceived benefits and impact on the functioning of 
bank An attempt was made to questionnaire exhaustive and illustrative so as to 
provide maximum reliability 
RESULTS 
Reliabihty and validity of the self-developed 42-item tool was used for 
collection of primary data The tool was tested for reliability both m terms of 
content and construct The tool was found to be reliable contentwise For 
[10] 
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construct validity Principal Component Analysis was peiioimed, and attei 
Piincipal Component Analysis, the tool was reduced to a 14-item scale toi 
measuring the status ot preparedness and perception regarding the impact ol 
Basel II among the banks in UAE and India 
The data collected was subjected to analysis The analysed results 
depicted the acceptance/ rejection of hypotheses as follows 
Hypothesis 
No. 
HI 
HI A 
HIB 
HlC 
HID 
H2 
H3 
H4 
H4A 
Statement of Null hypothesis 
The readiness »oi 
implementation of Basel II is 
affected by environment 
Understanding of Basel II is 
related with Environment 
Perceptions related to Relevance 
of Basel II, its impact ana 
benefits are related with 
environment 
Implementation status and 
acceptability is dependent on the 
environment 
Pricing and Implementation 
strategy is dependent on the 
environment 
Ability to bear the cost of 
implementation of BaselTI is 
related with environment 
Relevance and adequacy of risk 
management processes is 
different in different 
environments 
The perception regarding the 
effect of disclosure of 
information is different m two 
environments 
The perception regarding the 
effect of disclosuie of 
information on competence is 
Tool to test 
the 
hypothesis 
Chi-squaie 
Chi-square 
No test 
applicable as 
the other state 
was absent 
Chi-square 
Chi-square 
Independent 
sample's "t" 
test 
Independent 
sample's "t" 
test 
Dependent on F 
Independent 
sample's "t" 
test 
Significance 
X'=4 565, 
p=0 020 
r = 0 268, 
p=0 608 
X'=5 625, 
p=0 018 
X'=6 667, 
p=0 010 
t=l 640, 
p=0 110 
t=3 419, 
p=0 002 
t=5 8H, 
p<0 00! 
I4A and H4B 0 
accepted 
t=3 689, 
p=0 001 
Result 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Accepted 
nly paitially 
Accepted 
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Hypothesis 
No. 
H4B 
H5 
H6 
H7 
H7A 
H7B 
H7C 
H7D 
H8 
H9 
HIO 
Statement of Null hypothesis 
dittcrcnt in two environments 
The perception regarding the 
ettettot disclosuieot 
information on reputation is 
different in two environments 
The amount ot resistanee to 
Basel II by the personnel of 
banks is different m different 
environments 
The peiception that successful 
implementation of Basel II will 
a\ert financial crises is different 
in different environments 
The readiness for 
implementation of Basel II is 
affected by type ot ownership 
Understanding of Basel II is 
related with ownership type 
Perceptions related to Relevance 
of Basel 11, its impact and 
benefits are related with type of 
ownership 
Implementation status and 
acceptability is dependent on 
type of ownership 
Pncing and Implementation 
Strategy is dependent on type of 
ownership 
Ability to beai the cost of 
implementation of Basel-II is 
related to type of ownership 
Relevance and adequacy of risk 
management processes is 
different for different types of 
ownerships 
The perception regarding the 
effect of disclosuie of 
information is different for 
different types of ownerships 
Tool to test 
the 
hypothesis 
Independent 
samples t 
test 
Independent 
samples t 
test 
Independent 
samples '1 
test 
Chi-square 
Chi-square 
No test could 
be applied as 
the other state 
was absent 
Chi-square 
Chi-squaie 
ANOVA 
ANOVA 
Signilicance 
t= 0 5-^ 2 
p=0 599 
t=0 405 
p=0 689 
t=4 369, 
p<0 001 
X^ =4 658, 
p=0 097 
X^ =6 964, 
p=0 031 
f=11250, 
p:=0 004 
X'=6 667, 
p=0 036 
F=6426, 
p=0 005 
F=:7 3I9, 
p=0003& 
F=19 215, 
p<0001 
Result 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Dependent on iOA and lOB Only partially 
accepted 
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Hypothesis 
No. 
HlOA 
HIOB 
Hll 
H12 
Statement of Null hypothesis 
The perception regarding the 
effect of disclosuie of 
information on competence is 
diffeient for different types of 
ownerships 
The perception regarding the 
effect of disclosme of 
information on reputation is 
different foi dufeient types of 
ownerships 
The amount ot resistance to 
Basel II by the personnel of 
banks is different for different 
types of ownerships 
The perception that successful 
implementation of Basel II m 
will avert financial crises is 
different for different types of 
ownerships 
Tool to test 
the 
hypothesis 
ANOVA 
ANOVA 
ANOVA 
ANOVA 
Signiticance 
F=6 641, 
p=() 00') 
F=0 276, 
p=0 761 
F=12 300, 
p<0 001 
F=45 000, 
p<0 001 
Result 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
INFERENCES 
On the basis of results obtained and analysis thereupon m the light of 
statistical tools and secondary data, the following inferences were made: 
1. Banks lack openness of information: While collecting the primary 
data for the study, the banks were reluctant to opine, share views, give 
information about their preparedness for Basel II and the current status 
in that context. At the one hand, the back office operations are being 
outsourced; the banks are keeping curtains on the less sensitive 
information despite being assured of confidentiahty As a matter of fact, 
the study was planned to be a conducted as a survey covering the entire 
study universe in both the countries, however, owing to reluctance of 
banks to participate, finally the study was finally conducted using 
[13] 
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tonvenience sdmplmg technique only Among those who responded the 
aspect of Bdsel-II posing gieatest concern for industry was found to be 
Pillar III (8" 3%), which is concerned with sharing of information 
implying that it's not going to be easy to change the tradition 
conservative appioach of bankers to conceal more and reveal less There 
are still apprehensions amongst bankers that disclosure of information 
may affect their competence (mean score 2 333+0 922) 
2. Banking universe is open for all players: Today, ownership 
restrictions on banking operations are no more existing both in UAE 
and India, the ownership of banks is diversified, there are private banks, 
public sector/government banks, cooperative banks while leaving room 
for the foreign banks too The era of nationalisation of banks seems to 
be a forgotten story, now the rule is for efficiency and performance 
3. Much demand for Improved Risk Management: Today, market 
forces govern the business - there is a solution for each demand As 
regards the risks m the financial world, everybody wants a cover against 
it It was observed during the course of study that even making the 
preparation for Basel II improved the risk management as it helped 
people to think about the potential aieas of risk 
4. Operational Risks: Cause of much worry As far as the level of 
concern of the banks was concerned operational risks under Basel-II 
attracted greatest concern This implies that the banks who participated 
in the study are still not clear about the various safeguards provided by 
the Basel II on the issues of operational risks Being relatively a recently 
covered area under Basel II, its efficacy is not fully understood by the 
respondents 
5. Banking is going to be more competitive: Majority of respondents feel 
that banking is going to be more competitive in future as the main 
[14] 
impact ot Basel-II Given the huge costs that one has to bear tor 
implementation and adaptation to Basel-II, the smallei banks aie 
apprehensive ot bemg affected and are trying to make themselves 
competent in the changed environment 
6. Much more to do to understand the concepts: Very low scores tor the 
Items related to complexity (2 33+1 18) indicate that the very basic 
concepts of Basel II are not well understood by the banks Structuring ot 
almost all the processes and business operations by banks, which usually 
were subject to discretion earlier, apprehends the banks about its 
complexity, though with the use of modem information technology 
tools, It's going to be too easy, rather than being complex 
7. Lack of right people for the right job: Basel II seems to be a complex 
riddle for the banks which though they are determined to solve, however 
as yet they have not even identified the problem (as depicted by low 
scores for identification of processes), leave apart the task of finding the 
right person for the right job Use of third party/specialized personnel to 
analyze the market risks is below the desired levels 
8. Credit Adjudication - A Paradox: With the confusing risk weight 
calculations (for eg for a corporate house rated Below BB- the 
calculated risk weight is 150% while for an unrated corporate house the 
same is 100% which is equivalent to those rated as BB+ to BB-, then 
why will one go for ratings at the first hand'^), that's why there are too 
low scores regarding the relevance of credit adjudication processes 
(2 500+1 167) Assigning objectivity to each credit seems to be distant 
dream in an economy like India - is it going to be more discretion (mean 
score 2 233+0 922) rather than objectivity that is going to rule the roost 
9. From where the money will come?: One of the key areas of concern 
emerging m the study was adequacy of financial resources (1 83+1 29), 
y\bst ract 
with the global recession on, there is concern regarding the stressed 
resources 
10. Risk Management Processes still far from desired: Very poor scores 
(1.433+1.104) were obtained for the item adequacy of risk management 
processes implying that despite much brouhaha about Basel II being an 
effective tool to manage the risks, the risk management processes as 
embodied in Basel II accord are being felt to be inadequate by the banks 
in India and UAE. This may be due to environmental dif'^ 'erences 
between the Asian and Global banking. 
11. Financial Crises - No one can predict: Asian tigers were humbled 
within a day, mighty Americans within a span of three weeks, with that 
kind of history, the burgeoning economies touching the nadir in a short 
span of time, no-one thinks that Basel II, in any case, is gomg to be a 
safe bet against a financial crisis. 
12. Credit Derivatives - Still a distant dream: Dealing in credit 
derivatives helps in utilization of resources as well as mobilization of 
resources, but the complexities, associated risks, restrictions by 
regulatory authorities and lack of knowledge about its practical 
implications make credit derivatives still a distant dream. 
13. Trident of Statistics, Data sufficiency and Modeling: Very low 
scores for statistical modeling for implementation (1.833+1.206), 
inadequacy of availability of data these are the main blockers in the path 
of achieving the goals of Basel II. In statistical tools, the forecasting is 
based on historic evidence, in the absence of adequate database, the 
statistical modeling will be adversely affected and will be lacking its 
effectiveness. 
14. Environment Plays a role: As regards the issues related to clarity of 
the concepts and preparedness, the mean scores for items complexity 
_ _ 
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cind provisions lor iisks adding to costs ot operations the Indian banks 
seem to have significantly higher positive lesponses as compared to the 
banks in UAE, thereby tinderscoring the significance of ei vironment, 
however, in case of issues related to relevance of Basel II, its impact and 
benefits in two different environments the itemwise differences were 
more pronounced showing shifting of swings from item to item in either 
direction, the mean scores for relevance of credit adjudication and 
relevance of capital allocation processes had significantly higher 
positive scores as compared to those in UAE while for items such as 
adequacy ot risk management processes, relevance of risk management 
processes, increase in liabilities of staff on personal level, increase in 
personal discretion, disclosure of information affecting competence, 
reduction of risk with specified provisions, environment not suitable for 
development of credit derivative markets, UAE banks had significantly 
higher positive scores as compared to banks in India However, on the 
issue of implementation status and acceptability no significant 
difference between the two environments, thereby implying that despite 
readiness, preparedness, impact assessments and perceived notions 
about benefits - there is still confusion while implementing the accord 
15. Does ownership matter?: Most of the times yes' As regards basic 
understanding of concepts and preparedness the foreign banks seem to 
be have higher understanding than the government and private banks, in 
this regard government banks seem to lag much behind On the issues 
related to relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits too foreign banks 
take the lead while government banks and private banks assume the 
second fiddle for different items On the implementation and 
acceptability front too the foreign banks are on the driver's seat while 
private banks are on the pillion seat, as regards government banks they 
can be said to be following the former two on a bicycle 
_ _ 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. The study pointed out that there is lack of complete understanding on 
the main spirit of New Basel Capital Accord through the three pillars 
specified in the Accord and their implementation in the Banks across 
India and UAE is half-hearted, for which understanding of the concepts, 
financial resources, inadequacy of data and prevalent practices related to 
risk management and credit adjudication are responsible. 
2. In both the countries, regulatory authority is exercising greater controls, 
though in UAE, the grounds are not open for private banks as yet. 
Though UAE lacks a rich history of commercial banking as compared to 
India, yet the practices adapted by it and progress made by it are 
outstanding. Still banking on the burgeoning oil economy, the UAE 
banks have lesser experience of facing the market adversities as 
compared to Indian banks. The regulatory guidance of the Indian banks 
was driven for a long time by the emphasis on long time apart from 
being a part of mixed economy. However, the common things between 
these two nations' economy and banking systems niiay be that both 
systems are working towards achieving a stable economy. 
3. Major areas of concerns/obstacle in respect to implementing the Basel II 
in the banks with special reference to commercial banks in India and 
UAE were related to lack of clarity about basic concepts, lack of 
financial resources, apprehensions regarding dissemination of 
information leading to competitive disadvantage and doubts related to 
relevance of various provisions in the Basel II accord, inexperience of 
working with a systematic and structured approach was also one of the 
major impediments. 
Most of the banks in India and UAE follow the standardised approach as 
per the guidelines of the regulating authority to cover the operational risk. 
credit risk and market risk, being it a relatively new field, they are not yet using 
the moie advanced tools, tor lack of experience as well as resources - both 
financial and manpower However, in the long-term they are inclined to use 
more sophisticated and advanced tools too, Pillar 2 ot Basel II accord in terms 
of preparedness and implementation seems to be have no strong hold on the 
ground, there are a number ot laggards both conceptual and perceptional, as 
well as adequacy of resources and pressure of meeting the deadlines - the 
building blocks of the Pillar 2 are being stacked hastily without giving them a 
concrete basis on which they can strongly hold the weight ot the changing 
banking scenario of tomorrow As regards Pillar III of the Basel III accord is 
concerned, there is almost no inclination towards implementing this in its true 
spirit The long history of concealing than revealing cannot be changed in a day 
- meeting the deadlines in this connections seems to be one of the most 
difficult tasks It's yet immature to forecast business benefits in such 
atmospheie filled with utmost confusion and uncertainty, half heartedness and 
meeting the time frames 
SUGGESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL II 
S.No. 
1 
2 
Findings 
Major Industry Concerns -
Complexity, Risk coverage 
and Pillar III 
Enhanced competition 
Recommendations 
1 As Basel II utilizes the advanced statistical 
modeling tools, which are relatively new to use, 
appropriate tiaining should be ai ranged by the 
regulatory authority 
2 The distinction between use of traditional methods 
of risk coverage and those proposed by Basel II 
should be made emphasizing the evidence-based 
superionty of Basel II models 
3 Pillar III IS basically concerned with Financial 
communication and market discipline foi which 
Regulatory authority should make strict rules with 
constant audits/monitonng 
Newer areas / maikets for financial institutions 
should be identified, awareness regarding importance 
[ 1 9 ] 
y\bstract 
S.No. FindinsA Recommendations 
ot quality o< seivice rather than |usl quantity ot 
seiviLe should be cieated Banks should undeisland 
the relevance ot untraditional banking, niche 
marketing, efc _ ^ 
Indian Banking Association should include Risk 
Assessment in Context to Basel II and Financial 
Communication and Market Discipline as two papers 
in Its Associateship examinations Similar action is 
also recommended for the appropriate authority in 
UAE (Emirates Institute ot Banking & Financial 
Studies) as the situation was similar in both the 
countries Inclusion ot foreign bank executives as 
mstructoi foi CAIIB and Banking Diploma 
programmes in respective countiies 
Low Scores on Basic 
Understanding of Concepts 
Foreign banks having 
relatively higher scores 
Relevance of Basel-II its 
impact and benefits 
Piivate sector plaveis 
showing lelatneh loH 
scores 
In training itself use of simulated modeling, 
situational analysis case studies should be 
exhaustively done To promote and create awareness, 
a special periodical should be published, wherein the 
contributors should be encouraged to present their 
views on different aspects of Basel-II A toll-free 
help-desk should be established by the regulatory 
authority wherein doubts related to various aspects of 
Basel-II could be removed On the branch levels. 
Problem Based Learning Model facilitated by Peer 
Group should be adapted with meetings at a regular 
interval A reward system at cucle/zonal levels for 
the branches pioviding maximum/best solutions 
should be started 
In India, the impact in terms of enhanced personal 
responsibility and liability is much pronounced - it 
simply underlines that cunently in India banking 
sector jobs have become less attractive owing to 
enhanced responsibilities and low remuneration -
with increase in responsibilities and liabilities -
proper compensation should be ensured 
For private banks, a mandatory training programme 
IS recommended at each level, compliance to which 
should be monitored strictly and should be 
incorporated m the personnel appraisal system too 
Low acceptability on 
intellectual functions, 
adequate acceptability on 
physical facility creation 
Basel II unplementation is not a programme 
dependent solely on creation of physical facilities 
and forgetting the intellectual facilities, m contrast it 
depends on use of more of intellectual abilities and 
thereby i educing dependence on physical facilities 
[20] 
Abstract 
S.No. Findings Recommendations 
l()Hii>n hanks showmv, a 
ielali\eh sltenf^thenecl 
position 
Keeping in view the above observation, Banks 
should liy lo attiael the best intellectual talent in their 
told Establishment ot protcssional institutions 
spetifitaliy targeted for banking sector should be 
given priority Collaboration with existing 
institutions such as those related to Risk Assessment 
and Management should also be enhanced with 
special emphasis on development of curricula for 
different levels of banking professionals 
Study of the practices of foreign banks should also be 
conducted in order lo leain tiom then expeiience 
Low scoies on Pi icing and 
Implementation Stiategy 
Relativel) higher <;cores of 
UAE banks on pi icing 
stiategy. 
Better coordination between various channels 
involved in stiategic decisions will result in ha\ing a 
better pricing and implementation strategy Both foi 
pricing and implementation issue coordination upto 
branch level is also necessary Use of better 
communication technology is the key Structuring the 
pricing processes will reduce reliance on decisions 
on discretion basis, rather it will result in timely 
responsiveness to changing environment 
UAE banks have better pricing strategies as they 
were thriving in a burgeoning economy, where they 
could have chaiged puce for each service offered by 
them, an international exchange programme will help 
in understanding the issues involved in determination 
of a pricing strategy and them applying them 
effectively 
GENERAL SUGGESTION 
1. Creation of Awareness, clearing concepts, education regarding the 
benefits of Basel II implementation should be done more intensely by 
the appropriate authorities. 
2. All the stakeholders should be made aware that risk management should 
be viewed as an opportunity to increase shareholder value and not just as 
a loss-avoidance technique 
[21] 
y\bstract 
2. The study has been academic in nature. Hence, the sample size chosen 
has been one based on teasibihty The study could been more extensive. 
3. The sample size chosen for the study could be a limitation. 
4. Lack of availability of published books in UAE libraries has been a 
handicap. 
5. Time and cost have been limiting factors. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The present research was the first in its nature for not only takmg into 
account the physical preparedness but also taking note of various perceptions 
and beliefs of the strategy-makers. The study points out the need of increased 
education as regards the understanding of the Basel II. As Basel II should be 
viewed as a continued process towards improvement and value addition for 
shareholders and not just as a tool to minimize the loss, further improvements, 
change in the mindset of decision makers with experience will change the 
situation giving room for further research to understand the impact more 
clearly. 
[23] 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to Basel Accord 
1.1.1 History 
In 1974, the central banks governors of the G-10 countries namelf 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the 
United-Kingdom and the United States of America plus Luxembourg and 
Switzerland (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004b: 1) formed i 
committee under the name of "Committee of Banking Regulations and 
Supervision". 
The representatives have meetings regularly at the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) based in Basel to discuss the stakes related to 
their responsibilities. Although the Basel Committee does not have any legal 
state or international power, it introduces the norms of references and general 
directives and formulates recommendations in respect with good practices 
which all members commit themselves to implement. Individual authorities are 
encouraged to implement these standards through detailed arrangements -
statutory or otherwise which are best suited to their own national systems 
(Insurance Advisory Board, 2002:1). 
In 1980s, with the increase in globalisation of banking activities due to 
explosion of market activities the risk of share capital loss for banks were felt. 
The evolution of the financial environment, the development of markets 
worldwide, and also the will to limit the systemic crisis (that is to say a series 
of bankruptcy of the economic actors); lead the supervisors to revise the 
conception of their role. 
In 1988, it was agreed that the recommendation for "Minimum 
Requirements for Capital Adequacy of Internationally Active Banks" initially 
Qhafter-] 
be implemented by internationally active banks in the GIO countries, thereafter 
the widespread acceptance of this norm led to it gradually becoming the 
recognized standard in over 100 countries. 
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord and its amendments have undoubtedly 
been of great importance in building a safe and stable financial system by 
setting a common minimum level of capital requirements. 
In 1998, the Basel Committee introduced for the banks exercising their 
activities abroad a new set called "Basel Accord" which defines capital 
adequacy standards the banks must respect according to the risks they took. 
The international solvency ratio, called Cooke ratio (after the President of the 
Basel Committee) came into existence with a simple and near uniform rule of 
8% as a maximum leverage {i.e. for 100 weighted assets, the Bank must set 
aside 8 in Share Capital). (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2004b: 12) 
Above all, this recommendation now referred to as "Basel I" set 
important international standards in three ways: 
Firstly, despite great differences of opinion, the recognition of the 
constituents of capital was largely harmonized - since then; capital has been 
sub-divided into core capital (Tier 1) and supplementary capital (Tier 2). 
Secondly, risk rates for exposures were set. The framework of weights is 
considered to be too broad by today's standards and is the main reason for the 
amendment; the framework was also methodically limited by data processing 
and risk measurement capabilities available at the time. 
Thirdly, the important minimum ratios for Tier 1 capital (4% of 
weighted exposures) and total capital (8% of weighted exposures) were set. 
These ratios are also frequently known as the BIS Tier 1 Capital Ratio or the 
BIS Capital Ratio, after the seat of the Basel Committee at the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). 
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However, during the last decade financial markets have undergone 
significant changes, which resulted in increased criticism of the current Accord. 
In June 1999, in its attempt to close loopholes and re-establish a level 
playing field the Basel Committee started a process of establishing a new 
accord, which would correct the existing distortions and adjust the new Accord 
to the changed realities in the financial system the First Consultative Paper, "A 
New Capital Adequacy Framework", was published to replace Basel I and all 
interested institutions were requested to submit comments by March 31, 2000 
on this framework for a more risk-oriented revision of the 1988 Capital Accord. 
The New Capital Adequacy Framework has since then become known as the 
New Basel Capital Accord or "Basel 11". 
In January 2001, following evaluation and revision, a Second 
Consultative Paper was published on with a deadlme for comments of May 31, 
2001. This proposed for the first time the application of internal rating 
procedures to set capital charges for credit risk. The unsatisfactory and 
disappointing results of the Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS I and in particular 
QIS 2), the magnitude of the unresolved areas of regulation and not the least 
the high quality of the comments received prompted the Basel Committee to 
propose a third consultation round, which had been categorically rejected in 
January 2001. 
In April 2003, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
consultative paper entitled "New Basel Capital Accord" (Proposed New 
Accord). The Proposed New Accord set forth a "three pillar" framework 
encompassing risk-based capital requirements for credit risk, market risk, and 
operational risk (Pillar I); supervisory review of capital adequacy (Pillar II); 
and market discipline through enhanced public disclosures (Pillar III). The 
Proposed New Accord incorporated several methodologies for determining a 
bank's risk-based capital requirements for credit, market, and operational risk. 
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Bank Soundness 
Pillar I I Pillar II | Pillar III 
Source: The Significance of Basel 1 and Basel 2 for the Future of the Banking Industry 
with Special Emphasis on Credit Information-Maher Hasan Central Bank of 
Jordan 
Figure 1: Bank soundness 
Although the proposal was based on the same principles of promoting 
safety and stability of financial system and enhancing competitive equality as 
the current Accord, it also attempted to fill the gaps created by the divergence 
between the regulatory content of the 1988 Accord and innovations that have 
occurred in the financial instruments available to banks ever since its inception. 
" 1.1.2 Background of Basel Accord 
Banks were highly regulated and protected entities with hardly any 
competition among them till late 1970. Collapse of the Bretton Woods 
agreement put them in a new environment of increased competition, leading to 
gradual erosion of capital that started to alarm the regulators. Dealing with the 
problem on international level seemed to be the only possible way of finding a 
proper solution without increasing competitive differences between banks fi"om 
individual countries. Hence, a special committee was set up under the auspices 
of the Banlc for International Settlements in Basel. Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices or shortly the Basel Committee was 
established in 1974 by the governors of central banks of the Group of Ten 
(GIO) countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Svi^ itzerland, United Kingdom and USA) and Luxemburg. Its work 
focused on strengthening the soundness and stability of the international 
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banking system, and reducing the distortion of competition between 
international banks. The Basel Committee's meetings are usually held at the 
Bank for International Settlements. 
1.1.3 BasellAccord 
The committee, initially known as the Cooke Committee and later 
renamed the Basel Committee, formed a proposal in which it suggested that a 
common framework for calculating the capital adequacy of banks should be 
formed. This document, known as the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, was 
published in July 1988 and fully implemented by end of 1992. The document 
set out the calculation of capital adequacy ratio with the definition of capital 
and credit risk became a huge success after its adoption - it not only managed 
to level the playing field, but it also brought national practices on capital 
adequacy of banks in line 
The 1988 Accord has been supplemented a number of times, with most 
changes dealing with the treatment of off-balance-sheet activities. A significant 
amendment was enacted in 1996, when the Committee introduced a measure 
whereby trading positions in bonds, equities, foreign exchange and 
commodities were removed from the credit risk framework and given explicit 
capital charges related to the bank's open position in each instrument Bank of 
International Settlement (BIS) (2001). Over time the accord has become 
internationally accepted with more than 100 countries applying the Basel 
framework to their banking system. Since the implementation of the 1988 
Accord and later amendments, capital ratios of nearly all internally active 
banks have increased substantially, thus reinforcing the solidity of the 
international banking system. The widespread adoption in many countries 
fostered competitive equality. 
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• 1.1.4 Pitfalls of Basell Accord 
However, the financial world has evolved significantly during the past 
ten years, to the point where a bank's capital ratio, calculated using the 1988 
Accord, may not always be a good indicator of its financial condition. The 
current risk weighting of assets results, at best, is a crude measure of economic 
risk, primarily because degrees of credit risk exposure are not sufficiently 
calibrated to differentiate adequately borrowers' differing default risks. 
Further, increased market volatility as well as incidents such as the 
Asian and Russian monetary crises, the collapse of Barings, problems with 
Sumitomo Capital and the near collapse of Long Term Capital Hedge Fund, 
prompted a new look at the capital accord with a view to preparing a 
comprehensive and detailed update that attempts to address some of the 
underlying factors that caused the incidents. 
• 1.1.5 Features of the New Basel II Capital Accord 
(Third Consultative Paper) 
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Basel Capital Accord for the European Banking Industries " 
Figure 2: Temple of Basel II 
In June 2004, the BCBS issued a document entitled ''International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised 
Framework"" (New Accord or Basel 11). (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2004). The New Accord recognizes developments in financial 
products, incorporates advances in risk measurement and management 
practices, and assesses capital requirements that are generally more sensitive to 
risk. It is intended for use by individual countries as the basis for national 
consultation and implementation. 
The capital framework proposed in the New Basel Accord consists of 
three pillars, each of which reinforces the other. The first pillar, which 
establishes the way to quantify the minimum capital requirements, is 
complemented with two qualitative pillars, concerned with organizing the 
regulator's supervision and establishing market discipline through public 
disclosure of the way that banks implement the Accord. This proposed three-
pillar system of determining capital adequacy both revises and upgrades the 
1988 Capital Accord. 
The Objectives of the new accord (Basel 2) -as outlined by Basel 
committee- are: 
**** Promote safety and soundness in the financial system; 
**** Enhance competitive equality; 
<• Constitute a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks; 
•> Develop approaches to capital adequacy that are appropriately sensitive 
to the degree of risk involved in a banks' positions and activities; and 
**** Focus on internationally active banks and at the same time keep the 
underlying principles suitable for application to banks of varying levels 
of complexity and sophistication. 
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Basel II framework has substantive breadth and depth. It prescribes 
different approaches for different sized banks and/or domestic versus 
internationally active banks and recognizes properly different buckets of assets 
and assigns risk weights while incorporating the quality of issues/assets 
through rating mechanism. To allow this flexibility Basel 11 is elaborate and is 
bedecked with three mutually reinforcing pillars: 
• Minimum capital requirement (MCR -Pillar I) 
• Supervisory review process (Pillar II) 
• Market Discipline (Pillar III) 
All tturee pillars complement each other to form an overarching risk-
management structure for the promotion of financial stability. 
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Figure 3: Proposed structure of new Basel Accord 
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1.1.5.1 Pillar I Minimum capital requirement 
The Pillar I sets out minimum capital requirements. The new framework 
maintains both the current definition of capital and the minimum requirement 
of 8 percent of capital to risk-weighted assets. To ensure that risks within the 
entire banking group are considered, the revised Accord will be extended on a 
consolidated basis to holding companies of banking groups. The pillar provides 
for minimum capital requirement for 3 main risks i.e. credit risk, operational 
risk and market risk. 
1.1.5.1.1. Definition of capital 
Basel I defines capital based on two tiers: 
1. Tier 1 (Core Capital): Tier 1 capital includes stock issues (or shareholder's 
equity) and declared reserves, such as loan loss reserves set aside to cushion 
future losses or for smoothing out income variations. 
2. Tier 2 (Supplementary Capital): Tier 2 capital includes all other capital 
such as gains on investment assets, long-term debt with maturity greater 
than five years and hidden reserves (i.e. excess allowance for losses on 
loans and leases). However, short-term unsecured debts (or debts without 
guarantees), are not included in the definition of capital. 
Total capital is defined in the formula below: 
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Figure 4: Definition of the capital ratio 
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The main changes will come from the inclusion of the operational risk 
and the approaches to measure the different kinds of risks. 
The definition of capital in Basel 2 will not modify and that the 
minimum ratios of capital to risk-weighted assets including operational and 
market risks will remain 8% for total capital. Tier 2 capital will continue to be 
limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital. 
1.1.5.1.2 Types of Risk 
1.1.5.1.2.1 Credit Risk 
Credit Risk is defined as the risk weighted asset (RWA) of the bank, which 
are banks assets weighted in relation to their relative credit risk levels. 
According to Basel I, the total capital should represent at least 8% of the bank's 
credit risk (RWA). In addition, the Basel agreement identifies three types of 
credit risks; 
• The on-balance sheet risk (see Table 1 for example). 
• The trading off-balance sheet risk. These are derivatives, namely interest 
rates, foreign exchange, equity derivatives and commodities. 
• The non-trading off-balance sheet risk. These include general guarantees, 
such as forward purchase of assets or transaction-related debt assets. 
Let's take a look at some calculations related to RWA and capital 
requirement. Table 1 displays predefined categories of on-balance sheet 
exposures, such as vulnerability to loss from an unexpected event, weighted 
according to four relative risk categories. 
Risk Weight 
0% 
20% 
50% 
100% 
Asset Class 
Cash and gold held in the bank. 
Obligation on OECD governments and U.S. treasuries 
Claims on OECD banks. 
Securities issued by U.S. government agencies, claims on municipalities 
Residential mortgages 
All other claims such as corporate bonds, less-developed countries' debt, 
claims on non-OECD banks, equities, real estate, plant and equipment. 
Source: Michael K Ong "Internal Credit Risk Models, Capital Allocation and Performance 
Measurement (J 999) 
Table 1: Basel's Classification of risk weights of on-balance sheet assets 
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As shown in Table 2, there is an unsecured loan of $ 1,000 to a non-bank, 
which requires a risk weight of 100%. The RWA is therefore calculated as 
RWA=$1,000 X 100%=$1,000. By using Formula 2, a minimum 8% capital 
requirement gives 8% x RWA=8% ^$1,000=$80. In other words, the total 
capital holding of the firm must be $80 related to the unsecured loan of $1,000. 
Calculation under different risk weights for different types of assets are 
presented in Table 2. 
Asset Category 
Treasury Bond 
Municipal Bond 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Unsecured loan 
Risk 
Weight 
0% 
20% 
50% 
100% 
Capital 
Ratio 
8% 
8% 
8% 
8% 
Amount 
$1,000 
$1,000 
$1,000 
$1,000 
RWA 
$0 
$200 
$500 
$1,000 
Minimal 
Capital 
Requirement 
$0 
$16 
$40 
$80 
Source: Investopedia. com 
Table 2: Calculation of RWA and capital requirement on-balance sheet assets 
1.1.5.1.2.1.1 Approaches to measure Credit Risk 
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Figure 5: Approach to measure credit risk 
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1.1.5.1.2.1.1.1 Standardized Approach (a modified version of the existing 
approach). 
The standardized approach is conceptually the same as the present 
Accord, but it is more risk sensitive. The bank allocates a risk-weight to each of 
its assets and off balance-sheet positions and produces a sum of risk-weighted 
asset values. A risk weight of 100% means that an exposure is included in the 
calculation of risk weighted assets at its full value, which translates into a 
capital charge equal to 8% of that value. Similarly, a risk weigh of 20% results 
in a capital charges of 1.6%. Because of its simplicity it is expected that it will 
be used by a large number of banks around the globe for, calculating minimum 
capital requirements. 
Under Basel 1 individual risk weights depend on the board category of 
borrower (i.e. sovereigns, banks or corporates). Under Basel II the risk weights 
are to be refined by reference to a rating provided by an external credit 
assessment institution (such as a rating agency) that meets strict standards. For 
example, for corporate lending, the existing Accord provides only one risk 
weigh category of 100% but the new Accord will provide four categories (20%), 
50%, 100% and 150%). The following table illustrates the relation between the 
risk weights and credit assessment for corporate lending. 
Credit 
Assessment 
Risk weight 
AAA to AA-
20% 
A+ to A-
50% 
BBB+ to 
BBB-
100% 
Below 
BB-
150% 
Unrated 
100% 
Source: Adapted from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004b, Internal 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards Pg 15 
Table 3: the relation between the risk weights and credit assessment for 
corporate lending 
Banks' exposures to the lowest rated corporates are captured in the 
150% risk-weight category. 150% risk-weight can be assigned for example to 
unsecured portions of assets that are past due for more than 90 days, net of 
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specific provisions. Similar frameworks for sovereigns and banks credit risk 
weighs will be applied. 
For bank's exposures to sovereigns, the Basel II proposes the use of 
published credit scores of export credit agencies (ECA) and developed a 
method for mapping such ratings to the standardized risk buckets. 
The standardised approach is a simple rules-based approach designed to 
address some of the shortcomings of Basel I. The suggested risk weightings for 
some of the main different claims will now be reflected. 
•t* Claims on sovereigns 
Claims on sovereigns and their central banks will be risk weighted as 
follows: 
Credit 
Assessment 
Risk weight 
AAA to 
AA-
0% 
A+to 
A-
20% 
BBB+ 
to 
BBB-
50% 
BB+to 
B-
100% 
Below 
B-
150% 
Unrated 
100% 
Source: Adapted from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004b, Internal 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards Pg 15 
Table 4: Claim on sovereign and risk weights 
The notations used follow the methodology used by one institution, 
Standard & Poor's. 
The use of Standard & Poor's credit ratings is an example only as other 
credit assessment institutions may well be used. Claims on the Bank for 
International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Central Bank and the European Community may receive a U%) risk weight. 
Since sovereign risk is currently risk-weighted at 10%) under Basel 1, the 
risk weightings under Basel II will have a significant impact on the amount of 
capital required for this type of exposure. Banks may have to reconsider 
whether they still want to participate in this market segment and if so, how it 
will affect the pricing of products. 
*l* Claims on non-central government public sector entities (PSEs) 
Claims on domestic PSEs will be risk weighted at national discretion, 
according to either option 1 or option 2 for claims on banks. When option 2 is 
selected, it is to be applied without the use of the preferential treatment for 
short-term claims. Subject to national discretion, claims on certain domestic 
PSEs may also be treated as claims on the sovereigns in whose jurisdictions the 
PSEs are established. 
The following examples outline how PSEs might be categorised when 
focusing on one specific feature, namely revenue raising powers. 
Regional governments and local authorities could qualify for the same 
treatment as claims on their sovereign if they have specific revenue raising 
powers and have specific institutional arrangements the effect of which is to 
reduce their risks of default. 
Administrative bodies responsible to central governments, regional 
governments or to local authorities owned by the governments or local 
authorities may not warrant the same treatment as claims on their sovereign if 
the entities have no revenue raising powers. If strict lending rules apply to these 
entities, then it may be appropriate to treat these claims in the same way as 
claims on banks. Commercial undertakings owned by governments or by local 
authorities may be treated as a corporate in competitive markets even though 
the state is a major shareholder (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2004b: 16). 
Banks currently enjoy significant capital requirement benefits on its 
exposures to PSEs as the risk weighting is only 10%. This lower capital 
requirement allowed banks to price credit risk lower than corporate in general 
because the return on equity is far superior. The Basel II changes will have a 
significant impact on both the borrower and lender of this market segment. 
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*t* Claims on banks 
There are two options for claims on banks. National supervisors will 
apply one option to all banks in their jurisdiction. Under the first option, all 
banks incorporated in a given country will be assigned a risk weight one 
category less favourable than that assigned to claims on the sovereign of that 
country. However, for claims on banks in countries with sovereigns rated BB+ 
to B- and on banks in unrated countries, the risk weight will be capped at 100%. 
The second option bases the risk weighting on the external credit 
assessment of the bank itself with claims on unrated banks being risk-weighted 
at 50%. Under this option, a preferential risk weight that is one category more 
favourable may be applied to claims with an original maturity of three months 
or less, subject to a floor of 20%. will not be available to banks risk weighted at 
150%. The two options are summarised in the tables below. 
Risk weightings for banks under option 1 and 2 
Option 1 
Credit 
Assessment of 
sovereign 
Risk weight 
under Option 1 
AAA to 
AA-
20% 
A+to 
A-
50% 
BBB+ 
to BBB-
100% 
BB+to 
B-
100% 
Below 
B-
150% 
Unrated 
100% 
Option 2 
Credit 
Assessment of 
Banks 
Risk weight 
under Option 2 
Risk weight for 
short term 
claims under 
Option 2 
AAA to 
AA-
20% 
20% 
A+to 
A-
50% 
20% 
BBB+ 
to BBB-
50% 
20% 
BB+to 
B-
100% 
20% 
Below 
B-
150% 
150% 
Unrated 
100% 
20% 
Source: Adapted from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004b, Internal 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. 
Table 5: Risk weight options available to banks 
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*t* Claims on corporates 
The table provided below illustrates the risk weighting of rated 
corporate claims. The standard risk weight for unrated claims on corporate will 
be 100%. No claim on an unrated corporate may be given a risk weight 
preferential to that assigned to its sovereign of incorporation. 
Credit 
Assessment 
Risk weight 
AAA to 
AA-
20% 
A+ to A-
50% 
BBB+ to 
BBB-
100% 
Below B-
150% 
Unrated 
100% 
Risk weightings for corporate- Source: Adapted from Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2004b, Internal Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards. 
Table 6: Risk weightings for corporate 
Under Basel 1 all corporate risk exposures were risk weighted at 100%). 
The differentiated risk weightings under Basel II will have an impact on market 
segmentation and product offerings. 
**** Claims included in the regulatory retail portfolios 
Claims that qualify under the criteria listed below may be considered as 
retail claims for regulatory capital purposes and included in a regulatory retail 
portfolio and may therefore be risk weighted at 15%. This risk weighting is 
lower than the existing 100% under Basel 1. This may result in banks 
aggressively marketing their products to this segment as they can either lower 
their pricing or have an increased return on equity (ROE). An increase in 
competition may negate the benefits stated above. To be included in the 
regulatory retail portfolio, claims must meet the following four criteria: 
• Orientation criterion - The exposure is to an individual person or to a small 
business; 
• Product criterion - The exposure takes the form of any of the following: 
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Revolving credits and lines of credit (including credit cards and 
overdrafts), personal term loans and leases (e.g. instalment loans and 
personal finance).Mortgages are excluded as they qualify for different 
treatment; 
• Granularity criterion - The supervisor must be satisfied that the portfolio is 
sufficiently diversified. One way of achieving this may be to set a 
numerical limit that no aggregate exposure to one party can exceed 0.2% of 
the overall portfolio; 
• Low value of individual exposures - The maximum aggregated retail 
exposure to one party cannot exceed an absolute threshold of €1 million. 
•J* Claims secured by residential property and commercial real estate 
Lending fully secured by mortgages on residential property that is or 
will be occupied by the borrower, or that is rented, will be risk weighted at 
35% compared to 50% under Basel 1. This change in the risk weightings is 
likely to have a positive impact on banks with large mortgage exposures. In 
view of the experience in numerous countries that commercial property lending 
has been a recurring cause of troubled assets in the banking industry over the 
past few decades, mortgages on commercial real estate do not, in principle, 
justify other than a 100% weighting on the loans secured. 
•J* Higher risk categories 
The following claims will be risk weighted at 150% or higher: 
• Claims on sovereigns, PSEs and banks rated below B-. 
• Claims on corporates rated below BB-
• Past due loans 
• Securitisation tranches that are rated between BB+ and BB- will be risk 
weighted at 350%. 
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National supervisors may decide to apply a 150% or higher risk 
weighting reflecting the higher risks associated with some other assets, such as 
venture capital and private equity investments. This will have an impact on the 
market segments and product offerings. Since these areas are seen as high risk, 
they will have an internal impact on the bank in the form of capital 
management and disclosure requirements. 
1.1.5.1.2.1.1.2 Foundation Internal Rating Based Approach (IRB). 
Compared to the current Accord, the IRB approach is fundamentally 
different in concept, design and implementation. Consistent with the Basel 
Committee's objectives, it is intended to produce a capital requirement more 
closely linked to each bank's actual credit risks. The IRB approach is built to 
take advantage of two main principals. 
First, it is designed to take advantage of the bank's own information 
about the quality of its assets. 
Second, it is designed to promote and take advantage of best practices in 
risk management. There is relative unanimity in the industry that IRB is a 
major step towards aligning capital with true economic grounds. 
Banks using the Foundation IRB will estimate the Probability of Default, 
("PD") relating to each borrower, while the bank supervisors will supply the 
other inputs, i.e. Loss given Default ("LGD") and Exposure at Default 
("EAD") as primary inputs into the capital requirement calculation. (Section 
III.B, § 23 - 30, of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001a). 
Two aspects of the IRB qualification requirements worth mentioning 
are: 
1. External data sources are allowed, which could include data pooling among 
banks and adopting data from credit rating agencies. 
Qhapter- J 
2. In order to use IRB, banks must have five years of historical PD data. At the 
time of the implementation of Basel II, the requirement would be only two 
years, which will grow to five within the first three years. 
The IRB approach is based on four key parameters used to estimate 
credit risks (Saidenberg and Schuermann, 2003:8): 
Regulatory Capital = 8% x Risk Weighted Assets 
Risk Weighted Asset = Asset x Risk Weight = Capital Requirement x 12.50 x EAD 
Capital requirement = ZGD.AJ^-"(^)ir"'"(0 
Vr; xEAD 
PD = Probability of Default - it measures the likelihood that the borrower will default 
over a given time horizon (measured in decimals) 
LGD= Loss Given Default - measures the proportion of the exposure that will be lost if 
a defauh occurs (measured in decimals) 
EAD = Exposure at Default - it measures the loan commitments, the amount of the 
facility that is likely to be drawn if default occurs (measured in currency) 
M = Maturity - measures the remaining economic maturitj' of the exposure 
Figure 6: Internal ratings based approach formulas 
For a given maturity, these parameters are used to estimate two types of 
expected loss (EL). 
Expected loss as an amount: EL = PD x LGD x EAD 
And expected loss as a percentage of exposure at default: EL% = PD x LGD 
For the foundation approach only PD may be assigned internally, subject 
to supervisory review (Pillar II). LGD is fixed and based on supervisory values, 
e.g. 45% for senior unsecured claims and 75% for subordinated claims. EAD is 
also based on supervisory values in cases where the measurement is not clear, 
e.g. EAD is 75% for irrevocable undrawn commitments. Finally a single 
average maturity of 2,5 years is assumed for the portfolio. 
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Risk weighted assets for various exposures 
Using the above information there are formulas to calculate the risk 
weighted assets, which have different asset correlations in their formulas. 
Under the IRB approach for corporate credits, banks will be permitted to 
separately distinguish exposures to SME borrowers (defined as corporate 
exposures where the reported sale for the consolidated group of which the firm 
is a part is less than €50 million) from those to large firms. A firm size 
adjustment is made to the corporate risk weight formula, which results in a 
lower risk weighting for this category of assets. 
Banks that do not meet the requirements for the estimation of PD under 
the IRB approach for specialised lending assets will be required to map their 
internal grades to five supervisory categories, each of which is associated with 
a specific risk weight. A satisfactory level can be converted into a risk 
weighting of 115%. Besides the impact of the IRB approach on market 
segments and product offerings, it will also have a significant internal impact 
on the financial institutions in the form of costs, different decision-making 
methodologies and capital management. The IRB approaches may also have a 
global impact on the banks as it could accentuate the business cycle and it may 
result in an increase in merger activities as the different approaches may result 
in competitive advantages. 
Categorisation of exposures 
Under the IRB approach, banks must categorise banking book exposures 
into broad classes of assets with different underlying risk characteristics. The 
classes of assets are corporate, sovereign, bank, retail and equity. Within the 
corporate asset class, five sub-classes of specialised lending are separately 
identified. Within the retail asset class, three sub-classes are separately 
identified. 
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Definition of corporate exposures 
Banks are permitted to distinguish separately exposures to small-and 
medium-sized entities (SME) as defined below. Within the corporate asset class, 
five sub-classes of specialised lending (SL) are identified. Such lending 
possesses all of the following characteristics, either in legal form or economic 
substance: 
• The exposure is typically to an entity (often a special purpose entity) which 
was created specifically to finance and/or operate physical assets; 
• The borrowing entity has little or no other material assets or activities, and 
therefore little or no independent capacity to repay the obligation other than 
the income that it receives from the asset being financed; 
• The terms of the obligation give the lender a substantial degree of control 
over the asset and the income that it generates; and 
• As a result of the preceding factors, the primary source of repayment of the 
obligation is the income generated by the asset, rather than the independent 
capacity of a broader commercial enterprise. 
The five sub-classes are project finance, object finance, commodities 
finance, income producing real estate and high-volatility commercial real estate. 
Definition of sovereign and bank exposures 
These asset classes are defined in the same manner as the standardised 
approach, which is defined in paragraph above. 
Definition of retail exposures 
An exposure is categorised as a retail exposure if it meets all of the 
following criteria: 
• Nature of borrower or low value of individual exposures 
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• Exposures to individuals - such as revolving credits and lines of credit (e.g. 
credit cards and overdrafts) as well as personal term loans and leases are 
generally eligible for retail treatment regardless of exposure size. 
• Residential mortgage loans are eligible for retail treatment regardless of 
exposure size so long as the credit is extended to an individual that is an 
owner-occupier of the property. 
• Loans extended to small businesses and managed as retail exposures are 
eligible for retail treatment provided the total exposure of the bank to such a 
borrower is less than €1 million. 
Large number of exposures 
• The exposure must be one of a large pool of exposures, which are managed 
by the bank on a pooled basis. 
Within the retail asset class category, banks are required to identify 
separately three sub-classes of exposures: (a) exposures secured by residential 
properties as defined above, (b) qualifying revolving retail exposures, as 
defined below, and (c) all other retail exposures. 
Definition of qualifying revolving retail exposures 
All of the following criteria must be satisfied for a sub-portfolio to be 
treated as a qualifying revolving retail exposure (QRRE). These criteria must 
be applied at a sub portfolio level consistent with the bank's segmentation of its 
retail activities generally. 
• The exposures are revolving, unsecured, and uncommitted. 
• The exposures are to individuals. 
• The maximum exposure to a single individual in the sub-portfolio is 
€100,000. 
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• Because of a more favourable risk weighting for these assets, banks must 
demonstrate that the use of the QRRE risk weight function is constrained to 
portfolios that have exhibited low volatility of loss rates. 
• Data on loss rates must be retained in order to allow analysis of the 
volatility of loss rates. 
• The supervisor must concur that treatment as a QRRE is consistent with the 
underlying risk characteristics. 
Definition of equity exposures 
An instrument is considered to be an equity exposure if it meets all of 
the following requirements: 
• It is redeemable in the sense that the return of invested funds can be 
achieved only by the sale of the investment; 
• It does not embody an obligation on the part of the issuer; and 
• It conveys a residual claim on the assets or income of the issuer. 
The following table illustrates the results across some of the asset 
classes: 
Asset type Risk weight 
Qualifying revolving retail exposures 0.98% 
Residential mortgages 4.15% 
Other retail exposures 4.45% 
SME exposure 11.30% 
Corporate exposure 14.44% 
Source: Adapted from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004b, Internal 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. Page 197. 
Table 7: Illustrative IRB risk weightings 
From the above it is clear that the differences between the risk 
weightings of assets can be large and this may have an impact on the way in 
which a bank conducts its business in the future. 
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1.1.5.1.2.1.1.3 Advanced Internal Rating Based Approach (AIRB). 
Under the Advanced IRB approach, banks will supply all three inputs 
into the assessment of credit risk, i.e. PD, LGD and EAD. The difficulty with 
the IRB approaches, according to the Committee's own research, will be the 
lack of banks' own estimates of Loss Given Defauh for non-retail exposures. 
While monitoring of PD is a standard industry practice, the research suggests 
that few banks have robust data on which to base LGD. 
To qualify for the Advanced IRB approach. Banks require LGD data 
spanning a minimum of 7 years, and ideally covering a complete economic 
cycle 1. In addition, the institution needs to demonstrate that it is fully 
competent with the inputs into the risk function, and must disclose more 
information on an ongoing basis. 
The more sophisticated the approach, the more risk-sensitive it is 
thereby increasing the likelihood of a better evaluation of credit risk. It is 
generally believed that the Committee's intention is to allow lower capital 
under the more sophisticated approaches. Initial estimates are that the 
difference in capital between the Foundation IRB and Advanced IRB 
approaches may be in the region of 10-20% in favour of the Advanced IRB 
approach. 
However, the more risk sensitive the approach, the higher the cost to 
implement due to the increased sophistication required in the bank's capital 
management system. 
Once implemented, all participating banks will have to adopt the 
Standard approach, at a minimum. 
1.1.5.1.2.2 Market Risk 
Market risk estimates the uncertainty of the future earnings due to the 
changes in the market conditions; this is the risk that the value of assets or 
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liabilities will be affected by movements in equity and interest rate markets, 
currency exchange rates and prices of the commodities. Market risk can be 
divided into such main categories (by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2004): 
1. Interest rate risk is the exposure of a bank's financial conditions to 
adverse movements in interest rates. If bank accepts this risk as a normal 
part of banking, it can be a huge resource of profitability and the high 
value for the shareholders. Changes in the interest rates change the net 
interest income, operafing expenses, which affects a bank's profit. Interest 
rate can affect the bank's balance sheet in three ways: net interest margin, 
assets and liabilities (excluded cash) and trading positions. 
2. Equity risk arises in the case when assets that are included in the portfolio 
have a market value (securities). The change of the market price of such 
assets will affect the respective bank's portfolio value. 
3. Exchange rate risk is the risk of money loss or asset and/or capital 
depreciation after some adverse changes of the exchange rates. It consist 
of the risk of depreciated value of foreign assets portfolio after the adverse 
changes in the exchange rates and the risk of sign financial agreements of 
future converting the foreign value, when future exchange rates are stated. 
4. Liquidity risk is caused by the unexpected large negative cash flow over a 
short period. If the bank has highly liquid assets and suddenly needs some 
additional liquidity, it may sell some of its assets at a discount. 
Market Risk remains unchanged frcn the original Basel I Accord. This 
assessment is based largely on the bank's own measure of value-at-risk or the 
standardized approach for market risk. 
Emphasis should be focused on evaluating the adequacy of capital to 
support the trading function includes general market risk and specific risk. The 
general market risk refers to changes in the market values due to large market 
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movements. Specific risk refers to changes in the value of an individual asset 
due to factors related to the issuer of the security. There are four types of 
economic variables that generate market risk. These are interest rates, foreign 
exchanges, equities and commodities. 
1.1.5.1.2.2.1 Approaches to measure Market Risk (unchanged): 
In January 1996, the Basle Committee on Banldng Supervision issued 
the "Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks." This 
document provides a detailed account of the methodology laid down by the 
Committee to set capital requirements for market risk. Since January 1, 1998, 
banks in the GIO countries have been required to maintain regulatory capital to 
cover market risk. Market risk is usually measured as Value At Risk (VAR). 
V AR takes the form of a single number that estimates the maximum likely loss 
an institution is exposed to over a given time interval and at a given confidence 
level, based on the distribution of price changes over a given historical time 
horizon. The probability of losses greater than the VAR estimates occurring is 
small (as specified by the confidence level). 
The Market Risk Amendment sets out two approaches to the 
measurement of market risk: 
••• the standardized approach and 
**** the internal models approach 
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Choice of two levels of calculation - iicteasing i i detail, complexitv and sophisticatioi 
Increasing sophistication neans gieatet disclosure 
The standairdizsd mea&utemsnl 
introduces capital charges to be 
applied to 
n Current marlcBt value of 
open positions in Interest 
related instruments and 
equities in institutions' 
trading books 
21 Instltutlonj' total currency 
and commodities positions 
in respect of forsign 
excfiange and 
commodities risk 
The In-House Approacti allov;s 
institutions to use in-house 
measurements subject to a 
number of quantitative and 
qualitative criteria,these 
mclude 
II "Value at risk"computed 
daily 
2! Minimum price shock to 
ten days trading 
31 Model to incorporate 
one years trading data 
The capital charge for the 
mstitution v/ill be the greater of: 
I I The previous day's value at 
risk 
21 Three times the average of the 
dailyvalueatrlskofthe 
preceding 60 business days 
Source: The Basel II accord: what does it mean for the North American leasing market? 
Figure 7: Approaches to measure Market Risk 
1.1.5.1.2.2.1.1 Standardized Approach 
The standardized method, first proposed in 1993, adopts a so-called 
building block approach for interest rate related and equity instruments which 
differentiates capital requirements (charges) for specific risk fi-om those for 
general market risk. 
The capital requirements for specific risk are designed to protect against 
adverse price movements in a security because of factors related to the issuer of 
a security. The capital charges for general market risk are designed to protect 
against the risk of loss arising from adverse changes in market prices. 
1.1.5.1.2.2.1.2 Internal Models Approach 
For banks that prefer to use proprietary in-house models as an 
alternative approach to the standardized method for calculating market risk, the 
capital charge is the higher of: 
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Previous day's VAR 
•= Average of the daily VAR of the preceding 60 business days, multiplied by 
a minimum factor of three. 
While it is generally accepted that VAR is a useful measure of market 
risk, no universal agreement exists on the best method to calculate it. There are 
three popular methods to calculating VAR: 
•= Variance/Covariance Models 
•= Historical Simulation Method 
•= Monte Carlo Simulation Method 
VAR takes the form of a single number that estimates the maximum 
likely loss an institution is exposed to over a given time interval (the holding 
period) and at a given confidence level, based on the distribution of price 
changes over a given historical time horizon (the observation period). The 
probability of losses greater than the VAR estimate occurring is small (as 
specified by the confidence level). 
The Basel Committee requires that banks calculate their VAR on a daily 
basis with a one-tailed confidence interval of 99 percent, a minimum holding 
period of 10 days, and a minimum observation period of one year. 
Furthermore, banks' internal models are required to accurately capture 
the unique risks associated with options and option-like instruments. 
Banks that do not meet the qualitative and quantitative criteria laid down 
by the Basel Committee are not permitted to use their in-house models and 
must use the standardized approach instead. Furthermore, the use of proprietary 
models is conditional upon the explicit approval of a bank's supervisory 
authority. 
As is the case for credit risk, the capital requirements for market risk 
apply on a world-wide consolidated basis. 
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These internal models can only be used by the largest banks that satisfy 
qualitative and quantitative standards imposed by the Basel agreement. 
Moreover, the 1996 revision also adds the possibility of a third tier for the total 
capital, which includes short-term unsecured debts. This is at the discretion of 
the central banks. 
Value at Risk (VaR) is a measure of how the market value of an asset or 
of a portfolio of assets is likely to decrease over a certain time period (usually 
over 1 day or 10 days) under usual conditions. It is typically used by security 
houses or investment banks to measure the market risk of their asset portfolios 
(market value at risk), but is actually a very general concept that has broad 
application. Other measures of risk include volatility/standard deviation, semi 
variance (or downside risk) and shortfall probability. 
Details of the definition 
VaR has three parameters: 
• The time horizon (period) to be analyzed (i. e. the length of time over 
which one plans to hold the assets in the portfolio - the "holding period"). 
The typical holding period is 1 day, although 10 days are used, for 
example, to compute capital requirements under the European Capital 
Adequacy Directive (CAD). For some problems, even a holding period 
of 1 year is appropriate. 
• The confidence level at which the estimate is made. Popular confidence 
levels usually are 99% and 95%. 
• The unit of the currency which will be used to denominate the value at 
risk (VaR). 
The VaR is the maximum amount at risk to be lost from an investment 
(under 'normal' market conditions) over a given holding period, at a particular 
confidence level. As such, it is the converse of shortfall probability, in that it 
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represents the amount to be lost with a given probability, rather than the 
probability of a given amount to be lost. 
Note that VaR cannot anticipate changes in the composition of the 
portfolio during the day. Instead, it reflects the riskiness of the portfolio based 
on the portfolio's current composition. 
Example 
Consider a trading portfolio. Its market value in US dollars today is 
known, but its market value tomorrow is not known. The investment bank 
holding that portfolio might report that its portfolio has a 1-day VaR of $4 
million at the 95% confidence level. This implies that (provided usual 
conditions will prevail over the 1 day) the bank can expect that, with a 
probability of 95%, the value of its portfolio will decrease by at most $4 
million during 1 day, or, in other words, that, with a probability of 5%, the 
value of its portfolio will decrease by $4 million or more during 1 day. 
The key thing to note is that the target confidence level (95% in the 
above example) is the given parameter here; the output from the calculation ($4 
million in the above example) is the maximum amount at risk (the value at 
risk) for that confidence level. 
Common VaR calculation models 
In the following, return means percentage change in value. 
A variety of models exist for estimating VaR. Each model has its own 
set of assumptions, but the most common assumption is that historical market 
data is our best estimator for future changes. Common models include: 
• (a) variance-covariance (VCV), assuming that risk factor returns are 
always (jointly) normally distributed and that the change in portfolio 
value is linearly dependent on all risk factor returns, 
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• (b) the historical simulation, assuming that asset returns in the future 
will have the same distribution as they had in the past (historical market 
data), 
• (c) Monte Carlo simulation, where future asset returns are more or less 
randomly simulated 
The variance-covariance, or delta-normal, model was popularized by J.P 
Morgan (now J.P. Morgan Chase) in the early 1990s when they published the 
Risk Metrics Technical Document. In the following, we will take the simple 
case, where the only risk factor for the portfolio is the value of the assets 
themselves. The following two assumptions enable to translate the VaR 
estimation problem into a linear algebraic problem: 
(1) The portfolio is composed of assets whose deltas are linear, more exactly: 
the change in the value of the portfolio is linearly dependent on (i.e. is a 
linear combination of) all the changes in the values of the assets, so that 
also the portfolio return is linearly dependent on all the asset returns. 
(2) The asset returns are jointly normally distributed. 
The implication of (1) and (2) is that the portfolio return is normally 
distributed because it always holds that a linear combination of jointly 
normally distributed variables is itself normally distributed. 
We will use the following notation: 
• i means "of the return on asset i" (for a and fi) and "of asset i" 
(otherwise) 
• P means "of the return on the portfolio" (for o and \i) and "of the 
portfolio" (otherwise) 
• all returns are returns over the holding period 
• there are N assets 
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• f4,= expected value, i. e. mean 
• a = standard deviation 
• V = initial value (in currency units) 
• (jj = vector of all co, (T means transposed) 
• S = covariance matrix = matrix of co variances between all N asset 
returns, i. e. an NxN matrix 
The calculation goes as follows. 
(i) lip ^Y^u^ifiu 
i= i 
The normality assumption allows us to z-scale the calculated portfolio 
standard deviation to the appropriate confidence level. So for the 95% 
confidence level VaR we get: 
(iii) VaR = - Vp {^p - lM6ap ) 
The benefits of the variance-covariance model are the use of a more 
compact and maintainable data set which can often be bought from third parties, 
and the speed of calculation using optimized linear algebra libraries. 
Drawbacks include the assumption that the portfolio is composed of assets 
whose delta is linear, and the assumption of a normal distribution of asset 
returns (i.e. market price returns). 
Historical simulation is the simplest and most transparent method of 
calculation. This involves running the current portfolio across a set of historical 
price changes to yield a distribution of changes in portfolio value, and 
computing a percentile (the VaR). The benefits of this method are its simplicity 
to implement, and the fact that it does not assume a normal distribution of asset 
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returns. Drawbacks are the requirement for a large market database, and the 
computationally intensive calculation. 
Monte Carlo simulation is conceptually simple, but is generally 
computationally more intensive than the methods described above. The generic 
MC VaR calculation goes as follows: 
• Decide on N, the number of iterations to perform. 
• For each iteration: 
o Generate a random scenario of market moves using some market 
model. 
o Revalue the portfolio under the simulated market scenario. 
o Compute the portfolio profit or loss (PnL) under the simulated 
scenario, (i.e. subtract the current market value of the portfolio 
from the market value of the portfolio computed in the previous 
step). 
• Sort the resulting PnLs to give us the simulated PnL distribution for the 
portfolio. 
• VaR at a particular confidence level is calculated using the percentile 
function. For example, if we computed 5000 simulations, our estimate 
of the 95% percentile would correspond to the 250th largest loss, i.e. (1 -
0.95) * 5000. 
• Note that we can compute an error term associated with our estimate of 
VaR and this error will decrease as the number of iterations increases. 
Monte Carlo simulation is generally used to compute VaR for portfolios 
containing securities with non-linear returns (e.g. options) since the 
computational effort required is non-trivial. Note that for portfolios without 
these complicated securities, such as a portfolio of stocks, the variance-
covariance method is perfectly suitable and should probably be used instead. 
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Also note tliat MC VaR is subject to model risk if the market model is not 
correct. 
1.1.5.1.2.3 Operation al Risk 
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate 
or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. The 
definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputation risk. 
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This 
definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputation risk. 
Banks are encouraged to move along the spectrum of available 
approaches as they develop more sophisticated operational risk measurement 
systems and practices. 
1.1.5.1.2.3.1 Approaches to measure Operational Risk 
The framework presents three methods for calculating operational risk 
capital charges in a continuum of increasing sophistication and risk sensitivity: 
(a) the Basic Indicator Approach; 
(b) the Standardised Approach; and 
(c) Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA). 
1.1.5.1.2.3.1.1 The Basic Indicator Approach 
The Basic Indicator Approach provides a simple way to determine a 
capital requirement, based on a percentage of gross income. A factor (denoted 
beta) is included in the calculation. An example of this approach uses gross 
income as a proxy for the organization's operational risk exposure. This is 
calculated by multiplying a particular bank's average annual gross income over 
the previous three years by 15%. 
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Banks are encouraged to move along the spectrum of available 
approaches as they develop more sophisticated operational risk measurement 
systems and practices. 
Banks using the Basic Indicator Approach must hold capital for 
operational risk equal to the average over the previous three years of a fixed 
percentage (denoted alpha) of positive annual gross income. The charge may be 
expressed as follows: 
KBIA = [(GIl...nx)]/n 
Where 
KBIA = the capital charge under the Basic Indicator Approach 
GI = annual gross income, where positive, over the previous three years 
n = number of the previous three years for which gross income is positive 
15%, which is set by the Committee, relating the industry wide level of 
required capital to the industry wide level of the indicator. 
1.1.5.1.2.3.1.2 The Standardised Approach 
In the Standardised Approach, banks' activities are divided into eight 
business lines. Within each business line, gross income is a broad indicator that 
serves as a proxy for the scale of business operations and thus the likely scale 
of operational risk exposure within each business line. 
This approach divides an organization's activities into standardized 
business units (i.e., investment banking, banking and others) and various lines 
of business: 
(!) corporate finance, 
(ii) trading and sales, 
(iii) retail banking, ^j^^ 
(iv) commercial banking, 
(v) payment and settlement, 
(vi) retail brokerage, 
(vii) agency services, 
(viii) asset management. 
Risk indicators (from 12% to 18%) are established for each line of 
business to serve as the proxy for operational risk. 
The required capital under this approach is determined by multiplying 
the gross income (or for asset management, total funds under management), by 
a factor determined by industry loss experience for the given line of business. 
The total operational risk capital charge for the organization is the sum of all 
capital charges for each of the lines of business. 
The capital charge for each business line is calculated by multiplying 
gross income by a factor (denoted beta) assigned to that business line. Beta 
serves as a proxy for the industry-wide relationship between the operational 
risk loss experience for a given business line and the aggregate level of gross 
income for that business line. The beta factors are detailed below: 
Illustrative IRB risk weightings 
Business lines 
Corporate finance 
Trading and sales 
Retail banking 
Commercial banking 
PayjTient and settlement 
Agency services 
Asset management 
Retail brokerage 
Beta factors 
18% 
18% 
12% 
15% 
18% 
15% 
12% 
12% 
Source: Adapted from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004b, Internal 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. Page J 40. 
Table 8: Illustrative IRB risk weightings 
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The table above indicates that corporate finance, trading and sales and 
payment and settlement risk is perceived to have the highest risk of the 
operational business lines and will therefore be allocated more capital. 
1.1.5.1.2.3. L3 Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA) 
Under the AMA, the regulatory capital requirement will equal the risk 
measure generated by the bank's internal operational risk measurement system. 
Use of the AMA is subject to supervisory approval. 
Trading book capital treatment for specific risk under the standardised 
methodology. The following sections describe the changes to the specific risk 
capital treatments under the standardised methodology within the trading book 
ExtermI credit 
assessrnetil 
Specific I'lsH capita? charge 
AAA to AA- 0% 
A+ to B6B- 0-25% (residual term to final maturity 6 months or less) 
1.00% (residUE^ term to final maturity .greater ttian 6 and up to 
and Including 24 moitHis) 
1 60% (residua! term to final maturity' exceeding 24 months) 
All ottiers 8 00% 
Table 9: Specific risk capital treatments 
Under the Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA), the regulatory 
requirement will equal the risk measure generated by the bank's internal 
operational risk measurement system using quantitative and qualitative criteria. 
A research paper (de Fontnouvelle et al, 2003) from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston shows that the amount of capital that will be set aside under Basel 11 
will often exceed capital held for market risk and that the largest banks could 
choose to allocate several billion dollars in capital to operational risk. 
This will be the first time that banks will have to hold capital in respect 
of operational risks. This will have an internal impact on the banks as they need 
to develop sophisticated systems in order to comply with these regulations and 
the allocation of economic capital to such areas is a new phenomenon. 
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This approach allows banks more input into determining their 
operational risk capital charge, as their capital charge will be based on 
internally developed models. 
The AMA is designed to allow each financial institution to use its own 
methodology for assessing its exposure to operational risk, provided it is 
comprehensive and results in a capital charge that is reflective of the 
operational risk experience of the organization. 
This means one estimates the potential operational losses that the 
banking institution faces at a soundness standard of 99.9 percent confidence 
level over a one-year period (a once in a millennium event). 
The operational risk exposure would be multiplied by 12.5 to determine 
a risk-weighted assets equivalent, which is added to the amounts for credit and 
market risk for the denominator of the regulatory capital ratio. 
1.1.5.2 Pillar II the Supervisory Review Process 
The second pillar supplements provisions of the first pillar by organising 
the supervision of regulators in order to ensure the soundness of bank's internal 
processes of risk evaluation. 
Supervisory review process is in a way a formalization of the existing 
supervisory standards in the area of capital and capital adequacy supervision, 
together with their improvements and new approaches based on practical 
experiences in the field. One of the main objectives of the supervisory review 
process is to encourage banks to develop and apply better risk management 
processes. Supervisors have the responsibility to control the metrics used by 
banks and to verify that banks make appropriate capital charges to cover the 
inherent risk of all their business activities. Provisions of the second pillar 
allow supervisors to set a bank's capital requirements depending on its risk 
profile, meaning, the supervisors can require a bank with riskier business 
profile to maintain a higher capital ratio, if this is needed to ensure safe 
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operating of the bank in question. If the bank would not comply with these 
standards, it would be subject to supervisory intervention and in a position of 
jeopardizing its license. 
Implementation of the Pillar II is believed to be very demanding, as the new 
Accord proposes changing of traditional methods of supervision by shifting 
from rules to standards. 
It is centred around four principles concerning 
(1) banks' processes for evaluating their capital in relation to their risks, 
(2) supervisors' assessment of these processes and their capacity to take 
action as necessary, 
(3) the expectation of supervisors that banks will have capital in excess of 
that prescribed by minimum regulatory ratios, and 
(4) the need for supervisors to intervene to prevent banks' capital from 
falling below these minimal. 
These key principles are linked to criteria for assessment of compliance 
with the BCBS's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in the 
areas of capital adequacy and risk management as set out in the BCBS's Core 
Principles Methodology. 
In view of the role of such assessments in IMF Article IV surveillance, 
that now includes compliance with key financial standards of which that 
concerning bank supervision consists of the BCBS's Core Principles; the resuh 
will be to provide a link between this surveillance and the implementation of 
the New Capital Accord. While the logic of such a link may seem impeccable 
in principle, it could prove problematic in practice owing to the difficulty of 
assessing compliance with so complex an agreement in a context where 
compliance is already imposing a considerable new burden on most country's 
supervisors. 
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Pillar II (para. 732) prescribes comprehensive assessment of risks as 
follows: "All material risks faced by the bank should be addressed in the 
capital assessment process. While the Committee recognises that not all risks 
can be measured precisely, a process should be developed to estimate risks. 
Therefore, the following risk exposures, which by no means constitute a 
comprehensive list of all risks, should be considered". 
The risk classification which follows refers to credit risk, operational 
risk, market risk, interest-rate risk in the banking book, liquidity risk, and other 
risks such as reputational and strategic risk. Of the risks in this list the first 
three are covered under Pillar I, while the second has been reserved for Pillar II 
for reasons described below. Liquidity risk has the two dimensions of funding 
risk and market liquidity risk: the first is due to periodic needs for funds which 
cannot be precisely forecast in advance; and the second is that the bank's sales 
or purchases of assets have an adverse effect on prices in their markets. The 
first is traditionally covered as part of banks' asset and liability management 
rather than under capital (although like other banking risks it can be a source of 
unexpected losses) but the second is clearly related to market risk through its 
effects on valuations. Both dimensions are likely to be the subject of increased 
attention from regulators in the period following agreement on Basel II. 
Reputational risk is that of a loss of confidence in a bank amongst its peers, 
customers or regulators, or in the markets in which it trades. The consequences 
are reduced access to credit, the loss of customers and of investor support, 
lower credit ratings, and the sacrifice of regulatory confidence. Strategic risk is 
that of losses due to strategic errors in business selection or management. This 
prescription poses a formidable challenge to banks, and its acceptance provides 
regulators and supervisors (including the BCBS itself) considerable leverage in 
their future dealings with banks. 
In the discussion of subjects covered under Pillar II in Basel II two 
others deserve special attention: 
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Firstly, amongst factors external to the bank, reference is made to the 
effects of business cycles as a subject suitable for incorporation in 
supervisory review (RF, para. 724). 
However, guidance here is limited to the general references to the need 
for a bank's management to take account of the stage of the business 
cycle in assessing capital adequacy (RF, para. 726) and for supervisors 
to do the same (RF, para. 752); 
Secondly, the BCBS has decided against prescribing a quantitative 
capital charge under Pillar I for interest-rate risk in the banking book 
owing to the lack of agreement among banks and their supervisors as to 
the appropriate way to set such a charge. Interest-rate risk is instead 
singled out as a subject for Pillar II, some particular guidelines for 
supei-visory review being provided. 
There are also references to subjects which are covered as part of the 
setting of risk weights under Pillar I but which are also considered to be of 
special importance to supervisory review, namely operational risks, stress 
testing, the definition of default, the residual risk remaining after credit risk 
mitigation, credit concentration risk, and securitisation. The treatment here is 
devoted to particular problems under the different headings which may in some 
cases indicate the need for capital charges additional to those assessed in 
accordance with the rules of Pillar I set out above. 
Two matters here merit comment. 
• Credit concentration is generally related to the effect of cyclical 
downturns on banks' risk profiles (although there is no explicit reference 
to business cycles as such here). 
• The guidelines for supervisory review in the area of securitisation 
suggest the influence on regulatory thinking of recent innovations and 
corporate scandals and the role therein of shifts of assets and liabilities 
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off the balance sheet. Under the heading of "market innovations" RF 
interestingly notes (RF, para. 789): "As the minimum capital 
requirements for securitisation may not be able to address all potential 
issues, supervisory authorities are expected to consider new features of 
securitisation transactions as they arise. Such assessments would include 
reviewing the impact new features may have on credit risk transfer ... A 
Pillar I response may be formulated to take account of market 
innovations". 
The supervisory review process is meant not only to ensure that banks 
make appropriate capital charges to cover the inherent risk of all their business 
activities, but also to encourage them to develop and apply better risk 
management processes to monitor and manage their risk (cf. also Sec. 25a 
KWG). 
The supervisory review process shall include not only an audit of 
compliance with the minimum capital charge as under Pillar I but also a review 
of whether banks are implementing appropriate internal procedures and 
instruments for risk management, on the basis of which their capital adequacy 
may be judged. 
The risk management process requires a thorough assessment of all risk 
exposures, a valuation of existing capital adequacy, a formulation of a capital 
strategy and a comparison of the risk strategy with the current risk profile. 
The Basel Committee has made it clear that increasing capital should not 
be viewed as the only option for banks to take in the face of growing risks. 
More to the point, banks are expected to fundamentally address inadequate 
control and risk management processes and improve these step by step. Pillar 11 
cannot be viewed as a discrete element of the New Basel Capital Accord, as 
compliance with its qualitative standards is required for the Advanced 
Measurement Approaches in Pillar 1. 
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Under the supervisory review process, the qualitative standards for risk 
management by banks and for supervisors have been summarized as four key 
principles: 
Principle 1: 
Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy 
in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels. 
Principle 1 calls for banks to have a risk management process. The five most 
important elements of this process are: 
• oversight of the risk management process by the board of directors and senior 
management; 
• sound capital assessment; 
• comprehensive assessment of risks; 
• monitoring and reporting; 
• internal control review. 
Principle 2: 
Supervisors should review and evaluate banks' internal capital adequacy 
assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their 
compliance with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate 
supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of this process. 
Principle 3: 
Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum 
regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold 
capital in excess of the minimum. 
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Principle 4: 
Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital 
from falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk 
characteristics of a particular bank and should require rapid remedial action if 
capital is not maintained or restored. 
Principle 1 thus requires an internal capital adequacy assessment process 
(ICAAP) to be set up. 
Principle II deals with the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
(SREP). A bank's ICAAP is assessed by the supervisors in the SREP. 
1.1.5.3 Pillar III Market Discipline 
In the third and the last pillar disclosure requirements are used as a mean 
of enhancing market discipline. The. logic introduced in this pillar assumes that 
well-informed market participants will reward risk aware management and 
thereby exert pressure on banks to improve their systems and not take on 
additional risk. Detailed disclosure requirements are believed to create an 
environment in which effective market discipline can take place. Even though 
provisions of this pillar were considerably reduced in the CP3, it is still 
questionable, how efficient can their implementation be. The distinction in CP2 
between "core" disclosures (i.e. those essential for the operation of market 
discipline) and "supplementary" disclosures (not of crucial importance for all 
institutions but which are expected of sophisticated internationally active 
banks) has been dropped. The requirements for transparency under Pillar III 
should be seen in the context of increased links between banks' internal 
controls and accounting and the contents of banking regulation, greater 
reporting requirements regarding their governance, and the demands placed 
on their information systems. These demands pose particularly difficult 
problems for banks with cross-border operations which require compliance 
with rules often differing among jurisdictions (and have occupied an especially 
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prominen, place in ,he discussion of Basel II in c • ,• . 
publications^ '" '"'"'""''' '«*-"> 
d«dosure is ,o have a disdplina^ taction, both badcs and other 
ma*e. part.cipants .ust recogn,se the importance of detailed d.sc,osura 
mfon.at,on and play their role by changing their behaviour according to the 
..fonnation received. The situafon in emerging conntr,es in the field of 
disclosure standards is gradually changing, but .t is likely that the level 
envisaged in the new Accord will not be reached shortly. New legislation and 
further education of both bank manage,, and other market participants would 
be needed, if disclosure requirements were to be used as a successftl mean of 
enhancing market discipline. 
The Committee aims to encourage market discipline by developing a set 
of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess key 
pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk 
assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution. Market 
discipline can contribute to a safe and sound banking environment, and 
supervisors require firms to operate in a safe and sound manner. 
The third pillar of the new capital adequacy requirements relies on 
market forces as a regulatory mechanism. This mechanism assumes that well-
informed market participants will reward risk-aware management of companies 
and effective risk management by banks with their investment and credit 
decisions, thereby sanctioning a bank taking on more risk. 
As market discipline can only be effective as a regulatory factor with 
corresponding transparency, specific disclosure requirements have been laid 
down. These requirements relate to factors such as consolidation of information, 
capital structure including explanations of the background of innovative capital 
elements, the calculation of risk positions and details on interest rate risk. Apart 
from qualitative data, a great number of quantitative figures must be disclosed. 
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Flexibility has been built into the system to achieve a balance between 
the interests of banks and those of market participants. 
In practice, therefore, the extent and frequency of disclosures by 
individual banJcs will be governed by the principles of materiality and the 
protection of confidential information. In general, disclosure practice should 
harmonize with the assessment and management of a bank's risks by its senior 
management and management board. Pillar III Calls for Public Disclosure 
under Banking Supervision 
Application of Capital Requirements 
The disclosure requirements must be met on a consolidated basis; 
individual banks within a group generally do not have to meet these 
requirements. For the purpose of the regulatory capital charge, the companies 
belonging to the group must be listed and the consolidation principles 
explained. 
Capital Structure and Capital Adequacy 
Details on the nature and scope of individual capital elements and total 
liable capital are required. The capital requirement for each risk category 
(credit risk, market risk and operational risk), the risk measurement method 
used and the corresponding capital ratios must also be disclosed. 
Risk Exposures 
The risk management objectives and processes implemented for each 
risk category must be disclosed; in particular, strategies and processes and the 
structure and organization of the risk management function. Specific disclosure 
requirements must be observed for each of the four risk areas: credit risk, 
operational risk, market risk and interest rate risk. 
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1.2 Indian and UAE Banking Industry Overview 
1.2.1 Indian Banking Industry 
The Indian Banking industry, which is governed by the Banking 
Regulation Act of India, 1949 can be broadly classified into two major 
categories, non-scheduled banks and scheduled banks. Scheduled banks 
comprise commercial banks and the co-operative banks. In terms of ownership, 
commercial banks can be further grouped into nationalized banks, the State 
Bank of India and its group banks, regional rural banks and private sector 
banks (the old/ new domestic and foreign). These banks have over 67,000 
branches spread across the country. 
The first phase of financial reforms resulted in the nationalization of 14 
major banks in 1969 and resulted in a shift from Class banking to Mass 
banking. This in turn resulted in a significant growth in the geographical 
coverage of banks. Every bank had to earmark a minimum percentage of their 
loan portfolio to sectors identified as "priority sectors". The manufacturing 
sector also grew during the 1970s in protected environs and the banking sector 
was a critical source. The next wave of reforms saw the nationalizafion of 6 
more commercial banks in 1980. Since then the number of scheduled 
commercial banks increased four-fold and the number of bank branches 
increased eight-fold. 
After the second phase of financial sector reforms and liberalization of 
the sector in the early nineties, the Public Sector Banks (PSBs) found it 
extremely difficult to compete with the new private sector banks and the 
foreign banks. The new private sector banks first made their appearance after 
the guidelines permitting them were issued in January 1993. The private sector 
banks are presently in operation. These banks due to their late start have access 
to state-of-the-art technology, which in turn helps them to save on manpower 
costs and provide better services. 
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The banking system in India consists of commercial and cooperative 
banics, with the former accounting for around 98 percent of banking system 
assets. The entire segment is referred to as Scheduled Commercial Banks, 
because they are included in the Second Schedule of the Reserve Bank of India 
Act, 1934 The period 1992-97 laid the foundations for reform in the banking 
system (Rangarajan, 1998). It saw the implementation of prudential norms 
pertaining to capital adequacy, income recognition, asset classification, 
provisioning, and exposure norms. While these reforms were being 
implemented, the world economy also witnessed significant changes, 
"coinciding with the movement towards global integration of financial 
services" (Government of India, 1998). 
Against such a backdrop, a second government-appointed committee on 
banking sector reforms provided the blueprint for the current reform process 
(Government of India, 1998). 
A feature, somewhat unique to the Indian financial system is the 
diversity of its Composition. Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) in India are 
categorised into five different groups according to their ownership and / or 
nature of operation. 
These bank groups are 
(i) State Bank of India and its associates 
(ii) Other nationalised banks 
(iii) Regional rural banks 
(iv) Foreign banks and 
(v) Other Indian SCBs (in the private sector). 
The dominance of Government ownership coupled with significant 
private shareholding in the public sector banks which in turn continue to have a 
dominant share in the total banking system. These public sector banks are listed 
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on the stock exchange and their performance is reflected in their P/E ratios. The 
private sector banks especially the new ones are world class. We also have 
cooperative banks, whose numbers are large and pose a challenge because of 
the multiplicity of regulatory and supervisory authorities. There are also 
Regional Rural Banks with links to their parent commercial banks. Foreign 
bank branches operate profitably in India and by and large the regulatory 
standards for all these banks are uniform. The process of providing financial 
services is changing rapidly from traditional banking to a one stop shop of 
varied financial services and the old institutional demarcations are getting 
increasingly blurred. 
(Percent 
Bank Croup/End-Marcli 
1 
SchGdulod ComnieictU Banks 
PuWIc Sector Banks 
NaUonalis«d Banks 
SBI Croup 
Old Private Stctof Bai&s 
New Private Sector Banks 
Voreigfl Banks 
2000 
2 
U. l 
10 7 
10 1 
11.6 
12.4 
134 
11.9 
2001 
3 
11.4 
11.2 
102 
12.7 
11.9 
11.5 
12.6 
2002 
4 
12.0 
11.8 
10.9 
13 3 
12.5 
1Z3 
129 
2003 
5 
12 7 
12.6 
122 
134 
128 
i l . 3 
15 2 
20O4 
6 
12.9 
13.2 
13.1 
13.4 
13.7 
10.2 
15.0 
2005 
7 
12.8 
129 
13 2 
12 4 
12.5 
1^1 
14.0 
2O06 
8 
123 
12.2 
123 
119 
117 
12.6 
13.0 
2007 
S 
123 
1Z4 
1Z4 
12.3 
12.1 
IZO 
12.4 
2008 
10 
130 
125 
12 1 
13.2 
14.1 
144 
13.1 
Source : Based on off-site returns submUed t>y banks 
Source: RBI 
Table 10: capital adequacy for Banks in India 
Apart from the SCBs, there exist 130 regional rural banks (RRBs) and 
four local area banks (LABs). Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) were set up under 
the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976. RRBs were expected to operate as State 
sponsored, region based and rural oriented commercial banks. The basic 
objective of this set of rural financial institutions was to have a feel and 
familiarity with local need, and professionally managed alternative channel for 
credit dispensation to small and marginal farmers, agricultural labourers, socio-
economically weaker sections of population for development of agriculture, 
trade, commerce, industry and other productive activities. RRBs were expected 
to mobilise resources from rural areas and play a significant role in developing 
agriculture and rural economy by deploying mobilised resources in rural 
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sectors for the needy not covered by SCBs despite their large network. Keeping 
this objective in view, the capital of RRBs is held by the Central Government, 
concerned State Government and sponsor bank in the proportion of 
50:15:35.Four local area banks (LABs) were functional at end-March 2006. 
In 1996 it was decided to allow the establishment of local banks in the 
private sector with the objective to bridge the gaps in credit availability and 
enhance the institutional credit framework in the rural and semi-urban areas 
and provide efficient and competitive financial intermediation services in their 
area of operation. The minimum start-up capital of a LAB was fixed at Rs.5 
crore. The promoters of these banks were required to bring in the entire 
minimum share capital up-front. It was also decided that a family among the 
promoter group could hold equity not exceeding 40% of the capital. The NRI 
contributions to the equity of the bank were not to exceed 40% of the paid-up 
capital. The entire initial capital subscribed by the promoters (including their 
friends and relatives/associates) would carry a lock in period of three years 
from the date of licensing of the bank. Further, the promoters' equity to the 
extent of 40% of the initial paid- up capital was to be locked in at least for two 
years beyond the aforesaid period of three years subject to review before expiry 
of five years from the date of licensing of the bank. These were: Coastal Local 
Area Bank Ltd, Vijayawada; Capital Local Area Bank Ltd., Phagwara, Navsari; 
Krishna Bhima Samruddhi Local Area Bank Ltd., Mehboobnagar; and the 
Subhadra Local Area Bank Ltd., Kolhapur. 
Co-operative banking has passed through many phases since the 
enactment of the Agricultural Credit Co-operative Societies Act in 1904. Co-
operative banks, developed largely as an offshoot of official policy, expanded 
rapidly in the post-independence era and played an important role in 
implementation of various Government schemes. Their business is now being 
re-engineered to strengthen their role in contributing to financial inclusion and 
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deepening banking penetration in an increasingly competitive financial 
landscape. 
The co-operative banking structure in India is complex. It comprises 
urban co-operative banks and rural co-operative credit institutions. Urban co-
operative financial institutions consist of a single tier, viz., primary co-
operative banks, commonly referred to as urban co-operative banks (UCBs). 
However, they are classified according to their scheduled status, operational 
outreach and purpose/clientele. Out of the 1,853 UCBs, 55 enjoyed scheduled 
status, of which 24 had multi-State presence as on March 31, 2006. 
Of the non-scheduled UCBs, 117 were Mahila (women) UCBs and 
another 6 were Scheduled Caste (SC)/ Scheduled Tribe (ST) banks. In addition, 
there were 79 salary earners UCBs. Out of the 1,853 banks, 914 UCBs were 
unit banks i.e., having a single Head office/branch set up. 
Today the commercial banking system in India may be distinguished 
into: 
Public Sector Banks 
a. State Bank of India and its associate banks called the State Bank group 
b. 20 nationalised banks 
c. Regional Rural Banks mainly sponsored by Public Sector Banks 
Private Sector Banks 
a. Old generation private banks 
b. New generation private banks 
c. Foreign banks in India 
d. Scheduled Co-operative Banks 
e. Non-scheduled Banks 
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Co-Operative Sector 
The co-operative banking sector has been developed in the country to 
the supplement the village money lender. The co-operative banking sector in 
India is divided into 4 components 
1. State Co-operative Banks 
2. Central Co-operative Banks 
3. Primary Agriculture Credit Societies 
4. Land Development Banks 
5. Urban Co-operative Banks 
6. Primary Agricultural Development Banks 
7. Primary Land Development Banks 
8. State Land Development Banks 
Development Banks 
1. Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) 
2. Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) 
3. Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) 
4. Industrial Investment Bank of India (IIBI) 
5. Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) 
6. SCIClLtd. 
7. National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) 
8. Export Import Bank of India 
9. National Housing Bank 
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Bank Group 2004 
H) 
Asofi March 31 
2005 2006 
a) (3) 
Chapter ' 1 
2007 2008 
(4) (5) 
Sate Bank of India and its Associates 
Natior^ alised BanKs $ 
Foreign Banks 
Ragfonal Rural BanKs 
Other Sciieduled Commercsal Banks 
Non-Scheduled Commercial Banks 
13836 
34492 
221 
14721 
5951 
27 
13933 
35042 
242 
14752 
6454 
25 
14261 
35754 
259 
14777 
6819 
28 
14611 
37227 
272 
14802 
7401 
33 
15512 
38726 
280 
14957 
8265 
33 
Total 69246 70498 71898 74346 77773 
Notes : No. of offices includes administrative offices. 
S includes IDBI Bank Ltd. 
Data for 2004 to 2007 have been revised and data for 2008 are provisional. 
Soiifce • fvlaster Office File (latest updated version) on commercial banks. Department of 
Statistics and Information Management, RBi. 
Table 11: Offices of Commercial Banks in India 
Present Scenario 
The scheduled commercial banks in India are categorized into the 
following groups: nationalised banks, other public sector banks, State Bank of 
India (SBI) group, Indian private banks (further categorized as old private 
banks and new private banks) and foreign banks. Sometimes the first two 
categories are clubbed together as there is only one bank in the category 'other 
public sector bank', the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) bank. 
The first three categories are commonly known as public sector banks. At the 
end of March 2006, there were altogether 84 banks operating in India, 
consisting of 20 nationalised banks (including IDBI bank), 8 banks in SBI 
group, 19 old private banks, 8 new private banks and 29 foreign banks. The 
ratio of total assets of the commercial banks to the GDP of India stood at 86.9 
per cent at end-March 2006. At the end of March 2006, the share of public 
sector banks in the total banking assets of the country stood at 72.3 per cent. 
Old and new private banks together constituted about 20 per cent, while foreign 
banks accounted for 7.2 per cent of the total banking assets of India in March 
2006. 
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SBI& 
associates 
2006-
07 
8 
2007-
08 
8 
Nationalised 
Banks 
2006-
07 
20 
2007-
08 
20 
Other SCBs 
2006-
07 
25 
2007-
08 
23 
Foreign Bank 
2006-
07 
29 
2007-
08 
28 
AH Banks 
2006-
07 
82 
2007-
08 
79 
Table 12: Group-wise Presence of Banks in India (2006-07 & 2007-08) 
1.2.2 UAE Banking Industry 
The current domestic financial consists of forty-eight local and foreign 
commercial banks, two restricted license (specialized) banks, and twenty-five 
foreign bank representative offices. 
Central bank regulations announced on April 5, 1993, set the minimum 
capital to risk-weighted asset ratio at 10 percent, which is 2 percent higher than 
the minimum level recommended by the Basel Concordat committee on 
banking supervision. The reduction of higher risk assets may cause 
concomitant declines in UAE bank profits, but it is anticipated that this will 
strengthen the banking industry. 
Most banks provide trade, project and consumer financing. They re-
export financing accounts for a large portion of trade finance, and this is 
viewed as having substantial prospects for growth. Loan decisions are based on 
project viability and the credit worthiness of the parties involved. Short-term 
loans (3-6 months) by commercial banks are offered at current interest rates. 
Project loans are given for five years. Consumer financing is also growing 
rapidly. Furthermore, the local banking system has well-established 
correspondent relationships with international banks. 
The Central Bank Law establishes five principal categories of 
insfitutions in the UAE - commercial banks, investment banks, financial 
establishments, financial intermediaries, and monetary intermediaries - all of 
which must be licensed by both the Central Bank and the local licensing 
authorities. In addition to these five categories, current practice in the 
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individual Emirates permits the licensing of financial or investment consultants. 
These consultants are not required to obtain a Central Bank license. 
Commercial Banks 
The Central Bank Law defines a commercial bank as any establishment 
which customarily receives fimds fi^om the public, grants credit and banking 
facilities, and conducts other banking operations prescribed for commercial 
banks either by law or by customary banking practice. In the UAE, customary 
banking practice includes the marketing and sale of investment products and 
services, including the sale of securities and various funds. 
Investment Banks 
Central Bank Resolution No. 21 of 1988 regulates the activities of 
investment banks. Investment banks are defined as merchant or development 
banks or banks which provide medium or long term financing. The Central 
Bank Resolution authorizes investment banks in the UAE to offer financial 
products and services, including the issuance of financial instruments and the 
management of investment portfolios. 
On June 1, 1997, the Emirates Bank Group, which is controlled by the 
Dubai government, launched UAE's first mutual investment fund with an initial 
capital of about US$ 8.2 million. The fund offers non-UAE nafionals their first 
opportunity to invest in the UAE's tightly restricted equity market up to a limit 
of DH 500,000. The huge response by foreign investors prompted the UAE 
Central bank to raise its original ceiling of 20 percent of foreign investment to 
49 percent. When the fund closed for public subscription on June 15, 1997 the 
investment totalled to US$ 74.5 million. 
Financial Establishments 
The Central Bank Law permits financial establishments to lend money 
and to undertake other financial transactions but does not allow them to accept 
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deposits. The Central Bank has adopted a policy that prohibits financial 
establishments from offering financial products and services. In comparison to 
commercial banks, the only activity that financial establishments may 
undertake which commercial banks may not is the lease of equipment and 
machinery. 
Financial Intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries are brokers. Regulations issued under the UAE 
Central Bank Law allow licensed brokers to market and to sell foreign and 
local shares and financial instruments in consideration for a commission. Local 
and foreign companies may obtain a brokerage license from the UAE Central 
Bank. 
Monetary Intermediaries 
Monetary intermediaries are money changers. They are not authorized to 
market or to sell investment products and services. 
Investment Consultants 
The UAE Central Bank has not published regulations on investment 
consultancy. Under the existing policies of the individual Emirates, a company 
licensed as an investment consultant may advise and assist clients in pursuing 
various investment strategies but may not directly sell investment products. 
Sales of investment products introduced by consultants are, therefore, typically 
booked outside the UAE. Consultants are also not expected to receive 
investment funds from clients, although they may assist in the transfer of those 
funds. Consultants may not provide cr^ d^it facilities or open accounts for clients 
but may assist them in opening accounts with brokers and banks. If properly 
authorized by the client, the consultant could also manage such accounts. 
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The UAE Central Bank has issued instructions to local municipalities 
that they may issue investment consultancy licenses but only after first 
consulting the Central Bank. 
Present Scenario 
The UAE Central Bank has recently moved towards a tighter policy 
regarding investment companies and financial consultants. In the future, such 
companies will have to obtain a license from the Central Bank and to report 
under the mles it has established. Investment Companies for the purpose of 
these regulations have been defined as undertakings which are involved in 
investment in securities or in the management of trust funds or investment 
portfolios on behalf of others. The minimum paid up capital for investment 
companies (including branches of foreign companies) is DH 25 million, 
increasing to a larger amount depending on the activities of the company. 
Financial consultants, on the other hand, are deemed to be individual 
professionals or groups of professionals providing advice to individuals or 
companies about the value of securities and other financial instruments or 
giving recommendation about investing. For these, licenses can be issued with 
a minimum paid in capital of DH 1 million. 
The number of locally incorporated banks increased to 24 banks during 
the December 2008. The number of branches and pay offices of these banks 
rose from 573 (508 branches, 56 pay offices and 11 electronic banking services 
units) at the end of December 2007 to 717 (638 branches, 60 pay offices and 
19electronic banking services units) at the end of December 2008. 
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Banking Institutions (Head Offices & 
Branches) 
National Banks 
Head Offices 
Branches 
Electronic banking service units 
Pay offices 
Foreign Banks (Regional Offices & Branches) 
Regional Offices 
Branches 
Electronic banking service units 
Pay offices 
2007 
22 
508 
119 
56 
27 
81 
30 
1 
2008 
24 
638 
19 
60 
28 
82 
35 
1 
Sources: CB ofUAE 
Table 13: Commercial Bank in UAE 
Representative Offices 
The number of representative offices of foreign banks and other 
financial institutions licensed to operate in the country amounted to 23 in Abu 
Dhabi and 57 in Dubai at the end of March 2008. 
1.3 Comparative Analysis of Legal and Regulatory Framework 
1.3.1 Legal and Regulatory framework in which Indian banks operate 
Without a sound and effective banking system in India it cannot have a 
healthy economy. The banking system of India should not only be hassle free 
but it should be able to meet new challenges posed by the technology and any 
other external and internal factors. 
For the past three decades India's banking system has several 
outstanding achievements to its credit. The most striking is its extensive reach. 
It is no longer confined to only metropolitans or cosmopolitans in India. In fact, 
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Indian banking system has reached even to the remote comers of the country. 
This is one of the main reason of India's growth process. 
The government's regular policy for Indian bank since 1969 has paid 
rich dividends with the nationalisation of 14 major private banks of India. 
Not long ago, an account holder had to wait for hours at the bank 
counters for getting a draft or for withdrawing his own money. Today, he has a 
choice. Gone are days when the most efficient bank transferred money from 
one branch to other in two days. Now it is simple as instant messaging or dial a 
pizza. Money have become the order of the day. 
The first bank in India, though conservative, was established in 1786. 
From 1786 till today, the journey of Indian Banking System can be segregated 
into three distinct phases. They are as mentioned below: 
• Early phase from 1786 to 1969 of Indian Banks 
• Nationalisation of Indian Banks and up to 1991 prior to Indian banking 
sector Reforms. 
• New phase of Indian Banking System with the advent of Indian 
Financial & Banking Sector Reforms after 1991. 
In order to make this description more explanatory, the entire 
description is divided into three phases: Phase I, Phase II and Phase III. 
Phase I 
The General Bank of India was set up in the year 1786. Next came Bank 
of Hindustan and Bengal Bank. The East India Company established Bank of 
Bengal (1809), Bank of Bombay (1840) and Bank of Madras (1843) as 
independent units and called it Presidency Banks. These three banks were 
amalgamated in 1920 and Imperial Bank of India was established which started 
as private shareholders banks, mostly Europeans shareholders. 
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In 1865 Allahabad Bank was established and first time exclusively by 
Indians, Punjab National Bank Ltd. was set up in 1894 with headquarters at 
Lahore. Between 1906 and 1913, Bank of India, Central Bank of India, Bank of 
Baroda, Canara Bank, Indian Bank, and Bank of Mysore were set up. Reserve 
Bank of India came in 1935. 
During the first phase the growth was very slow and banks also 
experienced periodic failures between 1913 and 1948. There were 
approximately 1100 banks, mostly small. To streamline the functioning and 
activities of commercial banks, the Government of India came up with The 
Banking Companies Act, 1949 which was later changed to Banking Regulation 
Act 1949 as per amending Act of 1965 (Act No. 23 of 1965). Reserve Bank of 
India was vested with extensive powers for the supervision of banking in India 
as the Central Banking Authority. 
During those days public has lesser confidence in the banks. As an 
aftermath deposit mobilisation was slow. Abreast of it the savings bank facility 
provided by the Postal department was comparatively safer. Moreover, funds 
were largely given to traders. 
Phase II 
Government took major steps in this Indian Banking Sector Reform 
after independence. In 1955, it nationalised Imperial Bank of India with 
extensive banking facilities on a large scale especially in rural and semi-urban 
areas. It fornied State Bank of India to act as the principal agent of RBI and to 
handle banking transactions of the Union and State Governments all over the 
country. 
Seven banks forming subsidiary of State Bank of India was nationalised 
in 1960 on 19th July, 1969, major process of nationalisation was carried out. It 
was the effort of the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi that 14 
major commercial banks in the country were nationalised. 
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Second phase of nationalisation Indian Banking Sector Refonn was 
carried out in 1980 with seven more banks. This step brought 80% of the 
banking segment in India under Government ownership. 
The following are the steps taken by the Government of India to 
Regulate Banking Institutions in the Country: 
1949 : Enactment of Banking Regulation Act. 
1955 : Nationalisation of State Bank of India. 
1959 : Nationalisation of SBI subsidiaries. 
1961: Insurance cover extended to deposits. 
1969 : Nationalisation of 14 major banks. 
1971: Creation of credit guarantee corporation, 
1975 : Creation of regional rural banks. 
1980 : Nationalisation of seven banks with deposits over 200 crore. 
After the nationalisation of banks, the branches of the public sector bank 
India rose to approximately 800% in deposits and advances took a huge jump 
by 11,000%. 
Banking in the sunshine of Government ownership gave the public 
implicit faith and immense confidence about the sustainability of these 
institutions. 
Phase III 
This phase has introduced many more products and facilities in the 
banking sector in its reforms measure. In 1991, under the chairmanship of M 
Narasimham, a committee was set up by his name which worked for the 
liberalisation of banking practices. 
The country is flooded with foreign banks and their ATM stations. 
Efforts are being put to give a satisfactory service to customers. Phone banking 
and net banking is introduced. The entire system became more convenient and 
swift. Time is given more importance than money. 
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The financial system of India has shown a great deal of resilience. It is 
sheltered from any crisis triggered by any external macroeconomics shock as 
other East Asian Countries suffered. This is all due to a flexible exchange rate 
regime, the foreign reserves are high, the capital account is not yet fiiUy 
convertible, and banks and their customers have limited foreign exchange 
exposure. 
ANNOUNCED REFORMS 
r.inKti.ii<: 'if foiciLii brink puseiut 
in India 
AcgKgjK foreign direct imYStmau 
limU in pm'ate bonks 
FtMc igii V'iting ntjiis limii 
Branching limil. per )rar 
PRIOR TO 
MARCH 200T 
Bi.\ncl><5 Only 
49% 
10% 
12 
Blanches or wholly-
ottncdstibadiares 
74% for banlu identified 
as distressed by RBI 
201XJ THEREAFTFR 
Full national ti«iuiient, including 
i ro subKci 10 2is% oi paid-in 
capiuil beiny held lesidenl Indians 
74% 
Pi'^posid .linendmeiu to JIIMW voiing riglils to icfleci 
ottiieishiplcwl 
> 12 subject to RBI jpprwil 
UNCHANGED 
Five pcKenl Icitign mvesmient limit in pri«ile bante by mdmdual f'^ reiyi banks 
Ten percent foreign mvejtment limit in ptii-ate banks by foreign instituoonal nv-estors or Bxtnidual corponte entities. 
Source: RBI 
Table 14 : Financial reforms in India. 
The impressive institutional and legal reforms have been undertaken in 
relation to the banking sector. In 1994, a Board for Financial Supervision 
(BFS) was constituted comprising select members of the RBI Board with a 
variety of professional expertise to exercise 'undivided attention to supervision'. 
The BFS, which generally meets once a month, provides direction on a 
continuing basis on regulatory policies including governance issues and 
supervisory practices. It also provides direction on supervisory actions in 
specific cases. The BFS also ensures an integrated approach to supervision of 
commercial banks, development finance institutions, non-banking finance 
companies, urban cooperatives banks and primary dealers. 
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A Board for Regulation and Supervision of Payment and Settlement 
Systems (BPSS) has also been recently constituted to prescribe policies relating 
to the regulation and supervision of all types of payment and settlement 
systems, set standards for existing and future systems, authorise the payment 
and settlement systems and determine criteria for membership to these systems. 
The Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Bill, 2004 has been passed by 
both the Houses of the Parliament while the Government Securities Bills, 2004 
is under process. Certain amendments are being considered by the Parliament 
to enhance Reserve Bank's regulatory and supervisory powers. Major 
amendments relate to requirement of prior approval of RBI for acquisition of 
five per cent or more of shares of a banking company with a view to ensuring 
'fit and proper' status of the significant shareholders, aligning the voting rights 
with the economic holding and empowering the RBI to supersede the Board of 
a banking company. 
There have been a number of measures for enhancing the transparency 
and disclosures standards. Illustratively, with a view to enhancing further 
transparency, all cases of penalty imposed by the RBI on the banks as also 
directions issued on specific matters, including those arising out of inspection, 
are to be placed in the public domain. While the regulatory framework and 
supervisory practices have almost converged with the best practices elsewhere 
in the world, two points are noteworthy. First, the minimum capital to risk 
assets ratio (CRAR) has been kept at nine per cent i.e., one percentage point 
above the international norm; and second, the banks are required to maintain a 
separate Investment Fluctuation Reserve (IFR) out of profits, towards interest 
rate risk, at five per cent of their investment portfolio under the categories 'held 
for trading' and 'available for sale'. This was prescribed at a time when interest 
rates were falling and banks were realizing large gains out of their treasury 
activities. 
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Simultaneously, the conservative accounting norms did not allow banks 
to recognize the unreahzed gains. Such unrealized gains coupled with the 
creation of IFR helped in cushioning the valuation losses required to be booked 
when interest rates in the longer tenors have moved up in the last one year or so. 
The regulatory framework in India, in addition to prescribing prudential 
guidelines and encouraging market discipline, is increasingly focusing on 
ensuring good governance through "fit and proper" owners, directors and senior 
managers of the banks. Transfer of shareholding of five per cent and above 
requires acknowledgement from the RBI and such significant shareholders are 
put through a Tit and proper' test. Banks have also been asked to ensure that the 
nominated and elected directors are screened by a nomination committee to 
satisfy Tt and proper' criteria. Directors are also required to sign a covenant 
indicating their roles and responsibilities. 
The RBI has recently issued detailed guidelines on ownership and 
governance in private sector banks emphasizing diversified ownership. 
The listed banks are also required to comply with governance principles 
laid down by the SEBI - the securities markets regulator. 
Processes of banking reform 
The processes adopted for bringing about the reforms in India may be of 
some interest to this audience. Recalling some features of financial sector 
reforms in India would be in order, before narrating the processes. 
First, financial sector reform was undertaken early in the reform-cycle in 
India. 
Second, the financial sector was not driven by any crisis and the reforms 
have not been an outcome of multilateral aid. 
Third, the design and detail of the reform were evolved by domestic 
expertise, though international experience is always kept in view. 
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Fourth, the Government preferred that pubHc sector banks manage the 
over-hang problems of the past rather than cleanup the balance sheets with 
support of the Government. 
Fifth, it was felt that there is enough room for growth and healthy 
competition for public and private sector banks as well as foreign and domestic 
banks. The twin governing principles are non-disruptive progress and 
consultative process. 
In order to ensure timely and effective implementation of the measures, 
RBI has been adopting a consultative approach before introducing policy 
measures. Suitable mechanisms have been instituted to deliberate upon various 
issues so that the benefits of financial efficiency and stability percolate to the 
common person and the services of the Indian financial system can be 
benchmarked against international best standards in a transparent manner. 
Brief account of these mechanisms. 
First, on all important issues, workings group are constituted or 
technical reports are prepared, generally encompassing a review of the 
international best practices, options available and way forward. The group 
membership may be internal or external to the RBI or mixed. Draft reports are 
often placed in public domain and final reports take account of inputs, in 
particular from industry associations and self-regulatory organizations. The 
reform-measures emanate out of such a series of reports, the pioneering ones 
being: Report of the Committee on the Financial System (Chairman: Shri M. 
Narasimham), in 1991; Report of the High Level Committee on Balance of 
Payments (Chairman: Dr. C. Rangarajan) in 1992; and the Report of the 
Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (Chairman: Shri M. Narasimham) in 
1998. 
Second, Resource Management Discussions meetings are held by the 
RBI with select commercial banks, prior to the policy announcements. These 
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meetings not only focus on perception and outlook of the bankers on the 
economy, liquidity conditions, credit flow, development of different markets 
and directions of interest rates, but also on issues relating to developmental 
aspects of banking operations. 
Third, we have formed a Technical Advisory Committee on Money, 
Foreign Exchange and Government Securities Markets (TAC). It has emerged 
as a key consultative mechanism amongst the regulators and various market 
players including banks. The Committee has been crystallizing the synergies of 
experts across various fields of the financial market and thereby acting as a 
facilitator for the RBI in steering reforms in money, government securities and 
foreign exchange markets. 
Fourth, in order to strengthen the consultative process in the regulatory 
domain and to place such a process on a continuing basis, the RBI has 
constituted a Standing Technical Advisory Committee on Financial Regulation 
on the lines similar to the TAC. 
The Committee consists of experts drawn from academia, financial 
markets, banks, non-bank financial institutions and credit rating agencies. 
The Committee examines the issues referred to it and advises the RBI on 
desirable regulatory framework on an on-going basis for banks, non-bank 
financial institutions and other market participants. 
Fifth, for ensuring periodic formal interaction, amongst the regulators, 
there is a High Level Co-ordination Committee on Financial and Capital 
Markets (HLCCFCM) with the Governor, RBI as the Chairman, and the Heads 
of the securities market and insurance regulators, and the Secretary of the 
Finance Ministry as the members. This Co-ordination Committee has 
authorised constitution of several standing committees to ensure co-ordination 
in regulatory frameworks at an operational level. 
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Sixth, more recently a Standing Advisory Committee on Urban Co-
operative Banks (UCBs) lias been activated to advise on structural, regulatory 
and super\dsory issues relating to UCBs and to facilitate the process of 
formulating future approaches for this sector. Similar mechanisms are being 
worked out for non-banking financial companies. 
Seventh, the RBI has also instituted a mechanism of placing draft 
versions of important guidelines for comments of the public at large before 
fmalisation of the guidelines. To further this consultative process and with a 
specific goal of making the regulatory guidelines more user-friendly, a Users' 
Consultative Panel has been constituted comprising the representatives of 
select banl^ s and market participants. The panel provides feedback on 
regulatory instructions at the formulation stage to avoid any subsequent 
ambiguities and operational glitches. 
Eighth, an extensive and transparent communication system has been 
evolved. The annual policy statements and their mid-term reviews 
communicate the RBI's stance on monetary policy in the immediate future of 
six months to one year. Over the years, the reports of various working groups 
and committees have emerged as another plank of two-way communication 
from RBI. 
An important feature of the RBI's communication policy is the almost 
real-time dissemination of information through its web-site. 
Ninth, an important feature of the reform of the Indian financial system 
has been the intent of the authorities to align the regulatory framework with 
international best practices keeping in view the developmental needs of the 
country and domestic factors. 
Towards this end, a Standing Committee on International Financial 
Standards and Codes was constituted in 1999. The Standing Committee had set 
up ten Advisory Groups in key areas of the financial sector whose reports are 
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available on the RBI website. The recommendations contained in these reports 
have either been implemented or are in the process of implementation. I would 
like to draw your attention to two reports in particular, which have a direct 
bearing on the banking system, viz., Advisory Group on Banking Supervision 
and Advisory Group on Corporate Governance. 
Indicators 
Number of Commercial Banks 
(a) Scheduled Commerctal Banlcs 
ot 'hikSr. Regional Rural Banks 
(b) No^SchedJed Commercial Banks 
Number of Bank Ofices In Inria 
(a) Rural 
(b) Semi-Urtan 
(c) Urban 
(d) MetropoMan 
Population per Office (in thousand^ 
Aggregate deposits of Si^di ted 
Commercial Banks in India (Rs, crore) 
(3i Demand deposits 
(b) Time deposits 
Credit o( Schediilfid Commercial 
Banksm India (Rs. crore) 
Irorestments d Sclieduted Commercial 
Banks in India (Rs.cioiei 
Deposte of Scheduled Commercial 
Banksperott'ce (Rs. lakh) 
Credit of Scheduled Commercial 
6anksperoffice(Rs. lakhi 
Per capita Deposit of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks (Rs.) 
Per capita Credit of Scheduled 
Conimeicial Banks (Rs) 
Deposits of Scheduled Comnierciai Banks 
as percentage lo Gross National Product 
at (actoi cost (at cutiem prices) 
Scheduled Commeicial Banks' Advances 
10 Pnoiity Sectors (Rs. crore) 
Sliaie ol Prtorky Setior Adirances in iciial 
credit of Scheduled Commercial Banks ipei cent) 
Ciedil-Deposit Ratio (per ceiK) 
Investment-Deposit Raw (per oent) 
Cash-Deposit Ratto (per cent) 
June 
1969 
89 
73 
IS 
82S2 
1B33 
3342 
15S4 
1503 
G4 
4M& 
2104 
2342 
35S9 
1381 
56 
44 
88 
S8 
15.5 
504 
140 
77 5 
29.3 
8.2 
March 
2001 
300 
296 
195 
5 
67937 
32585 
14843 
11193 
9316 
15 
989141 
159407 
«29734 
529271 
3b7184 
1456 
779 
9770 
5228 
56.0 
182255 
31.0 
53.5 
37.1 
34 
fvlarch 
2O02 
297 
293 
196 
4 
68195 
32503 
14962 
11328 
9402 
16 
1131188 
169103 
9S2085 
609053 
437482 
1659 
893 
11008 
5927 
54.4 
205bOG 
14.8 
53 8 
38.7 
7.1 
March 
2003 
292 
283 
196 
4 
68500 
322«3 
1S135 
11566 
S516 
16 
1311761 
187837 
1123924 
746432 
547545 
1925 
1143 
12253 
7275 
58.8 
254648 
351 
56 9 
41.3 
6.3 
March 
2004 
290 
236 
196 
5 
69170 
32227 
15288 
I ISM 
9750 
16 
1504416 
225022 
1279394 
840785 
677538 
2265 
1330 
14089 
8273 
594 
263834 
34 5 
559 
45 0 
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March 
2005 
289 
285 
196 
4 
70373 
30790 
15325 
12419 
11839 
16 
1700198 
248028 
1452171 
1100428 
739154 
2574 
1700 
16281 
10752 
60.0 
381476 
36.7 
62.6 
47.3 
6.4 
March 
2006 
222 
218 
133 
4 
71685 
30436 
15811 
13034 
14204 
16 
2109049 
364640 
1744409 
1507077 
717454 
3047 
2209 
19130 
13869 
654 
510175 
35 3 
70.1 
40.0 
6.7 
FiSarch 
2007 
183 
179 
96 
4 
74346 
30575 
16620 
14049 
13102 
15 
2611934 
429731 
2182203 
1931190 
791516 
3675 
2757 
23382 
17541 
70.1 
632647 
34.3 
73.5 
35.3 
72 
naarch 
2003 
174 
170 
91 
4 
77773 
30977 
17656 
16245 
13895 
15 
3196940 
524310 
2672530 
2361913 
971714 
4344 
3222 
28610 
21218 
74.7 
738&S6 
32 9 
74 6 
35.4 
9.7 
Notes. 1) Nu.'nberot Mnk offices includes Administrative Offices 
2; Classification of haiw offices according to population for the year lSc9 is liased on 1S61 censjs and !o.' the 
subsequent years uo to March 20C4 it Is based on IS9I census For March 2005 uoto March 2007. classification 
of bank offices were based on 20C1 census 
3; Population per otilce, per capita deposits and per caoila cred'-. are based on the esfr-riated niid-year popi.iaticn 
figures, supplied by ;he Office of ".he Registrar General, India 
4': Deposits credi; a".d investments of Scheduled Connercial Banks in India are as per 'Forni-.A' return u-ider Section 
42i2) of the Reser/e Banh of India Ac;, i'J34 and relate to :he last Friday of the reference period 
5) Scheduled Conimsrcial Banks advances to priority sec'ors and the related .'atios are exclusive ol Hegionai 
Rural Banks 
6; For v;orking our cash-deposit rat o cas". .s taKen as ;h6 total of 'cash n hand a id 'balapces with She Reser«e Bank 
of Irdia The data for cash ir> banc 3K tal'.en from Forni-A return as oer Section 42f2i of the Reserve Banh of 
mdia Act, 1934 and 'balances wrh the Reserve Bank of Ind.a' are tahen from the' 'A'eekly Statement of Affairs of the 
Reserve Bank of India' 
7) investments of Scheduled Copinercial Ba",ks in Ind a .nctude only mvestmeiits in governnienl 3ecur,'.ies and other 
approved secunties 
Source: RBI 
Table 15: Indicators of Indian banks 
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1.3.2 Legal and Regulatory framework in which UAE banks operate 
In the UAE, the marketing of financial products and services is 
regulated by the UAE Central Bank under Federal Law No. 10 of 1980 (the 
Central Bank Law and related banking resolutions). Enforcement of Central 
Bank policy, however, is often undertaken by the local licensing authorities in 
the various Emirates. 
The UAE Central Bank prohibits lending an amount greater than seven 
percent of a bank's capital base to any single customer. The bank defines a 
customer as an individual, a company, or a group of companies under common 
ownership, and capital base as local capital. Foreign banks with branches in the 
UAE are not permitted to calculate loans as a percentage of their global capital 
(which may however be used to calculate the capital adequacy ratio). In a 
revision to the rule in 1993, the Central Bank decided to exclude non-funded 
exposures, such as letters of credit and guarantees from the requirement. The 
Central Bank has also announced implementation of internationally recognized 
and accepted accounting principles, in the form of the International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) number 30 on disclosure. 
The creation of tbe UAE's Central Bank in the early 1980s came in 
response to the oil boom which had created a chaotic financial environment in 
terms of bank proliferation, credit expansion, and real estate speculation. This 
atmosphere, coupled with the lack of a proper governing body, had led to a 
financial crisis and the collapse of two banks in 1977. In spite of pressures 
coming from various members of the Emirate's ruling families, the central 
bank announced in 1981 that it would not issue any new branch licenses for 
foreign banks and that existing foreign banks would each have to restrict the 
number of branches to eight by 1984. 
In the early 1980s, the central bank adopted several measures to 
strengthen the banking sector. It "expanded audits and inspections, increased 
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bank reporting requirements, establisiied a computerized loan risk department, 
and set minimum capital requirements". 
In 1983, the Central Bank was forced to take over UAE's third largest 
bank, Union Bank, when the later violated a regulation that limited the size of a 
bank's loans to its directors. The central bank and the Dubai government bailed 
out the bank with US $380 million. 
By the mid 1980s, the price of oil had fallen to below $10 per barrel, 
causing contractions in government spending, which in return, slowed down 
economic activities. The banking sector suffered loan losses arising from 
increased problem loans. This resulted in a restructuring of the banking sector-
three banks in Dubai merged as did three others in Abu Dhabi. The central 
bank took another step towards strengthening the sector in 1994, when it urged 
banks to adopt International Accounting Standards. 
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(In niJllions of AEDs) 
Item 
Asse ts 
Cash and Deposits with C.B. 
Cash in Hand (L.C.) 
Deposite with Central Bank 
Due From Resident Banks 
Uotiey at Cail and Short Notice 
Demand Deposits 
Time Ogpoeits 
Chscpes in clie C(niree of Ca^ecton 
Foreign Assets 
Net Due From Head Office 
anci/or Sranches Abroad 
Due From Other Banks Atxoad 
Cash in Hand {F.C.'i 
SeQunties *" 
Credrt to Hon - Residents '• 
C-ther rore»gR A^ets 
Domestic Credit and Investments " 
a} Credit Facilities 
Claims on Government 
Claims on Official Entities 
Loans. Adv^ices and Ov'erdrafts 
Claims on Private Sector 
Cormnercial Paptrs 
Real Esti^e Nlorsgage Loans 
Loans. Ad\'ance5 and Overdrafts 
Claims on Other Financial Institutions 
Loans. Advances and 0»/erdfaft3 
b) Domestic Investments 
Unclassified Assets 
Fixed Assets 
Inter-Sranch "ransactons 
ether Assets 
Total Assets.' Liabilities " 
2006 
vi^rtrtiftf J 
DEC. 
$3,415 
4 . ^ 5 
58,420 
H793 
2,218 
707 
30,3!^ 
1,478 
231,938 
18,024 
90,489 
114 
S6,638 
63,264 
3,409 
508,278 
474,162 
47,885 
31,513 
31,513 
376,170 
9,522 
31,016 
335,632 
18,594 
18,594 
32,116 
23,150 
4,555 
226 
18,369 
859,574 ' 
2007 
jf^^ 
SEP. 
129,629 
4,831 
124,698 
36,261 
5,145 
1,3% 
29,625 
95 
229,265 
17,328 
70,392 
130 
70,415 
66,643 
4,357 
626,301 
578,713 
55,861 
33,688 
33,688 
458,885 
11,990 
50,103 
396,792 
30,279 
30,279 
47,588 
43,538 
6,826 
6I» 
36.112 
1,064,894 ' 
l„UM>«U'JI 
DEC. 
236,852 
5,730 
231,122 
44,377 
5,512 
919 
37.816 
1 ^ 
198,896 
4,174 
60,222 
im 
57.795 
70,559 
4,CK)0 
700,708 
647,482 
58,402 
39,823 
39,823 
512.316 
13.312 
58,859 
440,145 
36,941 
36,941 
53,226 
44,240 
8,658 
1,2^ 
34,283 
1.223,073 ' 
^a 
My 
150,101 
7,207 
142.8^ 
5^331 
5,787 
1,718 
44,525 
301 
237,092 
8,108 
94.823. 
99 
56.595 
72.963 
4.504 
918,110 
848,235 
71,251 
48,297 
48.297 
672,696 
17.185 
93,224 
562.187 
66,091 
56,091 
69,875 
65,263 
12.323 
770 
52,170 
1,422,89? ' 
2008 
jjtlfuni\ 
AUG. 
137,447 
6,7M 
130,747 
58,200 
10,351 
1,622 
^ ,063 
164 
213,277 
11,793 
73,735 
1 « 
53,855 
69,105 
4,683 
950,058 
877,458 
66,930 
46,550 
46,5S) 
699,772 
:».622 
98.575 
580,575 
64,206 
64,206 
72,600 
74,507 
12.716 
10.036 
51,755 
1,433.489 • 
j i a i ^ , | . | ^ . 
SEP. 
124,576 
8,048 
116,528 
51,737 
6.341 
451 
44,732 
213 
223,410 
19,^0 
73,480 
89 
51,348 
m,m^ 
8,932 
983,101 
909,376 
62,387 
51,218 
51,218 
727,661 
22,765 
115,744 
589,152 
68,110 
68,110 
73,725 
63,475 
12,863 
956 
49,655 
1,446,299 
* Excluding Overseas Branches of National Banks. 
** Including provisions for had and doubtful debts as well as interest in suspense. 
Source: CB oflJAE 
Table 16: Aggregate balance sheet of banks in UAE 
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rtem 
Liabilities 
Monetary Deposits 
Demand Deposits (LC.) 
Bankers Drafts 
Quasi - Monetary Deposits 
Time Deposits (L-C.) 
Savings Deposits (LC.) 
Commerdd Prepaym«itsI'LC.) 
Other Deposits (FC.) 
Foreign Uti l i t ies 
Net Due To H. 0. andtor 
Branches Abroad 
Due To Other Banlts Abroad 
Other Deposits (L.C. - F.C.) 
Provisions' 
Other roresgn Liabr.ities 
Government Deposits 
{L.C. + F.C.) 
Government Lending Funds i 
Due To Central Bank 
Capital and Reserves 
Due To Resident Banks 
Money at Ca'l and Short Notice 
Demand Deposits 
Time Deposits 
Unclassified Liabilities 
Inter-Branch Transactons 
Provsions ^ 
Other Liabilities 
2006 
j^Aauij 
DEC. 
98,182 
SS.367 
1,815 
279,274 
159,374 
18,015 
5,578 
96.307 
177,688 
20,513 
I01,0S4 
49,484 
1,279 
5,318 
93,880 
16 
168 
104,089 
38,397 
1,904 
€65 
35,828 
68,080 
205 
33,183 
34,692 
2007 
• )t l A t^j. 
SEP. 
132,969 
129,436 
w j ' ^ ^ ^ i j 
349,765 
207,780 
2 1 , 1 ^ 
7,991 
112.796 
244,864 
21,950 
146,193 
67,704 
1,054 
7,963 
104,589 
16 
6,452 
121,636 
40,641 
3,205 
1,780 
35,656 
64,962 
157 
19,996 
44,SQ9 
jfSMi^ 
DEC. 
155,722 
152,721 
3.0)1 
384,038 
259.374 
24,654 
9,003 
91,037 
320,970 
44.475 
209,303 
64.684 
819 
1,^8 
114,579 
16 
94 
130,882 
46,026 
2,008 
1,255 
42,763 
70,746 
372 
20,788 
49.586 
Ji^Si 
JULY 
219,910 
212,019 
7.891 
435,624 
277,^23 
32,904 
10.015 
114,782 
308,769 
27.S98 
2(X),124 
76,065 
833 
4,139 
116,466 
16 
25,906 
166,527 
77,363 
2,118 
1,868 
73,367 
73,338 
437 
22,913 
49 ,9^ 
2008 
UKkUiMwl 
AUG. 
206,591 
201,040 
5,551 
454,532 
284,511 
32,049 
10,413 
127,559 
328,986 
29,^1 
206,811 
85,559 
798 
5,959 
111,908 
15 
21,808 
171,821 
66,290 
3,914 
2.270 
60,106 
71,536 
388 
23,339 
47,809 
1 ^ j L ^ t l f t ^ * 
SEP. 
200,420 
198,220 
4.200 
446,079 
284.916 
32.346 
10.925 
117,892 
326,250 
28.305 
202,102 
88.0771 
708 
7,058 
136,761 
15 
35,030 
169,995 
54,936 
3,135 
1,878 
49,925 
76,811 
949 
24,384 
51,478 
Memoranda Accounts 952,310 1,376,821 1,416,622 1,713,106 1,708,433 1,844,839 
Letters cf Credit 79,228 99,216 110,860 143,797 137,474 130,624 
Gjafan:eesar,dO:herendor5i-;ie';$ I H l ^ S 244,671 252,402 319,515 301,599 333,932 
Acceptances 14,740 17,020 18,272 23,725 20.952 24,091 
For.vard Exchange Contracts 341,413 620,376 569,807 677,325 764,405 779,721 
Other Memoranda Ace 322,786 395,538 465,281 546,744 484,003 576,^71 
*Excluding Overseas Branches of National Banks 
1. Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts as well as interest in suspense 
2. Including Construction Refinancing by the Government of Abu Dhabi 
Source- CB ofUAE 
Table 17: Aggregate balance sheet of banks in UAE 
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List of N.ittomil JJaiiks v'i Thdr Briindios 
(As a( 31/12/21)071 
iu,i„i c i .^-k R«'-'*l . ! „ „ I'mm-AI -U- f.^ Pa\ Cnnil 
W«W '^""' "*"** KWwh - ^ " ^ O ^ r t . rntilrai ^'"* Wac« TOM 
NATHINM BANK,? AIni 
I NilciulK»lLcfAluDlut< 
AnbBjikFfif lavcMnflitJt f^aj»Tfa«fe 
Ut»nNi«ou ie i i k 
Comnucul Biot of D<U 
Dulva kbaiK b i k 
lkb>l»qB>it 
12 gMtofStnpk 
14 kmlB^ik 
i; TkHnwi!hiko<R«-AIKi4n)li 
Cc«)ntKMl ijtk Iwetwmiaj 
RKiM&iak 
.M Am)li:>tHkUinKltAnt 
ID 
Id 
I'l 
37 
3 
3 
17 
3 
5 
10 
9 
4 
•u 
2 
2 
2 
J 
4 
2 
2 
1 
S 
3 
i 
1 
3 
7 
1 
0 
• • ! • ! 
12 
l ( 
M 
12 
•21 
3 
1 
J 
2 
•12 
2 
4 
"5 
1 
4 
5 
4 
6 
y 
1 
(. 
2 
1 
10 
4 
3 
•8 
12 
1 
1 
4 
.! 
1 
1 
1 
•> 
4 
1 
0 
2 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
1 
1 
6 
2 
0 
1 
0 
2 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
! 
1 
1 
^ 
1 
1 
5 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
2 
^ 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
Q 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
1 
t 
0 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
57 
39 
i 
55 
42 
2D 
4} 
51 
3 
45 
18 
4 
I 
n 
3) 
i 
12 
15 
15 
43 
10 
5 
16 
5 
0 
a 
6 
5 
0 
9 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
73 
44 
5 
46 
4« 
25 
43 
(D 
24 
49 
19 
4 
9 
12 
20 
9 
12 
15 
15 
43 
10 
5 
TOTU m 2M 539 597 
Source: CB ofUAE 
Table 18: List of national banks and their branches in UA£ 
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1.4 Motivation and Rationale of Research 
There were a number of motivations to pursue the present study: 
1. Interest of the researcher to understand the changes taking place 
following implementation of Basel-II framework and their impact on 
banking sector in particular and society in general. 
2. This research is being conducted as a Ph.D. thesis, after completion of 
which the researcher will be getting an academic incentive. 
3. As the researcher is currently working in UAE, where the environment 
is quite different from India, the researcher is always interested to see 
the differences and similarities between the two systems. 
The researcher is a full-time academician, the vastness of the topic and 
its impact on almost every sphere of life will provide the researcher an 
opportunity to understand the relationships more clearly and vividly. 
1.5 Organization of Thesis 
As per the plan of study the present study has been chaptered as follows: 
Chapter 1- Introduction: This chapter of the thesis provides the reader an 
insight to the research area. It focuses on the Basel accord, its background and 
also makes the reader familiar with the terminology, the developments leading 
to Basel-II. It provides the conceptual knowledge about the capital needs of 
banks and forms the basis of the study that follows, because the most important 
impact areas have been identified in this chapter for research in the later 
chapters. It gives an overview of the banking industry in India and UAE, the 
evolution of the banking industry and the varied nature and forms of banks 
operating in the region. Further this chapter also provides insight on the legal 
and regulatory framework of the two countries financial sector and covers 
major regulations and laws under which the banks operate in India and UAE. 
Chapter 2- Literature Review on the Basel Capital Accord: In this chapter 
the theoretical framework relevant to the purpose of this study has been 
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presented. The chapter also covers the reviews the literature on the three pillars 
of Basel II and present the relevant theories on the Capital Accord along with 
various studies related with the issue of implementation of Basel-II accord and 
response from banking community worldwide. 
Chapter 3- Research Methodology & Research Design: This chapter 
discusses the research methodology of the thesis. It starts with need of study, 
statement of problem justification of study, scope of study, objective of study, 
research design, hypotheses proposed and research approach. It also outlines 
research strategy, sampling method, research setting, data collection, research 
tools and the pattern of data analysis. 
Chapter 4 - Tabulation, Analysis and Interpretation: In this chapter the test 
tool was employed to the respondents from Axis bank, HDFC bank, ABN 
AMRO Bank, ENBD, Commercial Bank of Dubai and Union National Bank. 
The data gathered from the questionnaire are analysed statistically and 
subjectively in context with the secondary data available. Basic Information, 
Industry analysis and testing of research tools along with comparative 
assessment is provided in this chapter. Finally, the hypotheses proposed have 
also been tested at the end of this chapter. 
Chapter 5 - Inferences & Conclusion: Covers the major inference of the study, 
the formulation of conclusions. 
Chapter 6- Recommendations and Suggestions: It gives the gist and final 
outcome of the research. It contains findings and recommendations. It also 
provides general suggestions along with the challenges ahead, impacts, 
limitation of study and finally it justifies the study and poses the question 
whether there are any areas of further studies? 
Chapter 7- Basel II Accord and Economic Meltdown 2008-2009: Covers the 
literary view of the Basel II Accord and the Economic Meltdown. 
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Introduction 
(Introduction to Basel Accord and Study of Banking Industry 
in India and UAE with comparative analysis of Legal and 
Regulatory Framework) 
Literature Review on the Basel Capital Accord 
(Theoretical Framework relevant to the purpose of 
study and review of related literature) 
Research Methodology and Research Design 
Tabulation, Analysis & Interpretation 
(Discussion on collected data in banking sector of India and 
UAE) 
i 
Inferences and Conclusion 
(Inferences and Conclusion based on the analysis of 
data) 
i 
Recommendations and Suggestions 
(Findings, Recommendations, General Suggestions, 
Challenges ahead, Impact, Limitations of study and 
Direction of Future Research) 
i 
Basel II Accord and Economic Meltdown 
2008-2009 
(An Overview of Economic Meltdown) 
Figure 8: Organization of Thesis 
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1.6 Conclusion 
From the above discussion we can see that Basel-II framework is 
affecting the banking sector radically, and in today's world where the financial 
institutions play an important role in almost every sphere of life the impact of 
Basel-II framework will not only be limited to the banks alone rather it would 
be reflected on almost every sphere of life. Basel-II is an attempt to standardise 
the banking world over as per one single standard, which needs fundamental 
changes in proportions of men, machines and money in banking sector - which 
presently are not evenly distributed throughout the world, the economic and 
financial environments in different countries are different - so are the problems 
faced by them in acceptance and implementation of Basel-II and here the 
challenges emerge to accommodate all the differences and rope them in one 
thread. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE BASEL 
CAPITAL AWARD 
The ongoing reform of the Basel Accord relies on three "piJJars": capital 
adequacy requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. Yet the 
articulation between these three instruments is far from clear. On the one hand, 
the recourse to market discipline is justified by common-sense arguments about 
the increasing complexity of banking activities, and the impossibility of 
banking supervisors' monitoring of these activities in detail. It is therefore 
legitimate to encourage monitoring of banks by professional investors and 
financial analysts as a complement to banking supervision. (MONETARY 
AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/OCTOBER 2005). 
The Basel Committee's proposals have stimulated an intense academic 
research. A large number of papers have been dedicated to credit risk modeling, 
with a particular focus on the consistency between the IRB risk-weighting 
framework and the empirical evidence on credit risk. 
2.1 Pillar I-Minimum capital requirement 
The discussion of Pillar 1 bypasses a number of important issues 
concerning the definition and measurement of capital, in particular, what is 
capital; is dividing capital into tiers appropriate and, if so, what should be the 
criteria; role of "subdebt;" what is the relationship between capital and loan 
loss reserves; and how should loss reserves be determined over the business 
cycle (Borio, Furfine, and Lowe, 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; and 
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000). 
The higher degree of risk-sensitivity provided by the IRB approach is 
certainly welcome, in particular when we consider the extensive literature 
arguing that uniform capital requirements can induce banks to increase risk-
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Several empirical papers report evidence for different countries that 
banks subjected to capital adequacy requirement curtail their lending in 
response to a negative shock to their regulatory capital. 
Such a reduction in bank loans would not affect the real output, as long 
as firms can quickly find alternative sources of finance. But given the presence 
of asymmetric information in the financial market, this may not be feasible for 
some borrowers, so that they are forced to curtail their investment. A fall in 
loan supply is therefore likely to affect the smaller firms most adversely, since 
they tend to have little access to financial markets. Hence, if banks cannot raise 
capital flexibly and some firms are dependent on bank loans, a fall in bank 
capital or an increase in capital adequacy requirement leads to a reduction in 
aggregate loan supply and output. 
Altman and Saunders (2001) compared the capital charges under the 
Standardized Approach to those obtained under the foundation Internal 
Ratings-Based (IRB). They argued that for banks with an average quality 
portfolio, th.ere is no incentive to shift from the standardized to the foundation 
IRB approach. 
Milne and Whalley (1999, 2001), Milne (2001a), interpreted that bank 
capital regulation increases capital requirements which in turn reduces bank 
appetite for risk in the short run and has little impact in the long run. 
The recent literature suggests that capital adequacy regulation may also 
affect the monetary transmission mechanism. If some firms are "bank 
dependent", the responsiveness of loan supply to changes in monetary policy 
determines the strength of the transmission mechanism. Chami and Cosimano 
(2001) and Van den Heuvel (2002) argued that capital adequacy regulation 
gives rise to a financial accelerator. In both papers, a tight monetary policy 
reduces banks' capital and constrains their ability to lend, if they are subject to 
capital adequacy requirement. 
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Finally, Kirstein (2002) examined whether banks have an incentive to 
reveal the quality of their loan portfolio under the IRB approach. He comes to 
the conclusion that this is the case only if the regulator validates the internal 
ratings and imposes a fine on the banks that overestimated the quality of their 
loans 
Frey and McNeil (2002) addressed the non-coherence of VaR as a risk 
measure in the context of portfolio credit risk. They show that VaR is not 
subadditive, which questions its use for the definition of capital requirements, 
as is proposed under the new Basel Accord. 
Jackson, Perraudin and Saporta (2002) compared the solvency standard 
implied by the new Accord to the solvency standard banks chosen by their own 
capital setting decision. They concluded that for large international banks, the 
minimum regulatory capital requirement would not be binding. 
A smaller number of papers look at the new Basel Accord from an 
incentive perspective. 
Gordy (2002) demonstrated that such a risk-bucketing approach, i.e. 
capital requirements which only depend on the characteristics of an individual 
exposure, is consistent with an asymptotic single risk factor credit portfolio 
model, itself based on ihe Merton (1974) options-based model of firm default. 
Roy (2003) studied the impact of capital requirement on risk taking by 
commercial banks of seven OECD countries within the framework of the 
simultaneous equations framework. He found that changes in capital and credit 
risk were negatively related over the period studied, which supported the 
argument that stringent capital requirements went hand in hand with greater 
financial stability in addition to imposing a higher capital buffer against 
unexpected credit risk losses. However, they also found evidence indicating 
that the regulation was ineffective in raising the capital ratio of 
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undercapitalized banking institutions in France and in Italy, which leaves room 
for the validity of the argument presented above. 
In a simple static model, Kashyap and Stein (1994) have shown that if 
the capital adequacy requirement is binding, bank loans may not respond at all 
to a monetary expansion. In a more general but similarly static framework, 
Tanaka (2002) showed that the monetary transmission mechanism is weakened 
if banks are poorly capitalized, or the capital adequacy requirement are very 
stringent under these circumstances, they have little scope for expanding their 
loan supply in response to a monetary expansion. In a dynamic context, Van 
den Heuvel (2002a) illustrated that the effects are more subtle. Although the 
loan supply of a poorly capitalized bank may not initially respond to an 
expansionary monetary policy, it tends to overreact after the first quarter. This 
was because a lower interest rate increases banks' profits and hence reduces the 
probability that the capital adequacy requirement will bind in the future. Thus, 
if banks are initially poorly capitalized, loan supply will not respond to an 
expansionary monetary policy in the first instance, but its dynamic effect may 
well be stronger. 
2.2 Pillar II- Supervisory Review 
Supervisory review "is intended... to ensure that banks have adequate 
capital to support all the risks in their business" (Basel, 2003, p. 138) 
determined both by Pillar I and by supervisory evaluation of risks not explicitly 
captured in Pillar I, e.g., interest rate risk and credit concentration. "Supervisors 
are expected to evaluate how well banks are assessing their capital needs 
relative to their risks and lO intervene, where appropriate. 
This interaction was intended to foster an active dialogue between banks 
and supervisors such that when deficiencies are identified, prompt and decisive 
action can be taken to reduce risk or restore capital" (Basel, 2003, p. 138). This 
supervisory responsibility was spelt out further in three of four key principles 
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developed for supervisory review. Principle 2 of Pillar II states that 
"supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they are not satisfied 
with" (Basel, 2003, p. 142) their review and evaluation of the adequacy of the 
banks' internal models. Moreover, principle 3 states that "supervisors should 
expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and 
should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the 
minimum" 
(Basel, 2003, p. 144). Principle 4 states that "supervisors should seek to 
intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the minimum 
levels... and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or 
restored" (Basel, 2003, p. 144). But nowhere in CP3 are supervisors granted the 
tools and authority to perform these functions. This makes it less likely that 
country not currently granting regulators such powers will introduce them 
when adopting Basel II 
Calem and Rob (1996) designed a dynamic (discrete-time) model of 
portfolio choice, and analyzed the impact of capital-based premia when 
regulatory audits are perfect. 
They showed that regulation may be counterproductive: a tightening in 
the capital requirement may lead to an increase in the risk of the portfolios 
chosen by banks, and similarly, capital-based premia may sometimes induce 
excessive risk taking by banks. However, this never happens when capital 
requirements are stringent enough. 
Froot and Stein (1998) modeled the buffer role of bank capital in 
absorbing liquidity risks. They determine the capital structure that maximizes 
the bank's value when there are no audits or deposit insurance. 
Dangl and Lehar (2001) mixed random audits as in Bhattacharya el al. 
(2002) with risk shifting possibilities as proposed by Leland (1998) to compare 
the efficiency of the first Basel Accord (1988) and value-at-risk (VaR) 
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regulation. They showed that VaR regulation was better, since it reduces the 
frequency of audits needed to prevent risk shifting by banks. 
Milne and Whalley (2001) developed a model in which banks can issue 
subsidized deposits without limit to finance their liquidity needs. The social 
cost of these subsidies were limited by the threat of regulatory closure. Milne 
and Whalley (2001) studied the relation between two regulatory instruments: 
the intensity of costly auditing and the level of capital requirements. They also 
allowed for the possibility of banks' recapitalization. They showed that banks' 
optimal strategy was to hold an additional amount of capital (above the 
regulatory minimum) used as a buffer against future solvency shocks. This 
buffer reduced the impact of solvency requirements. 
Finally, Pages and Santos (2001) analyzed optimal banking regulations 
and supervisory policies according to whether or not banking authorities are 
also in charge of the deposit insurance fund. If this was the case, they showed 
that supervisory authorities should inflict higher penalties on the banks that do 
not comply with solvency regulations, but should also reduce the frequency of 
regulatory audits. 
Following Leland (1994), Bhattacharya et al. (2002) derived closure 
rules that can be contingent on the level of risk chosen by the bank. Then they 
examined the complementarities between two policy instruments of bank 
regulators: the level of capital requirements and the intensity of supervision. 
2.3 Pillar Ill-Market Discipline 
Market discipline may be defined as actions by stakeholders to both 
monitor and influence the behaviour of entities to improve their performance 
(Bliss and Flannery, 2002). Pillar III in Basel II was intended "to complement 
the minimum capital requirements (Pillar I) and the supervisory review process 
(Pillar II) ... [and] to encourage market discipline by developing a set of 
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disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess... the 
capital adequacy of the institution" (Basel, 2003, p. 154). 
However, as argued by D'Avolio, Gildor, and Shleifer (2001), "market 
mechanisms . . . are unlikely themselves to solve the problems raised by 
misleading information . . . For the future of financial markets in the United 
States, disclosure [of accurate information] is likely to be critical for continued 
progress." In other words, financial markets will not by themselves generate 
enough information for investors to allocate their funds appropriately and 
efficiently, and in some cases will even tend to spread misleading information. 
This means that disclosure of accurate information must be imposed by 
regulators. 
Decamps, Roger and Rochet (2002) examined the optimal mix between 
the three pillars. They showed that market discipline can reduce the minimum 
capital requirement needed to prevent moral hazard. 
Unfortunately, the requirements for effective market discipline are not 
discussed in the section on market discipline in CP3. Rather, the section 
discusses in great detail what information on a bank's financial and risk 
positions need be disclosed to the public (Lopez, 2003). 
In a recent empirical studied of disclosure in banking, Baumann and 
Nier (2003) found that more disclosure tends to be beneficial to banks: it 
decreases stock volatility, boosts market values, and increases the usefulness of 
accounting data. 
In a recent empirical study of disclosure in banking, Baumann and Nier 
(2003) found that more disclosure tends to be beneficial to banks: it decreases 
stock volatility, boosts market values, and increases the usefulness of 
accounting data. 
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As argued by Rochet and Vives (2004), too much disclosure may trigger 
bank runs and/or systemic banking crises. This happens in any situation where 
coordination failures may occur between many dispersed investors. 
2.4 Studies on Implementation of Basel II across the world 
Hanson and Starley (2004) in a primary data survey conducted by using 
Ernst & Young scale found that data gathering for internal ratings model 
development was the topmost credit risk management challenge, while 
identification of key risk indicators was the topmost operational risk 
management challenge. Among the various credit risk tools under 
implementation, credit risk modeling, credit risk warehousing, data cleaning 
tool, portfolio credit risk analysis tool, reporting tool for risk disclosure had 
been implemented to a certain extent ranging between 25-40%. However, as far 
as credit scoring system was concerned, the implementation was only within 
10-15% range. 
In a study published in July 2004, in the special supplement of The 
Banker based on survey data, it was found that among Asia and Emerging 
markets the apprehensions that capital position will worsen was maximum 
(25%)) while in Canada and Australia this proportion was 10%, in America 6%, 
in Europe there was no such feeling. As regards the contemporary status of 
Basel II programs the compliant solution roll out was ready between 20% to 
50%) for various issues with an average of around 30%. With reference to 
Banks targeting IRB approach the US banks were at the top while Japanese, 
Asian and South African/Brazilian banks were at the bottom rung. On the issue 
of reliance on IT for FTE resources the Canadian and Australian banks led the 
tally (42%) as against just 4% for Asia & emerging markets and US markets. 
The reliance on non-lT FTE resources was maximum in European large banks 
(49%) while it was minimum in US banks (17%). As far as FTE resources (IT 
+ Non-IT) for Basel II programs were concerned the Canadian and European 
banks led the tally (75%) while European large banks (71%), European 
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medium banks (41%), Asia and emerging markets (24%) and US banks (21%) 
followed them in that order. 
In a study, on the readiness of Thai Banks for Basel IPs Pillar II and 
Economic Capital Management? (July 3, 2006). Implementing Basel II 
according to the requirements of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and the Bank of Thailand, most of the commercial banks usually focus on Pillar 
I - Minimum Capital Requirement at the moment. However, the banks should 
also be aware that other requirements are just around the comer described in 
Pillar II - Supervisory Review Process. 
Four key principles under Pillar II 
The Bank of Thailand had issued the circular on 6 March 2006 for the 
draft of supervisory review process commonly known as Pillar II of Basel II 
which comprise of four key principles. 
Principle 1: The banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital 
adequacy in relation to their risk profile and strategy for maintaining their 
capital levels. 
Principle 2: The Bank of Thailand has the responsibility to review and 
evaluate banks' internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies as well as 
the ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital ratios. 
Principle 3: The banks should have the ability to maintain their capital in 
excess of the minimum regulatory capital ratios in case that the Bank of 
Thailand views the minimum capital not appropriate or adequate for banks' 
risk profile. 
Principle 4: The Bank of Thailand may intervene at an early stage to prevent 
capital from falling below the minimum level required to support the risk 
characteristics of banks and request rapid remedial action if capital is not 
maintained or restored. 
In interpreting these key principles, the supervisors are moving to a position 
where they will require banks to define clear business and risk strategies which 
demonstrate how business models ensure that risk can be safely borne. They 
will also insist on the implementation of systems to assess whether the level of 
capital is consistent with the risk profile of the bank and a strategy for 
maintaining such capital level. 
Pillar II challenge 
While Pillar I of Basel II provide three distinct approaches for credit and 
operational risk and options within each one. Even though it provides a certain 
degree of flexibility, it still has a high degree of standardisation. Pillar II just 
provide the desired flexibility and at the same time address factors not covered 
by Pillar I including a) risk considered but not fully captured such as credit 
concentration risk, b) factors not taken into account such as interest rate risk in 
banking book and strategic risk and c) factors external such as business cycle 
effects. 
Moreover, in case that the banks select to apply the Internal Ratings-
Based approach for credit risk and the Advanced Measurement approach for 
operational risk, under Pillar II, the supervisory will assess the compliance with 
the minimum standards and disclosure requirement to ensure that all 
requirements are being met both as qualifying criteria and on a continuing basis. 
Under Pillar II, the supervisors will evaluate the bank's risk 
management system and provide recommendations or intervene. Accordingly, 
the banks are convinced to enhance risk management techniques and improve 
risk monitoring and management. 
Economic capital management as a helpful tool 
Under Basel II requirement of Pillar II, it will be impossible for banks to 
discharge their risk management responsibilities and comply with the 
regulations without a comprehensive risk and capital management framework; 
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consequently, the economic capital is rapidly moving importance in the 
banking industry. In European countries, the supervisors regard economic 
capital management as a means to guarantee that the bank has sufficient capital 
to cover its risks and protect investors, shareholders and customers from the 
risk of insolvency. 
At the strategic level, economic capital analysis assists the management 
to determine the optimal capital level consistent with the determined risk 
appetite. At the operational level, it offers a much more accurate means of 
assessing performance of each business unit, product and service. This will 
enhance the way to be more effective decision making on product and 
marketing expansion and portfolio remodel, and also allow accurate risk-based 
pricing and elimination of unprofitable business units. 
Last but not least, economic capital also makes it easier to communicate 
the bank's capital strategy, risk management and value-based performance to 
supervisors, shareholders, investors and customers as well as rating agencies 
who are increasingly focusing on assessing bank's risk management and risk-
bearing capacity in an economic capital context. 
For those banks just starting out on Pillar II and economic capital 
processes, they constitute a challenging agenda as they will require dedicated 
effort and resources and expert guidance. 
KPMG International (2004) conducted a survey between October and 
November 2003 among 303 institutions in 39 countries. Participants included 
retail banks, investment banks, cooperatives and savings banks, building 
societies, private banks, securities firms and universal banks. 
The study revealed that: 
Many banks were still at relatively early stages of their Basel 
programmes when the survey was carried out, and some may have struggled to 
catch up, particularly in the Asia Pacific region, given the 2007 implementation 
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date then proposed in the draft Accord. The revised time frames (for some at 
least) may have come as a welcome extension to many. At the same time, many 
banks clearly perceived the advantages to be gained from Basel II, especially in 
its potential to enhance credit ratings and thus drive benefits across the business. 
As banks have progressed in their Basel preparations, they appear to 
have shifted their attention away from their initial focus on the possibility of a 
lower capital requirement. There is a realisation that Basel is less about 
reducing regulatory capital, and more about running the whole business more 
effectively and efficiently. 
• More than 90 percent of respondents have started a Basel project. 
• Over half of the participants are still in the pre-study / assessment phase 
in their credit risk projects. 
• Less than 25 percent of respondents have started implementation for 
credit risk, and less than 15 percent have begun implementing 
operational risk processes. 
• Less than 10 percent of respondents have started the testing and 
validation phase in either area (which, based on our experience, 
consumes 25 to 30 percent of total project time) 
• Almost 60 percent of respondents see the short time frame for 
implementation as the main cause for concern. 
• Over 60 percent of respondents agreed that their adopted approach 
would improve their credit rating system, process quality and 
management of operational risk. 
• Almost SO percent of respondents agreed that implementing Basel II will 
provide a better foundation for future developments in risk management 
and risk-sensitive capital assessment. 
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Many banks in Asia Pacific see the New Accord as a compliance 
requirement. This may explain the relatively early stages of their Basel 
programmes since few Asia Pacific central bankers have announced their 
requirements. Asia Pacific banks that operate globally/regionally see the New 
Accord as more than just a compliance requirement, have progressed further 
with their Basel programmes. 
In a report published in 2005, Indian banks were well behind schedule 
for the implementation of Basel II, according to a survey of 252 financial 
entities across 36 countries by consulting firm KPMG. 
In an assessment of impact of Basel-II by Carvalho (2005) concluded 
that implementation of Basel-II instead of providing greater safety against risks 
will add up to the cost of lending. 
An impact assessment of Basel II in developing economies with special 
reference to Bangladesh was done by Md. Akhtaruzzaman. A pilot testing 
model for Basel II parallel calculations was employed to measure the impact of 
capital requirements of a commercial bank in Bangladesh. The result showed 
that capital requirement to comply with Basel II increased by 41.94% as 
compared to Basel I. However, despite this phenomenal change in capital 
requirements, the author suggested that the norms are for strengthening the 
banking systems globally and this objective should not be lost. In his view 
developing economies need to be prepared and to adapt to the changing global 
conditions and to adapt the norms to their own advantage. 
In an overview of Indian Banks' prepared for Basel II, G. 
Sankaranarayan, Sr. Vice President, Indian Banks' Association opined that the 
overall position as regards preparedness of Indian banks for embracing Basel-II 
is satisfactory. He based his views on the Indian Banks' past performance in 
nineties when they adopted the Basel I standards without encountering any 
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major hurdles. He found Indian banks to be confident enough to adapt to the 
Basel-II recommendations in the given timeframe. 
In a study by Central Bank of UAE (2006), it was assessed that Basel II 
implementation in the UAE was expected to have a positive effect on the 
financial system's stability and soundness. It was expected that Basel II would 
encourage banks and other financial institutions to improve their risk 
management systems and corporate governance. It was anticipated that the 
implementation process in the UAE would take place gradually with the 
ultimate intention for the banks to adopt more advanced methods. The need of 
bank's internal experts, central bank's experts and external experts was also 
emphasized for successful implementation. A need for formation of joint 
working groups towards reaching a consensus in ft-aming regulations was also 
feh. 
In a seminar organised by the Central Bank of UAE on course for Basel 
II implementation in which experts and senior representatives from KPMG, 
Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers shared their thoughts with the 
audience in respect of the issues arising it was emphasized that a lot of 
discussion is required to be made in respect with various issues concerning the 
local banks and foreign banks operating in UAE. It was cited that countries 
around the world have opted to implement the different elements of Basel II in 
stages that suit the particular environment in their own markets and a similar 
approach should also be adopted in UAE after considering various issues 
involved. 
Issac John (2007) stated that the UAE Central Bank expects banks to 
adopt the 1996 Amendment to Basel II, in accordance with the Basel II 
requirements, in phases, and must be compliant with the standardised approach 
to credit risk evaluation by the end of this year. 
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As part of the strategic initiative to implement Basel II in the UAE, the 
central bank and external consultants conducted a comprehensive diagnostic 
review and Gap Analysis, with the objective to verify the status of Basel II 
readiness of all banks. Based on expectations of banks, the analysis indicates 
that Basel 11 implementation in the UAE is expected to have a positive effect 
on the financial system's stability and soundness. 
Hussein A. Hassan Al-Tamimi (2008) conducted a study to measure the 
preparations of UAE. Based on the results of the analysis in this study, it was 
concluded liiat the UAE banks were ready for the implementation of Basel II. 
This conclusion was supported by the fact that the UAE banks have sufficient 
resources for the implementation of Basel II, which represents a prerequisite 
for the implementation. The readiness of the UAE banks for implementing 
Basel II is also supported by the common understanding of Basel II by the 
employees of the UAE banks and the satisfactory level of education on Basel 
II. The results also indicate that there is no difference between UAE national 
and foreign banks in their readiness for the implementation of Basel II, which 
gives a positive impression about the competitive advantage of the national 
banks. Finally, the results support the importance of training and education on 
Basel II as one of the requirements of the implementation. 
Criticism of Basel II 
In a report by Indian Bankers' Association the KPMG findings have 
been cited as 'Risk Management Revolution disguised as Regulation'. They 
had acknowledged the fact that any attempt to regulate the complexity that 
curreht global financial infrastructure presents is far from easy. The complexity 
involved in modeling has been termed as 'modeling risk', which can be 
reduced by back-testing the model, but not eliminated entirely. 
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The criticism has been done under the sections "Pro-cyclicality", 
"Fearsome complexity", "Heavy implementation costs", "Credit risk concerns" 
and "Concerns of National Supervisors". 
Pro-Cyclicality 
Risk-based financial regulation is inherently pro-cyclic. The pro-
cyclicality springs fi-om the treatment of risk as an exogenous variable, whereas 
in reality, it is endogenous. The actions of a market participant based on a 
predictive model affects the market and if many participants are using the same 
model, their combined actions render the basic assumptions of the model on the 
heterogeneous nature of the market (normal distribution) false. 
^Requiring banks to run their capital through a stress test to assess what 
impact worsening economic conditions will have on their loan portfolios, and 
requiring bank supervisors to evaluate those models independently, increases 
the safety of the bank. This is one of the measures that will help the banks to be 
less pro-cyclical because they will have taken into account the whole (business) 
cycle,' counters Jaime Caruana, Chairman of the Basel II Committee in an 
interview to Reuters. 
The US Comptroller of Currency, John D. Hawke Jr., considered CP3 
(Consultative Paper 3) published by Basel Committee as having 'mind-
numbing complexity'. ^Can anyone reasonably assume that a mandate of the 
complexity of Basel II will be applied with equal forcefulness across such a 
broad spectrum of supervisory regimes,' asked Hawke. 
Fearsome complexity 
The meek answer from BCBS was that the complexity of the new 
accord resulted from the complexity it seeks to address. 'This (Basel II 
implementation) is a task of extreme complexity involving the intersection of 
computer science, mathematics and finance,' said Dr. Ron Dembo, founding 
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chairman of Algorithmics Inc., a Toronto- based company specializing in 
financial risk management software. 
Heavy Implementation Costs 
Datamonitor estimated that financial institutions worldwide will spend 
close to US$ 4 billion over two years on upgrading databases and other systems 
in order to comply with Basel II. Aberdeen Group estimated that banks will 
spend US $3.2 billion in the next four years preparing for Basel II. ^Asian 
banks are expected to spend between seven to ten per cent of their global IT 
and business operations budget on Basel II compliance for the next four to six 
years,' observes BIS. 
While such estimates were music to the ears of software suppliers and 
consulting firms, the moot question for banks were 'what benefits will accrue 
from this investment?' and 'how long will the pay back period be?' 
Credit Risk Concerns 
Using the standardized approach, un-rated corporate borrowers attract 
less risk weight (100 per cent) than the lowest rated borrower (150 per cent) 
giving incentives to high-risk borrowers to remain un-rated. 
Another argument against Basel II is that it does not resort to full credit 
risk modelling-it fails to take into account portfolio effects of risk mitigation 
through diversification. 
The New Accord is criticized on the ground of being as much 
prescriptive as to be lacking in trust for national supervisors. Also, Pillar II 
requires national supervisors to give up arms-length supervision in favour of 
participative implementation. 
Concerns of National Supervisors 
Supervisors also need to invest heavily in people and technology to 
perform their duties as envisaged in Basel II. 
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Perceived Impact 
Adapting to Basel II will be more demanding for some institutions than 
for others, based on factors including current risk management practices, 
business size, geographical spread, risk types, specific business, portfolio, and 
market conditions. 
Apart from banks and regulators, who are directly affected by Basel II, 
customers, rating agencies, capital markets and other financial companies 
(outside the scope of Basel II) will also be affected. Banks will have to 
implement an enterprise-wide risk management framework, which will entail 
establishing relevant processes and gathering, integrating and analysing large 
amount of data. Using quantitative methods to manage risk - and to deploy 
capital based on risks - requires high quality and high frequency data. 
Impact on various entities in financial markets 
Customers will find that they have to cope with increased demands for 
timely information from banks that are on IRB approaches. Risk-based pricing 
of credit products will become the norm as banks begin differentiating 
customers as per their risk profiles. Riskier borrowers are likely to find their 
borrowing costs going up and/or credit lines tightened up. 
Rating agencies may face more competition as the market for them will 
expand and deepen, which will be a driver for them to be more transparent in 
their rating process. 
Good quality rated corporates will prefer capital markets to banks for 
their funding. Securitisation and credit derivatives will increasingly be used as 
credit risk hedging tools. 
Basel II is also likely to impact financial institutions that do not have to 
comply with it. Non-banking corporations such as credit card companies, 
leasing companies, auto manufacturers and financiers, or retailers' financing 
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arms may not have to fulfill the potentially extensive disclosure requirements 
prescribed by Basel II nor make investments in managing operational risk, 
which will put them at a competitive advantage vis-a-vis banks. 
In an attempt to assess the impact of Pillar I requirements of capital 
adequacy, BCBS did undertake a few quantitative impact surveys (QIS), the 
last of which is referred to as QIS-3. The results indicated that, in general, 
banks' required capital will decrease with respect to credit risks and increase 
with respect to operational risks. However, in Asia and other emerging markets, 
several factors may raise the required capital even for credit risks, as real estate 
continues to be widely used as collateral for business loans, and the 
standardised approach, which is the most likely approach for many banks, 
places a 150 per cent risk weight on non-performing loans. Basel II will 
increase the level of capital that is required for banking institutions in the 
emerging markets, mainly owing to the new operational risk charge, which will 
be higher if the basic indicator approach is used. 
Impact on emerging markets and smaller banks 
7 don't believe that any responsible supervisor can or should make a 
judgment about the impact of BASEL II on the capital level it supervises on the 
basis of QIS-3,' observed Hawke, emphasizing the need for national level 
impact study. 
By application of differential risk weights on the basis of sovereign 
rating as a benchmark, the capital inflows in emerging markets could be 
seriously affected as most of the borrowers in such markets will be categorised 
under the speculative grade. 
Smaller banks would find the investments on Basel II compliance too 
big for their existing budgets. 
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Implications for India 
The official position of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as emphasized 
in its response to CP3 of BCBS, is as follows, 7« its (Basel II) attempt to strive 
for more accurate measure of risks in banks, the simplicity of the present 
Capital Accord is proposed to be replaced, with a highly complex methodology 
which needs the support of highly sophisticated MIS / data processing 
capabilities. The complexity and sophistication essential for banks for 
implementing the new capital accord restricts its universal application in the 
emerging markets.' RBI had also suggested that a common definition of 
'internationally active banks' be provided by BCBS. Even the United States of 
America is not adopting the new accord for all of its banks. But, in the same 
response, RBI has also affirmed that it is fully committed to implement the best 
international practices'. 
The response from the Indian banking industry was equally positive. 
Indian Banks are not averse to making the investment of the effort to embrace 
global practices,' asserts V. Leeladhar, chairman, Indian Banks' Association 
(IBA) and chairman and managing director, Union Bank of India. H.N. Sinor, 
chief executive officer, IBA, added ^Basel II is a reality that no progressive 
country can afford to ignore. It provides an opportunity for global integration 
and ushering in international best practices.' 
Rana Kapoor, managing director, YES Bank (the latest entrant to new 
generation private banks in India), held that Indian banks have a demonstrated 
track record of compliance - the system subjected itself voluntarily to the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and was found to be in compliance with the relevant principles.' 
P.S. Shenoy, chairman and managing director, Bank of Baroda, believed 
that Basel II compliance would eventually result in banks acquiring a 
competitive edge, stating ^Banks that move proactively in the broad direction 
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outlined by the Basel Committee will have acquired a definite edge over their 
competitors when the new accord enters the implementation phase.' The 
largest banking conglomerate in India, State Bank of India, has already 
declared its firm resolve to become Basel II compliant. 
Viewed against these brave words from the major Indian banks, the 
Indian regulator RBI, appears to be more cautious and pragmatic, holding a 
view that ^Banks in emerging markets would, therefore, face serious 
implementation challenges due to lack of adequate technical skills, under 
development of financial markets, structural rigidities and less robust legal 
systems. Besides banks, supervisors would be required to invest considerable 
resources in upgrading technology systems, and human resources to meet the 
minimum standards.' 
Having successfully implemented the 1988 Basel Accord, the Indian 
banking industry is poised to implement the 1996 Amendment for inclusion of 
market risk in capital adequacy calculations this year. Sinor expected Indian 
banks to eventually embrace Basel II, albeit slowly and 'without making 
noises'. Supporting the phased approach taken by RBI with respect to Basel II, 
Sinor feels that 7/ie new accord provides incentives to banks for improving 
their credit portfolio through risk management'. Leeladhar expressed 
confidence that ^in any event, banks will reap the benefits of improved systems 
and efficiency in the long term'. 
Initially, banks in India will have to adopt the standardised approach 
(possibly the simplified one) for credit risk, and the basic indicator approach 
for operational risk calculations. RBI had done a selective impact study last 
year using these approaches on data sourced from seven major banks. The 
results of both the RBI study and the QIS-3, suggest an increase of one to two 
per cent on account of credit risk and eleven per cent on account of operational 
risk, in the minimum capital requirements, moving from Basel I to Basel II. 
Kapoor provides the roadmap, saying 'Most (Indian) banks are likely to start 
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with simpler, elementary approaches, just adequate to ensure compliance to 
Basel II norms and gradually adopt more sophisticated approaches. The 
continued regulatory challenge will be to migrate to Basel II in a non-
disruptive manner. Competitive compulsions will ensure that banks make the 
necessary investments in the appropriate technology and qualified, experience 
professionals to adopt advanced approaches.' 
Shenoy felt that 'The new accord will reward those banks that use a 
more sophisticated IRB approach to measure and manage risk.' Countered by 
Nial] S.K. Booker, chief executive officer, HSBC India and chairman of the 
IBA Committee on Basel II, 'There is the possibility that in international 
markets access may be easier and costs less for banks adopting a more 
sophisticated approach.... however in a market like India it seems likely that 
the large domestic players will continue to play a very significant role 
regardless of the model used.' Meanwhile, Leeladhar remain hopeful that 
banks will ultimately adopt the IRB approach for credit risk. 
The additional capital charge on account of operational risk is 
considered 'harsh' by bankers and software suppliers unanimously. But all of 
them agree that it will benefit banks in the long term by making them sensitive 
to operational risk. Sinor expected that the operational risk charge will 
eventually be calibrated down as the implementation progresses. 
It is, however, certain that efforts have begun at major public sector 
banks and some new private sector banks in India, to prepare for the new 
paradigm of enteiprise risk management. 
'Public sector banks in India will initially focus on credit risk,' 
predicted H.S. Rajashekhar, principal consultant - risk management at iflex 
Solutions, adding that 'there is a need to develop a business case on adoption 
of Basel 11 prescriptions'. Rajashekhar also felt that proprietary risk models 
will be used as competitive tools. Aruna Rao, executive vice president, Polaris 
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Software Labs, and Manoj Kunkalienkar, executive director, ICICI Infotech, 
agree, voiced that Basel II was not a short term opportunity like Y2K but an 
evolving commitment to align with global practices in risk management. 
C. Krishnan, head - risk management practice, Tata Consultancy 
Services, felt that Basel II will favour, at least in the short term, the bigger 
banks who have the technology advantage, but considered this as an 
opportunity for domestic banks to catch up with the big league in the long term. 
Agrees Leeladhar ^ While the new accord may initially appear to favour those 
established in development markets, the ultimate beneficiaries will be those 
banks that can upgrade their systems to sophisticated levels in the minimum 
possible time.' 
Booker supported the adoption of advanced approaches. TAe cost of IT 
development is almost certainly less in India than elsewhere,' said Booker and 
asserted further that ^there may be a faster payback for the more advanced 
method of internal ratings despite the greater level of investment required as 
the payback in terms of reduced capital utilisation at least on the credit side 
may be quicker depending of course on each banks cost of capital.' 
Sinor was confident that ^Customers in India will not be marginalized. 
Instead, there will be qualitative changes in lower rated corporates and SMEs 
towards improving their rating to obtain a price advantage. 
It was generally agreed the implementation of Basel II is likely to 
provide momentum for mergers and acquisitions in the Indian banking industry. 
Shenoy thought that 'The higher disclosure requirements in the banking sector 
might lead to a growing tendency towards structural changes in the form of 
mergers and acquisitions.' Kapoor provided another reason, stating 'as more 
and more banks move towards the advanced approaches, the gap between the 
strong and weak banks will increase further, making the weaker banks 
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potential takeover targets'. Booker and Sinor attributed it to economic logic, 
with Basel II just accentuating it. 
As this report was about to go to press, Kishori J Udeshi, deputy 
governor, RBI, in her speech at the ^World Bank/IMF/US Federal Reserve 
Board 4th Annual International Seminar on Policy Challenges for the 
Financial Sector: Basel IF at Washington on June 2, 2004, summed up the 
Indian response to Base] II. Here are a few excerpts from her speech, which 
describe RBI's current approach: 
• We are now not debating whether to go forward with Basel II but how 
to implement Basel II. In fact, understanding Basel II concepts is one 
step away from agreeing to it in principle. Implementing Basel II is 
another long step away from understanding it'. 
• RBI's approach to the institution of prudential norms has been one of 
gradual convergence with international standards and best practices 
with suitable country specific adaptations. Our aim has been to reach 
global best standards in a deliberately phased manner through a 
consultative process evolved within the country. RBI had in April 2003 
itself accepted in principle to adopt the new capital accord'. 
• RBI has announced, in its Annual Policy statement in May 2004 that 
banks in India should examine in depth the options available under 
Basel II and draw a road-map by end December 2004 for migration to 
Basel II and review the progress made thereof at quarterly intervals'. 
• At a minimum all banks in India, to begin with, will adopt Standardized 
Approach for credit risk and Basic Indicator Approach for operational 
risk. After adequate skills are developed, both in banks and at 
supervisory levels, some banks may be allowed to migrate to IRB 
Approach'. 
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• India has three established rating agencies in which leading 
international credit rating agencies are stakeholders. However, the level 
of rating penetration is not very significant as, so far, ratings are 
restricted to issues and not issuers. Encouraging ratings of issuers 
would be a challenge'. 
• Basel II could actually imply that the minimum requirements could 
become pro-cyclical. No doubt prudent risk management policies and 
Pillars II and III would help in overall stability. We feel that it would be 
preferable to have consistent prudential norms in good and bad times 
rather than calibrate prudential norms to counterpro-cyclicality'. 
• Banks adopting IRB Approach will be much more risk sensitive than the 
banks on Standardised Approach, (so) the banks on Standardised 
Approach could be inclined to assume exposures to high risk clients, 
which were not financed by IRB banks. Due to concentration of higher 
risks, Standardised Approach banks can become vulnerable at times of 
economic downturns'. 
• Keeping in view the cost of compliance for both banks and supervisors, 
the regulatory challenge would be to migrate to Basel II in a non-
disruptive manner. We would like to continue the process of interaction 
with other countries to learn from their experiences'. 
From an Indian perspective, it appears that Basel II compliance may be a 
challenge in the short term but it will certainly prove to be an opportunity in the 
long term. 
Itiplication in UAE 
The challenges facing UAE banks while they implement Basel II 
guidelines were highlighted at the Financial Technologies Middle East (FTME) 
- Riskraft Consulting Ltd, roundtable conference in 2007 for Risk Managers 
entitled 'Basel II and Beyond'. The biggest challenge faced by the banks is the 
quantification of operational risk - the risk of failure of systems, processes and 
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people. This challenge is magnified due to the lack of credible, quality and 
granular data. 
The Risk manager from the UAE stated that most of the banks may need 
more than six months to be compliant with Basel II accord. The responses from 
the industry were positive with the summation that Globalization of UAE's 
financial sector is a reality and its banks must subject themselves to global 
standards and disciplines to remain competitive. Adoption of the risk 
intelligence system provided under the Basel II norms not only leads to better 
and prompt compliance but increases efficiency and productivity of the banks. 
It becomes a source of competitive advantage in the international financial 
market. 
Arshad Khan, Director, FTME commenting on progress of compliance 
effort though ''Banks in UAE are very well conversed with the benefits that 
Basel 2 compliance will bring for them. That's the reason that even though they 
are facing several challenges still sincere efforts are being put-in to become 
compliant in the near future. Compliance with these norms helps banks in 
emerging economies to prepare themselves for global competition and adopt 
best international practices, particularly in risk management. 'Basel II 
compliance program should be viewed by UAE banks as a source of 
competitive advantage rather than as just another regulatory issue." Dr. A K 
Nag, Chief Consulting Officer of Riskraft defended the importance of Basel II 
thought "Basel II compliance mitigates various kinds of risks that any bank is 
exposed to. Mitigation of such kind of risks is an important part of their overall 
risk assessment program. In the absence of proper information management 
framework, banks in emerging economies do not have the required risk profile 
of their borrowers. Availability of detailed data can be used to price various 
banking products differentially for different types of customers ". 
From the UAE perspective, its implementation is seen as essential for 
domestic banks in emerging market economies to maintain their independence. 
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Research Design/ 
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Approach 
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experience 
Pilot testing model 
Survey method/ 
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Findings 
Four focal areas of 
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Basically concerned 
with Pillar-2. 
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economic capital 
was laid. No 
discussion 
regarding Pillar-3 or 
impact. 
Short time frame a 
major concern. 
Majority viewed 
Basel-ll to be a 
better foundation for 
future development 
in risk management. 
Regional 
differences 
observed. 
Indian banks found 
to be well behind 
schedule for the 
implementation. 
Basel-ll instead of 
providing greater 
safety against risks 
will add up to the 
cost of lending. 
Capital 
requirements shown 
to grow up 
Importance of 
training and 
education 
emphasized. 
Table 20: Methodology Adapted by Different Studies in the past 
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2.5 Gaps in Literature 
1. There are almost no studies to study the impact of Basel-II framework in 
comparative terms. 
2. Most of the studies have been targeted to assess the availability of 
physical and tangible facilities but there is no study to assess the 
psychographic setup in terms of acceptance and readiness for the Basel-
II framework. 
3. Basel-II is being implemented in phases. Most of the available studies 
are before the start of Pillar-II implementation and are usually the pre-
implementation assessments. Only a few studies are available which 
take stock of the contemporary situation in banks. 
4. No study has taken up the issue of impact of ownership on acceptance of 
Basel-II, though the priorities in banking sector change with the change 
in ownership pattern. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The review of literature revealed various gaps in literature primarily 
those related to study the perception of the decision-makers regarding various 
aspects related to the provisions, implementation and preparedness. Apart from 
that there is no contemporary research on the issue of status of banks on 
different stages of implementation. The present study tries to take stock of the 
situation at a time when the Pillar II implementation is almost at the verge of 
completion. In the further chapters of this work an attempt will be made to fill 
these gaps. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH 
PESION 
The present study was undertaken to compare the Implementation of 
Basel II Accord and its Implication in Indian and U.A.E. Banking Sector. After 
a thorough study of the previous works on the topic, the methodology to 
undertake the present study was evolved. The present chapter discusses the 
methodology adapted for the present study in detail. 
3.1 Need of Study 
• Lack of comparative assessment of impact of environment on Basel-II 
readiness and implementation status, as it will help the decision makers to 
clarify v/hether uniform Basel-II framework is applicable universally or it 
needs some adaptations according to local needs. 
• Lack of comparative assessment of impact of ownership, as it will help the 
decision makers to understand the specific issues related with different 
types of owners of banks in order to ensure the uniform implementation. 
• To assess the present status in readiness and implsmentation. 
• To assess the readiness in connection with Pillar III recommendations. 
3.2 Detailed Statement of Problem 
Indian Banking Sector 
The banking sector being life blood of the economy. Banks are a critical 
and important component of any economy. They provide financing for 
economic enterprises, basic financial services to a broad segment of the 
population, and access to payment systems. In addition, some banks are 
expected to make credit and liquidity available in different market conditions. 
The importance of banks to national economies is underscored by the fact that 
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banking is, almost universally, a regulated industry and that banks have access 
to government safety nets. 
The economy of India, measured in USD exchange-rate terms, is the 
twelfth largest in the world, with a GDP of around $1 trillion (2008). It 
recorded a GDP growth rate of 9.0% for the fiscal year 2007-2008 which 
makes it the second fastest big emerging economy, after China, in the world. 
The Indian money market is classified into: the organised sector 
(comprising private, public and foreign owned commercial banks and 
cooperative banks, together known as scheduled banks); and the unorganised 
sector (comprising individual or family owned indigenous bankers or money 
lenders and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs)). The unorganised 
sector and microcredit are still preferred over traditional banks in rural and sub-
urban areas, especially for non-productive purposes, like ceremonies and short 
duration loans. 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi nationalised 14 banks in 1969, followed 
by six others in 1980, and made it mandatory for banks to provide 40% of their 
net credit to priority sectors like agriculture, small-scale industry, retail trade, 
small businesses, etc. to ensure that the banks fulfil their social and 
developmental goals. Since then, the number of bank branches has increased 
from 10,120 in 1969 to 98,910 in 2003 and the population covered by a branch 
decreased from 63,800 to 15,000 during the same period. The total deposits 
increased 32.6 times between 1971 to 1991 compared to 7 times between 1951 
to 1971. Despite an increase of rural branches, from 1,860 or 22% of the total 
number of branches in 1969 to 32,270 or 48%, only 32,270 out of 5 lakh 
(500,000) villages are covered by a scheduled bank. 
The public sector banks hold over 75% of total assets of the banking 
industry, with the private and foreign banks holding 18.2% and 6.5% 
respectively Since liberalisation, the government has approved significant 
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banking reforms. "While some of these relate to nationalised banks (like 
encouraging mergers, reducing government interference and increasing 
profitability and competitiveness), other reforms have opened up the banking' 
and insurance sectors to private and foreign players.' Since liberalisation, the 
government has approved significant banking reforms. While some of these 
relate to nationalised banks (like encouraging mergers, reducing government 
interference and increasing profitability and competitiveness), other reforms 
have opened up the banking and insurance sectors to private and foreign 
players. 
More than half of personal savings are invested in physical assets such 
as land, houses, cattle, and gold. 
The banking sector reforms were initiated in India as a part of the 
overall structural reforms aimed at improving the productivity and efficiency 
of the economy. The banking sector has undergone the far reaching changes 
since the year 1991. 
UAE Banking Sector 
The Banking sector in UAE until recently had been growing 
significantly mainly as a result of relatively low interest rate environment, high 
oil prices and a flourishing economy. With high GDP growth rates achieved in 
the recent past and surge in oil prices, the sector had been growing over 30% 
year on year in the past five years. At the end of 2008, the total assets of UAE 
banks stood at AED l,480.5bn, the largest among the GCC countries. The 
sector comprised of 24 national banks and 28 foreign banks having aggregate 
branch network of 638. The presence of 52 banks to serve a population of 
4.7mn is relatively high which makes UAE one of the highest penetrated 
banking countries in the world. Central Bank of the UAE has played an 
important role in streamlining the banking operations and increasing consumer 
confidence. Furthermore, the DIFC has been a catalyst in attracting 
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internationally reputed commercial banks and financial institutions. In 
comparison to the GCC banks, UAE banks have performed better than other 
country's banks. 
Finally, Dubai/UAE banks play relevant role in enhancing the private 
sector as claims on the latter are estimated at almost 80% of total claims on 
credit facilities, 
Moody's views the UAE banks as having strong financial fundamentals 
overall, with satisfactory capitalisation levels and fully provided non-
performing loans. "High oil revenues over the past five years have served as a 
catalyst for growth and the accumulation of substantial financial reserves, and 
the banking sector's strong association with local govemments/quasi-
govemment institutions, which are the principal architects and drivers of 
infrastructure, have helped to boost the franchises of local banks," explains Mr 
Tofarides. 
Both the economies are economically diverse, the Indian economy 
which is considered the largest economy is aiming at total transformation from 
the mere social oriented leading to the purpose and security -oriented lending 
through series strategic changes implemented in the bank in phased manner 
from 1991 onwards. In comparison to the oil price-led liquidity in the economy 
which saw excellent growth in the last few years. Good times predominantly 
owed to the high credit and deposit growth on the back of relatively low 
interest rate environment, high oil prices and a flourishing economy. 
Asset expansion through proper risk management culture is another 
important strategic dimension in the Basel II context with matching supervision, 
audit and vigilance systems, which should encourage capturing business rather 
than driving it away. 
The Biasel II going on live from 1st January 2008 in UAE and 31st 
March 2008-2009 in India the banks have mainly been focussing their efforts to 
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become Basel II compliant. Basel II is likely to have a major impact on the way 
in which a bank conducts its business, with which the bank does business with, 
how the bank will account for that business and even whether the bank will do 
business at all.. We were aware that banks faced a huge workload in 
implementing the accord against a tight timetable, a task made more complex 
by the major uncertainties introduced by the lack of finality in the consultation 
process. 
These things raised the following questions 
• The assessment of the adoption by India and UAE banking system of the 
new capital requirement 
• The examination of adequacy of regulatory and legal environment for 
implementation of the Basel II Accord in the two countries Banking 
Sector. 
• How do Indian and UAE banks monitor and evaluate risks; including 
the calculation of economic capital? 
• Which Basel II approach (standard or advanced) Indian and UA E banks 
have chosen or choose? 
• The examination of the effectiveness of the existing Business Risk 
Management systems by the banks operating in the UAE and India. 
• How will it affect their regulatory capital base and risk management? 
How far the new capital arrangement will result in less or more stringent 
capital requirements? 
• The examination of the adequacy of the Internal Control Systems in 
banks operating in India and UAE. 
The above questions have encouraged to study the problems faced by 
banks in implementation of Basel II accord and the impact on the business 
thereto therefore present the research under the title "A Comparative Study of 
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Implementation of Basel II Accord and its implication in Indian and U.A.E. 
Banking Sector". 
3.3 Justification of Study 
As the Basel-II, Pillar-II implementation is scheduled to be over in 2009, 
while the Pillar-III is concerned with financial communication and market 
discipline only, it is the right time to highlight the status of implementation and 
acceptability and preparedness for the Pillar-III. 
3.4 Scope of Study 
The present study has a very wide scope from the point of view of 
academicians, bankers and planners: 
1. Academicians: The academicians will get a chance to understand 
various relationships between banks, environmental impact on transition, 
impact of ownership on transition, relationship between banks and 
solution providers, relationship between banks and regulating authorities, 
relationship between banks and government, implication on various 
stakeholders, the impending fears amongst the banking personnel, and 
their perceptions regarding various issues involved in the transition. 
2. Bankers: The gap analysis will give the bankers an opportunity to 
understand their strengths and weaknesses in detail and thereby provide 
them, an opportunity to diagnose the problems and take correct measures, 
thereby focussing their energies to the correct issues. 
3. Policy Makers: The study of differences between environments and 
differences among different ownerships would give the policy makers an 
opportunity to mould their policies and regulations in such a way so as 
to facilitate the smooth transition. 
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3.5 Aims & Objectives of Study 
The present study was carried out with an aim to study the 
Implementation of Basel II Accord and its Implication in Indian and U.A.E. 
Banking Sector. 
For the above aim the following objectives were framed for the present 
study: 
• To study the clarity of the main spirit of the New Basel Capital Accord 
through the three pillars specified in the Accord and their implementation 
in the Banks across India and UAE. 
• To study the two economies i.e. India and UAE in reference to regulatory 
and legal framework and thereby understanding the overall regulatory 
guidance and constraints; 
• To find out areas of concern /obstacle in respect to implementing the 
Basel II in the Banks with special reference commercial banks in India 
and UAE 
• To study the approach of Indian, Foreign and UAE banks towards various 
risks. 
• To find out problems faced by the banks in different environments. 
3.6 Research Hypotheses 
Based on the foregoing objective the following null hypotheses were 
derived to aid the present study: 
HI. The readiness for implementation of Basel II is affected by 
environment. 
H1 .A. Understanding of Basel II is related with Environment 
Hl.B. Perceptions related to Relevance of Basel II, its impact and 
benefits are related with environment 
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Hl.C. Implementation status and acceptability is dependent on the 
environment. 
Hl.D. Pricing and Implementation Strategy is dependent on the 
environment 
H2. Ability to bear the cost of implementation of Basel-II is related 
with environment. 
H3. Relevance and adequacy of risk management processes is 
different in different environments. 
H4. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information 
is different in two environments 
H4.A. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information 
on competence is different in two environments. 
H4.B. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information 
on reputation is different in two environments. 
H5. The amount of resistance to Basel II by the personnel of banks is 
different in different environments. 
H6. The perception that successful implementation of Basel II will 
avert financial crises is different in different environments. 
H7. The readiness for implementation of Basel II is affected by type 
of ownership. 
H7. A. Understanding of Basel II is related with ownership type 
H7.B. Perceptions related to Relevance of Basel II, its impact and 
benefits are related with type of ownership 
H7.C. Implementation status and acceptability is dependent on type of 
ownership. 
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H7.D. Pricing and implementation strategies are dependent on 
ownership type. 
H8. Ability to bear the cost of implementation of Basel-II is related to 
type of ownership. 
H9. Relevance and adequacy of risk management processes is 
different for different types of ownerships. 
HIO. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information 
is different for different types of ownerships 
HIO.A. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information 
on competence is different for different types of ownerships. 
HIO.B. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information 
on reputation is different for different types of ownerships 
HI 1. The amount of resistance to Basel II by the personnel of banks is 
different for different types of ownerships. 
H12. The perception that successful implementation of Basel II in will 
avert financial crises is different for different types of ownerships. 
3.7 Research Design 
There were multiple objectives in the present study. At the one hand it 
was targeted to understand the banks' preparedness and attitude towards the 
Basel-II accord in two different environments, on the other hand it was targeted 
to understand the different safeguards provided in the Basel-II accord, its 
implications and impact on the banking industry in particular and financial 
world in general. For this purpose exploratory design was the most suitable 
research design as it explores and describes all the aspects of the problem in 
detail. 
As two different banking environments (India and UAE) and three 
different types of ownerships (Foreign, Government and Private) were selected. 
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an observational study was directed to see whether any difference exists in the 
attitude towards Basel-II recommendations, perceived benefits, acceptance and 
preparedness towards it. 
3.8 Sampling 
3.8.1 Sampling Universe 
The sampling universe for the study was all commercial banks either of 
private, government or foreign ownership working within the geographical 
limits of UAE and India. 
3.8.2 Sampling Frame 
The sample framed banks based on few parameters which included: 
Primary criteria: 
1. Top management in full support of implementing Basel II 
2. Geographically, India and UAE 
3. Adequate coverage of the public, foreign and private banks 
Secondary criteria: 
1. Tier I CRAR(minimum capital to risk assets ratio) 
2. Capital adequacy ratio 
3. Number of years of operation 
The respondents were chosen on the following parameters 
1. The knowledge of Basel II 
2. Middle and top management of the banks 
3.8.3 Sample Size 
Although the study was planned as a survey, however, owing to 
reluctance of the respondents to participate, the observational part of the study 
was conducted as a pilot study. A sample size of 30 was selected as according 
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to Central Limit Theorem, a sample size of 30 or above is considered to 
represent a normal distribution. 
3.8.4 Sampling Method 
The study was planned to be a randomized sampling with participation 
of the all members falling in sampling universe, however, owing to reluctance 
of respondents to disclose information the sampling method has to be finally 
changed to convenience sampling. 
3.8.5 Study Groups 
The study samples were divided into two major groups depending upon 
the environment to which they belonged. 
Group I: Commercial Banks from UAE (n=20) 
Group II: Commercial Banks from India (n=10) 
3.9 Research Tool 
3.9.1 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts, first part consisted of 
questions related to the information related to location of the bank and type of 
ownership, the second part was related with questions related to industry, the 
third part was a scale developed to measure the preparedness, attitude and 
abilities of the participating banks for Basel II. After surveying the related 
literature, the questions were framed following Delphi technique. For this 
purpose a team of six persons (from academic, banking and financial sectors) 
was constituted to propose questions related to various issues related to 
preparedness of banks towards Basel II accord and their attitude towards 
various issues related to its perceived benefits and impact on the functioning of 
bank. An attempt was made to questionnaire exhaustive and illustrative so as to 
provide maximum reliability. 
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3.9.2 Tool Testing 
The tool was tested by performing reliability analysis using Cronbach 
alpha coefficient to be the measure for reliability. A cut-off value of 0.7 for the 
scale was considered to be the criteria for acceptability of the scale. The scale 
was then subjected to factor analysis using Principal Component Analysis 
method. For this, factor loadings more than 0.3 were taken as the criteria for 
inclusion; if multiple factor loadings or low factor loadings were found then the 
factor loadings were revalidated after rotation. In case of multiple factor 
loadings even on rotation, the item with highest value in a factor was chosen. 
Thus, the scale was divided further into subscales. These subscales were 
subjected to reliability analysis once again, and only those subscales were 
finally retained in the questionnaire which assured the acceptable reliability. 
3.9.3 Measurement 
The responses were recorded on Likert Scale, with 0 representing the 
most negative and 4 representing the most positive response on the particular 
question. 
3.10 Data Collection 
There were two sources of data: 
3.10.1 Primary Data 
Primary data was collected by administering a schedule to the 
respondents participating in the study. 
3.10.2 Secondary Data 
The secondary data was collected from numerous sources such as Banks' 
Annual Report, Reports of Independent Monitoring and Regulatory Bodies, 
Journals, Books, Internet and Newspapers. 
3.11 Time Frame 
The study was conducted between October 2007 to March 2008. 
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3.12 Pattern of Data Analysis 
The primary data so collected was subjected to analysis using Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences Version 15.0. The data has been presented as 
meaniSD. The following statistical tests were employed: 
1. Cronbach's Alpha: This was used to measure the reliability of a 
construct and to maintain internal consistency of the research tool. A 
cut-off value of 0.70 for scale, and 0.60 for subscales was taken as the 
criteria for acceptability. 
2. Factor Analysis: As there were 42 items in the questionnaire, 
representing different aspects of the problem and sometimes same aspect 
from different perspectives, in order to recognize the factors that affect 
the outcome in unison, factor analysis was performed. The number of 
factors so produced were restrained to 4 in order to ascertain adequate 
reliability and component membership. The criteria for formation of a 
component was Eigen value above 1. 
3. Pearson's Chi-square test for Proportions: Used to see whether the 
difference in proportion among different groups is statistically 
significant. 
4. Analysis of variance (ANOVA): ANOVA (F-test) was employed to see 
the differences in mean scores for the items among three different 
ownerships. 
5. Independent Sample's "t"-test: Independent sample's "t" was 
perfoirmed to see the differences in mean scores between two different 
environments. 
6. Confidence Level: The confidence level of the study was kept at 95%, 
hence a "p" value less than 0.05 depicted a statistically significant 
difference. 
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TABULATION, ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION 
The present chapter shows the results of tool testing, tabulated results of 
primary data and finally the results of hypothesis testing. The primary data of 
the study was collected from 30 respondents representing 6 different banks in 
two different countries and three types of ownerships. 
The observations have been depicted in five parts. Part I comprises the 
basic information related to the location of the bank and type of ownership. 
Part II comprised of the perceptions of the respondents related to industry in 
general. Part III comprised the reliability and factor ailalysis of the scale 
developed to measure the acceptability and readiness of the banks for Basel-II 
and Part IV was the comparative assessment of the banks in different 
environments and different types of ownerships. Finally Part V is hypothesis 
testing. 
4.1 Part I: Basic Information 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Name of 
Bank 
ABN Amro 
CBD 
ENBD 
UNB 
Axis Bank 
HDFC 
No. of 
respondents 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Country 
where 
functioning 
UAE 
UAE 
UAE 
UAE 
India 
India 
Ownership 
Foreign 
Government 
Government 
Government 
Private 
Private 
Parent 
bank 
location 
Australia 
UAE 
UAE 
UAE 
India 
India 
Source: Primary Data 
Table 21: Basic Information related to Location, Ownership and Parent 
Bank Location participants 
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CBD 
16 7% 
ENBD 
16 7% 
UNB 
16 7% 
ABNAmro 
16 7% 
HDFC 
16 7% 
AXIS Bank 
16 7% 
Figure 9: Banks Participating in the Study 
India 
33 3% 
UAE 
66 7% 
Figure 10: Location of the Participating banks 
India 
33 3% 
UAE 
500% 
Others 
16 7% 
Figure 11; Origin (Location of Head Office of Parent Bank) of the 
Participating Banks .^^ ^ 
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Thus, out of the total 6 banks participating in the study, four were from 
UAE and 2 were from India. Both the Indian banks were private banks with 
parent bank located in the country itself. Out of the 4 banks from UAE, three 
were government owned having their parent bank location in UAE itself while 
the remaining 1 was a foreign bank with its parent bank located in Edinburgh. 
Thus the profile of the banks enrolled in the study was diversified in 
terms of location and ownership. 
4.2 Part II: Industry Analysis 
1. Aspects of Basel-II posing the greatest concern for industry (n=30) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Aspects 
Complexity 
Credit risk 
Operational risk 
Time of transition 
Pillar II 
Pillar III 
Mean 
Score 
(Maximum 
6) 
3.83 
3.83 
4.00 
2.83 
3.50 
3.67 
No. of Banks 
surpassing the 
threshold (4) 
20 (66.7%) 
20 (66.7%) 
20 (66.7%) 
5 (16.7%) 
20 (66.7%) 
24 (83.3%) 
*Higher scores indicate greater concerns, *Cut-off4 
Table 22: Aspects of Greatest Concern for Industry 
4 
- ^ 3.5 
i 3i 
s 
£ 
O 2 
v> 
5^5 
s 1 
0.5 
0 
• 
1 
Complexity Credit risk Operational risk Time of 
transition 
Pillar I Pillar III 
Major aspects 
Figure 12: Aspects of Greatest Concern for Industry 
Source: Primary Data 
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Table 212 and Figure 12 indicate that on an average for industry operational 
risk posed the greatest concern, followed by complexity, credit risk, pillar III 
implementation, pillar II implementation and then time of transition. 
90 
O 80 
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TO 60 
(0 50 
2 
» 40 
30 
c 
V 
•o 
c 
Q. 20 
(0 
o 
OC 10 
Complexity Credit risic Operational risk Time of 
transition 
Pillar II Pillar III 
Major aspects 
Figure 13: Aspects of Greatest Concern for different banks 
Source: Primary Data 
As is evident from Figure 13, that though for industry operational risk 
was the greatest concern, however, only 24 out of 30 (66.7%) respondents 
surpassed the threshold of 4 on this aspect. As far as proportion of respondents 
crossing the threshold of 4 was concerned. Pillar III implementations emerged 
as the aspect with greatest concern (83.3% respondents surpassing the 
threshold). Pillar III is concerned with dissemination of information, the 
difference in Industry concerns and individual banks' concerns shows that 
while few banks are open to sharing the information, most of the banks deem it 
to be not fit for the health of their business. This can be attributed to the 
environments of the countries these banks are working. In India as well as in 
UAE, openness of systems, responsibility towards stakeholders has not been 
clearly defined until a few years back. In India, only after the financial reforms 
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started in late 1990s, and following the financial scams thereafter, sharing of 
information has become one of the mandatory requirements for financial 
institutions, until then the financial institutions had one of the most protected 
information system, where confidentiality was the key word. In present study 
too, the reluctance of respondents to participate can be viewed as one of the 
indicators of the protective approach followed by the banks in this part of 
world. 
2. Main impact of Basel-II on the concerned banking sector (n=30) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
5. 
Suggested Impact 
No significant impact 
May lead to industry consolidation 
May increase competition and possibly 
market segmentation 
May reduce market share of banks in 
relation to other financial institutions 
No. of 
respondents 
6 
5 
19 
0 
Percentage 
20 
16.67 
63.33 
0 
Table 23; Main perceived impact of Basel-II on Banking Sector 
Industry consolidation 
16.7% 
No significant impact 
20 0% 
Enhanced competition 
63.3% 
Figure 14: Main perceived impact of Basel-II on Banking Sector 
Source: Primary Data 
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Majority of respondents (63.3%) consider that implementation of Basel 
II may increase competition and possibly market segmentation, one fifth (20%) 
respondents feel that Basel II implementation will have no significant impact as 
regards the competition and industry consolidation while 16.7% respondents 
were of the view that Basel II will eventually result in industry consolidation. 
None of the respondents selected the option that it may reduce market share of 
banks in relation to other financial institutions. 
Basel II may confer a competitive advantage since its practitioners could 
operate with less capital and price more favourably. At a minimum, Basel II 
should protect mid-tier banks from being hurt by larger competitors that adopt 
sophisticated models and thrive. 
There will firstly be an impact on market segments and product 
offerings. Secondly, there will be an internal impact on the banks in the form of 
increased costs, decision-making and capital management. 
4.3 Part III: Testing of Research Tool/Development of a new Scale 
A 42-item questionnaire was developed to address the objectives of the 
study. As the tool was self-developed following brainstorming and Delphi 
technique, it was essential to validate its content and construct validity. The 
reliability of the tool was scale was tested by calculating the Cronbach's alpha 
(a) value. Table 24 shows the scale Mean values of the items, mean values of 
scale after deleting the item, scale variance after deleting the item, and 
Cronbach's alpha (a) value at each step. 
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Reliability Testing of the Scale (n=30) 
Item 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Item description 
Complexity 
Establishment of 
postofCRO 
Development of a 
strategy and 
mechanism for risk 
management and 
capital allocation 
across all levels of 
bank 
Process to estimate 
the Risk Weighted 
Assets 
Use of third party/ 
specialized 
personnel to analyze 
the market risk 
Need of statistical 
modeling for 
implementation 
Status of Business 
Process Re-
engineering 
Status of IT 
solutions in use 
Status of Credit 
Adjudication 
processes 
Status of Issues 
related to Credit 
Adjudication 
processes 
ilelevance of Credit 
Adjudication 
processes 
Mean 
value of 
the item in 
the scale 
2.33 
3.23 
3.03 
2.23 
2.97 
1.83 
2.37 
3.57 
1.30 
1.43 
2.50 
Standard 
deviation 
1.184 
0.817 
0.556 
1.006 
0.669 
1.206 
1.159 
0.504 
0.651 
0.679 
1.167 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
106.13 
105.23 
105.43 
106.23 
105.50 
106.63 
106.10 
104.90 
107.17 
107.03 
105.97 
Scale 
Varianc 
e if Item 
Deleted 
173.499 
182.461 
193.702 
177.082 
181.638 
165.757 
173.197 
190.990 
183.040 
193.757 
198.309 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
.770 
.778 
.791 
.773 
.776 
.758 
.769 
.787 
.778 
.792 
.802 
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Item 
No. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Item description 
Complexity of 
Credit Adjudication 
processes 
Adequacy of Pricing 
processes 
Relevance of Pricing 
processes 
Readiness to handle 
Pricing processes in 
terms of manpower 
Adequacy of Risk 
management 
processes 
Relevance of Risk 
management 
processes 
Readiness to handle 
Risk management 
processes in terms of 
manpower 
Adequacy of capital 
allocation processes 
Relevance of capital 
allocation processes 
Adequacy of 
software 
Competence of 
software 
3rofessionals 
Ability to structure 
and objectively 
define the processes 
ncrease in liabilities 
df staff on personal 
evel 
Mean 
value of 
the item in 
the scale 
2.40 
1.50 
2.10 
2.93 
1.43 
2.40 
3.47 
3.53 
2.47 
2.57 
2.17 
1.43 
2.50 
Standard 
deviation 
1.303 
1.106 
1.322 
1.258 
1.104 
1.070 
0.507 
0.681 
1.106 
1.165 
1.440 
1.194 
1.456 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
106.07 
106.97 
106.37 
105.53 
107.03 
106.07 
105.00 
104.93 
106.00 
105.90 
106.30 
107.03 
105.97 
Scale 
Varianc 
e if Item 
Deleted 
166.478 
180.723 
167.757 
169.775 
170.033 
177.926 
192.483 
197.926 
192.138 
173.679 
189.803 
198.861 
186.378 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
.761 
.779 
.763 
.765 
.764 
• .775 
.789 
.797 
.794 
.770 
.796 
.803 
.792 
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Item 
No. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
1 
Item description 
Increase in personal 
discretion 
Adequacy and 
competence of 
current staff 
Resistance amongst 
personnel 
Disclosure of 
information 
affecting 
competence 
Disclosure of 
information leading 
to loss in reputation 
Adequacy of 
financial resources 
Correctness of 
measuring risk and 
provisions against it 
Spontaneous 
reaction to external 
events affecting 
image of 
organisation 
Spontaneous 
reaction to external 
events affecting 
confidence of 
stakeholders 
Strict compliance 
eading to loss in 
business 
Status of 
Dreparedness for the 
approach to be 
followed 
Mean 
value of 
the item in 
the scale 
2.23 
2.90 
3.53 
2.33 
3.67 
1.83 
1.97 
3.57 
3.47 
3.40 
2.83 
Standard 
deviation 
1.455 
0.662 
0.629 
0.922 
.479 
1.289 
1.159 
0.504 
0.507 
0.621 
0.913 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
106.23 
105.57 
104.93 
106.13 
104.80 
106.63 
106.50 
104.90 
105.00 
105.07 
105.63 
Scale 
Varianc 
e if Item 
Deleted 
192.875 
191.151 
198.478 
180.326 
194.717 
163.551 
194.603 
192.714 
195.241 
196.064 
177.275 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
.799 
.788 
.797 
.776 
.792 
.756 
.797 
.789 
.792 
.794 
.772 
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Item 
No. 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Item description 
Timeframe for 
adopting the selected 
approach 
Reduction of risk 
with specified 
provisions 
Provisions for risks 
having adverse 
effect on operations 
Provisions for risks 
adding to costs of 
operations 
Clear guidelines 
from regulatory 
body on regulatory 
discretion under 
approaches of 
capital 
determination 
Environment not 
suitable for 
development of 
credit derivative 
markets 
Successful 
implementation as a 
safeguard against 
inancial crises 
Mean 
value of 
the item in 
the scale 
3.43 
2.73 
3.30 
2.83 
2.83 
2.13 
1.77 
Standard 
deviation 
1.305 
1.202 
0.750 
0.874 
0.834 
1.383 
1.431 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
105.03 
105.73 
105.17 
105.63 
105.63 
106.33 
106.70 
Scale 
Varianc 
e if Item 
Deleted 
172.171 
174.616 
192.557 
181.413 
189.206 
186.299 
198.010 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
.770 
.772 
.791 
.777 
.787 
.790 
.805 
CRONBACH ALPHA FOR SCALE IN ITS PROPOSED FORM (42 ITEMS)=0.787 
Table 24: Mean item scores and Reliability Testing 
As in its expanded form the Cronbach alpha value of the scale was 0.787, 
which is well above the accepted cut-off of 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978). Thus the 
scale was reliable in its present form. Though are some workers viz. Moss et al. 
(1998), have also supported the view that Cronbach alpha value above 0.6 is 
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generally acceptable. Hair (1998) has also supported the view that in a study 
with small sample size, low Cronbach alpha scores such as 0.6 can be taken as 
the measure of acceptable reliability. In the study of Duong et al. (2004) too, 
low Cronbach alpha score of 0.64 was accepted for a subscale. As a matter of 
fact as the number of items increase the test-retest validity enhances. The 
reliability of the entire scale was a function of 42-items while subscale items 
were ranging from 5 items to 12 items, in that case even with a poor subscale 
reliability the reliability of the entire scale cannot be questioned. Kline (2005) 
have also advocated the acceptance of low Cronbach alpha value in exploratory 
designs giving them a subjective name as "lenient criteria". The high reliability 
of the scale can be attributed to its focal characteristic and having highly 
specific yet easily understandable questions. Although the successive analysis 
to see the effect on Cronbach alpha value following successive deletion of 
items, revealed no significant improvement. Following the general 
acceptability of the scale, the scale was subjected to Principal Component 
Analysis for recognition of principal components and to assess the overlapping 
of the items, thereby providing opportunity to reduce the data. 
The Principal Component Analysis was performed in order to recognize 
the Principal Components in the scale. The criteria for factorization inclusion in 
a component was such that the Eigen value should exceed 1. Rotation of the 
matrix was also allowed with varimax selected as the criteria for rotation. The 
number of factors were restricted to four only in order to ascertain adequate 
reliability of subscale and proper representation of items in the scale. 
Results of Principal Component Analysis in form of Component Matrix 
showing factor loadings are shown in 
Table 25. 
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Component Matrix showing factor loadings of the items of the scale 
Item No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Component 
1 
.711 
.566 
-.058 
.348 
.692 
.587 
.765 
.447 
.494 
-.203 
.413 
.757 
.671 
.496 
.813 
.333 
.174 
-.054 
-.587 
.413 
.624 
.679 
.074 
-.276 
-.559 
2 
-.176 
-.199 
-.438 
.712 
.099 
.745 
-.202 
-.347 
.517 
.212 
-.520 
-.040 
-.279 
.488 
.224 
.731 
.543 
.004 
-.090 
-.708 
.470 
-.379 
-.644 
.621 
.616 
-.079 ! .521 
3 
.195 
.330 
.638 
-.372 
.168 
.209 
.449 
-.328 
-.254 
-.284 
-.059 
.442 
.166 
.396 
-.302 
.179 
.665 
.000 
.156 
-.102 
-.455 
-.372 
.585 
.439 
.403 
-.652 
-.560 -.174 1 .063 
.067 i .859 1 .224 
4 
.046 
.411 
.112 
.358 
.168 
-.140 
.236 
.355 
-.094 
.533 
-.164 
.181 
-.427 
-.378 
-.061 
.293 
.289 
.085 
-.083 
.130 
.104 
-.261 
-.326 
.420 
.270 
.209 
-.025 
-.167 
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Item No. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
1 
-.241 
.677 
.048 
-.085 
-.393 
-.342 
.783 
.640 
.351 
.174 
.760 
-.134 
-.380 
-.641 
Component 
2 
-.146 
.284 
-.190 
.089 
-.015 
-.036 
.324 
.425 
.548 
-.523 
-.254 
.588 
.616 
.736 
3 
.273 
.457 
-.437 
-.058 
-.104 
-.045 
-.257 
-.403 
.592 
.246 
-.172 
-.535 
.394 
.001 
4 
.198 
.351 
.812 
.152 
-.106 
-.278 
-.387 
-.385 
-.256 
.468 
.136 
-.015 
-.263 
-.036 1 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis a 4 components extracted. 
Table 25: Component Matrix using Principal Component Analysis 
The factor analysis showed many items with multiple loadings on a 
threshold of 0.3 i.e. indicating that 9% of the variance on the item was being 
shared with the factor. As in component analysis there were a number of items 
showing more than one factors surpassing the cut-off limit while some items 
did not reach to the threshold limit in any factor, hence the Rotation was 
allowed using Varimax approach (Table 26). 
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Rotated Component Matrix showing factor loadings of the items of the 
Item No. 
Qi 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Q7 
Q8 
Q9 
QIO 
Qll 
Q12 
Q13 
Q14 
Q15 
Q16 
Q17 
Q18 
Q19 
Q20 
Q21 
Q22 
Q23 
Q24 
Q25 
Q26 
027 1 
scale 
Component 
1 
.664 
.768 
.269 
.282 
.693 
.497 
.897 
.369 
.246 
-.044 
.225 
.866 
-.410 
-.396 
.491 
.474 
.551 
-.005 
-.436 
.335 
.351 
.262 
-.156 
.158 
2 
-.232 
-.151 
.004 
.262 
-.026 
.551 
-.138 
3 
.097 
-.157 
-.707 
.717 
.233 
.601 
-.100 
-.588 1 .131 
.145' 
.054 
-.554 
-.009 
.303 
-.479 
-.203 
.579 
.732 
.015 
.175 
-.737 
-.042 
-.678 
.210 
.792 
-.148 .851 
-.241 .081 
-.429 .049 
.709 
.077 
-.028 
.007 
-.151 
-.352 
.712 
.389 
-.097 
-.043 
-.403 
-.179 
.821 
.398 
.624 
-.152 
-.228 
.622 
-.394 
4 
.270 
-.032 
.207 
-.482 
.097 
.226 
.220 
-.235 
.031 
.664 
.336 
.233 
.674 
.523 
.131 
-.229 
-.056 
-.089 
-.021 
.102 
-.168 
.353 
.641 
-.396 
-.360 
-.544 
-.083 
133 
ChaTpter~4 
Item No. 
Q28 
Q29 
Q30 
Q31 
Q32 
Q33 
Q34 
Q35 
Q36 
Q37 
Q38 
Q39 
Q40 
Q41 
Q42 
1 
.080 
.011 
.886 
.211 
-.024 
-.402 
-.412 
.342 
.169 
.418 
.445 
.587 
-.334 
-.246 
-.517 
Component 
2 
.794 
.088 
.274 
-.427 
.058 
.044 
.051 
-.079 
-.037 
.667 
-.350 
-.507 
.220 
.816 
.764 
3 
.421 
-.416 
.105 
-.007 
.011 
-.101 
-.084 
.805 
.888 
.166 
-.486 
.284 
.614 
-.010 
.131 
4 
.084 
-.111 
.007 
.813 
-.194 
-.056 
.132 
.401 
.285 
.437 
-.164 
.085 
-.335 
.148 
-.291 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; a Rotation converged in 6 
iterations. 
Table 26: Rotated Component Matrix 
Even on rotation, though some of the items did not achieve the threshold, 
while some factors had multiple loadings, finally, it was decided that the items 
not reaching the threshold be dropped while for others the component showing 
largest factor loading was selected (Table). 
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Selecting Factors 
Item Details 
Readiness to handle Risk 
management processes in terms 
of manpower 
Spontaneous reaction to external 
events affecting image of 
organisation 
Complexity 
Establishment of post of CRO 
Use of third party/ specialized 
personnel to analyze the market 
risk 
Status of Business Process Re-
engineering 
Complexity of Credit 
Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of capital allocation 
processes 
Resistance amongst personnel 
Adequacy of financial resources 
Spontaneous reaction to external 
events affecting confidence of 
stakeholders 
Strict compliance leading to loss 
in business 
Provisions for risks adding to 
costs of operations 
Status of IT solutions in use 
Relevance of Credit 
Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of Risk management 
processes 
Relevance of Risk management 
processes 
Relevance of capital allocation 
Componeni 
No. 
Dropped 
Dropped 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
^ Item 
No. 
Q18 
Q32 
Ql 
Q2 
Q5 
Q7 
Q12 
Q19 
Q27 
Q30 
Q33 
Q34 
Q39 
Q8 
Qll 
Q16 
Q17 
Q20 
Component 
1 
-.005 
-.024 
.664 
.768 
.693 
.897 
.866 
-.436 
-.429 
.886 
-.402 
-.412 
.587 
.369 
.225 
.474 
.551 
.335 
2 
.015 
.058 
-.232 
-.151 
-.026 
-.138 
-.009 
.175 
.049 
.274 
.044 
.051 
-.507 
-.588 
-.554 
.579 
.732 
-.737 
3 
-.043 
.011 
.097 
-.157 
.233 
-.100 
.007 
-.403 
-.394 
.105 
-.101 
-.084 
.284 
.131 
-.028 
.389 
-.097 
-.179 
4 
-.089 
-.194 
.270 
-.032 
.097 
.220 
.233 
-.021 
-.083 
.007 
-.056 
.132 
.085 
-.235 
.336 
-.229 
-.056 
.102 
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Item Details 
processes 
Competence of software 
professionals 
Increase in liabilities of staff on 
personal level 
Increase in personal discretion 
Disclosure of information 
affecting competence 
Reduction of risk with specified 
provisions 
Environment not suitable for 
development of credit derivative 
markets 
Successful implementation as a 
safeguard against financial crises 
Development of a strategy and 
mechanism for risk management 
and capital allocation across all 
levels of bank 
Process to estimate the Risk 
Weighted Assets 
Need of statistical modeling for 
implementation 
Status of Credit Adjudication 
processes 
Readiness to handle Pricing 
processes in terms of manpower 
Adequacy of software 
Adequacy and competence of 
current staff 
Disclosure of information 
leading to loss in reputation 
Status of preparedness for 
selected approach 
Timeframe for adopting a 
particular approach 
Component n^j^ 
No. jvo. 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Q22 
Q24 
Q25 
Q28 
Q37 
Q41 
Q42 
Q3 
Q4 
Q6 
Q9 
Q15 
Q21 
Q26 
Q29 
Q35 
Q36 
Component 
1 
.262 
.158 
-.148 
.080 
.418 
-.246 
-.517 
.269 
.282 
.497 
.246 
.491 
.351 
-.241 
.011 
.342 
.169 
2 
-.678 
.792 
.851 
.794 
.667 
.816 
.764 
.004 
.262 
.551 
.145 
-.203 
-.042 
.081 
.088 
-.079 
-.037 
3 
.398 
-.152 
-.228 
.421 
.166 
-.010 
.131 
-.707 
.717 
.601 
.709 
.712 
.821 
.622 
-.416 
.805 
.888 
4 
.353 
-.396 
-.360 
.084 
.437 
.148 
-.291 
.207 
-.482 
.226 
.031 
.131 
-.168 
-.544 
-.111 
.401 
.285 
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Item Details 
Provisions for risks having 
adverse effect on operations 
Clear guidelines from regulatory 
body on regulatory discretion 
under a particular approach 
Status of Issues related to Credit 
Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of Pricing processes 
Relevance of Pricing processes 
Ability to structure and 
objectively define the processes 
Correctness of measuring risk 
and provisions against it 
Component 
No. 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Item 
No. 
Q38 
Q40 
QIO 
Q13 
Q14 
Q23 
Q31 
Component 
1 
.445 
-.334 
-.044 
-.410 
-.396 
-.156 
.211 
2 
-.350 
.220 
.054 
.303 
-.479 
.210 
-.427 
3 
-.486 
.614 
.077 
-.151 
-.352 
.624 
-.007 
4 
-.164 
-.335 
.664 
.674 
.523 
.641 
.813 
Table 27: Selected Factors under different components 
Thus finally item nos. 18 and 32, Readiness to handle Risk management 
processes in terms of manpower and Spontaneous reaction to external events 
affecting image of organisation were dropped from the scale owing to low 
factor loadings. 
Item Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, 12, 19, 27, 30, 33, 34 and 39, i.e. a total of 11 items 
comprised the First Component of the scale. 
Item Nos. 8, 11, 16, 17, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28, 37, 41 and 42, i.e. a total of 
12 items comprised the second component of the scale. 
Item Nos. 3, 4, 6, 9, 15, 21, 26, 29, 35, 36, 38 and 40, i.e. 12 items 
comprised the third component of the scale. 
And finally, item nos. 10, 13, 14, 23 and 31, i.e. a total of 5 items 
comprised the fourth component of the scale. 
Now the scale had four components with 40 items. At this stage the 
reliabiHty of each component of the scale was further checked as shown in 
Table 28 to Table 31. The final adapted scale is shown in Table 32. 
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Items 
Ql 
Q2 
Q5 
Q7 
Q12 
Q19 
Q27 
Q30 
Q33 
Q34 
Q39 
Overall r 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
29.57 
28.67 
28.93 
29.53 
29.50 
28.37 
28.37 
30.07 
28.43 
28.50 
29.07 
eliability without d 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
23.426 
26.920 
29.375 
23.499 
21.569 
33.826 
34.171 
23.099 
33.840 
33.638 
27.375 
elating any item 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
.754 
.694 
.504 
.768 
.844 
-.103 
-.149 
.703 
-.106 
-.077 
.583 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
.728 
.747 
.769 
.726 
.710 
.815 
.816 
.735 
.808 
.811 
.757 
0.788 
Table 28: Reliability Analysis of Component 1 (11 items) 
The overall reliability with all the 11 items was within acceptable limits 
(Cronbach a = 0.788), though deletion of items 19, 27, 33 and 34 indicated a 
slight increment in Cronbach a, yet owing to diversified nature of the scale 
items and the reliability being within acceptable range, it was decided to keep 
the component unchanged. 
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Q8 
Qll 
Q16 
Q17 
Q20 
Q22 
Q24 
Q25 
Q28 
Q37 
Q4I 
Q42 
Overall 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
24.67 
25.73 
26.80 
25.83 
25.77 
26.07 
25.73 
26.00 
25.90 
25.50 
26.10 
26.47 
Cronbach's alpha 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
31.471 
35.375 
21.200 
21.178 
37.840 
37.857 
18.892 
20.828 
22.024 
21.293 
22.714 
23.430 
without deleting 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
-.370 
-.512 
.709 
.742 
-.693 
-.581 
.681 
.504 
.781 
.622 
.380 
.300 
any item 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
.488 
.590 
.241 
.237 
.619 
.644 
.189 
.273 
.255 
.257 
.332 
.362 
0.437 
Table 29: Reliability Analysis of Component II (12 items) 
For the second component, the overall Cronbach alpha value obtained 
was 0.437, which ensured only mild to moderate reliability. A perusal at Table 
29 showed that deletion of item 22 ensured a Cronbach's alpha value of 0.644, 
which is within acceptable range as discussed earlier. Thus finally the 
component was accepted after deleting item 22, i.e. finally the component 
retained 11 items only. 
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03 
Q4 
Q6 
09 
Q15 
021 
Q26 
Q29 
Q35 
Q36 
038 
Q40 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
29.83 
30.63 
31.03 
31.57 
29.93 
30.30 
29.97 
29.20 
30.03 
29.43 
29.57 
30.03 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
45.592 
32.654 
31.620 
36.323 
29.720 
30.079 
38.723 
43.821 
32.999 
29.013 
44.806 
37.137 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
-.494 
.741 
.672 
.693 
.794 
.841 
.368 
-.293 
.797 
.816 
-.317 
.429 
Overall Cronbach's alpha without deleting any item 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
.852 
.777 
.782 
.792 
.766 
.762 
.811 
.840 
.774 
.763 
.854 
.807 
0.817 
Table 30: Reliability Analysis of Component III (12 items) 
The reliability analysis of the third component showed a Cronbach's 
alpha value of 0.817, which was well beyond the generally acceptable limits 
meeting the stricter criteria. Although, a perusal of Table 30 showed that 
deletion of item nos. 29 or 38 improved the reliability slightly, but considering 
the diversified nature of the items and excellent reliability even without 
deleting any item as such, it was decided to finally keep all the items of the 
scale. 
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QIO 
Q13 
Q14 
Q23 
Q31 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
8.93 
7.87 
8.47 
7.80 
8.40 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
11.995 
9.637 
9.637 
10.028 
9.903 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
.541 
.602 
.440 
.469 
.514 
Overall Cronbach's alpha without deleting any item 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
.695 
.644 
.717 
.698 
.679 
0.733 
Table 31: Reliability Analysis of Component IV (5 items) 
Reliability analysis of Component 4 showed a negative Cronbach's 
alpha value of 0.733, thus indicating that there was a negative average 
covariance amongst items. Deletion of none of the items revealed to ensure 
acceptable reliability hence, the component was accepted as such. Thus finally, 
the scale had three components and 39 items as detailed below: 
s. 
N. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Item Details 
Complexity 
Establishment of post of CRO 
Use of third party/ specialized personnel to analyze the 
market risk 
Status of Business Process Re-engineering 
Complexity of Credit Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of capital allocation processes 
Resistance amongst personnel 
Adequacy of financial resources 
Spontaneous reaction to external events affecting 
confidence of stakeholders 
Strict compliance leading to loss in business 
Provisions for risks adding to costs of operations 
Component 
No. 
1 
Basic 
understandin 
g, and 
preparedness 
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s. 
N. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
Item Details 
Status of IT solutions in use 
Relevance of Credit Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of Risk management processes 
Relevance of Risk management processes 
Relevance of capital allocation processes 
Increase in liabilities of staff on personal level 
Increase in personal discretion 
Disclosure of information affecting competence 
Reduction of risk with specified provisions 
Environment not suitable for development of credit 
derivative markets 
Successful implementation as a safeguard against financial 
crises 
Development of a strategy and mechanism for risk 
management and capital allocation across all levels of bank 
Process to estimate the Risk Weighted Assets 
Need of statistical modeling for implementation 
Status of Credit Adjudication processes 
Readiness to handle Pricing processes in terms of 
manpower 
Adequacy of software 
Adequacy and competence of current staff 
Disclosure of information leading to loss in reputation 
Status of preparedness for selected approach 
Timeframe for adopting selected approach 
Provisions for risks having adverse effect on operations 
Clear guidelines from regulatory body on regulatory 
discretion under suggested approach 
Component 
No. 
2 
Perceptions 
related to 
Relevance of 
Basel II, its 
impact and 
benefits 
3 
Implementati 
on Status 
and 
acceptability 
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s. 
N. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
Item Details 
Status of Issues related to Credit Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of Pricing processes 
Relevance of Pricing processes 
Ability to structure and objectively define the processes 
Correctness of measuring risk and provisions against it 
Cronbach's alpha value for the scale after reconstruction 
Component 
No. 
4 
Pricing and 
Implementati 
on strategy 
0.747 
Table 32: Final Scale Used for the study 
Thus, finally, the scale comprising of 39 items and 4 components with a 
reasonably acceptable reliability (a=0.747) was used for the analysis of results. 
4.4 Part IV: Comparative Assessment 
Mean Item Scores for Component I (n=30) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Item Details 
Complexity 
Establishment of post of CRO 
Use of third party/ specialized personnel to analyze 
the market risk 
Status of Business Process Re-engineering 
Complexity of Credit Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of capital allocation processes 
Resistance amongst personnel 
Adequacy of financial resources 
Spontaneous reaction to external events affecting 
confidence of stakeholders 
Strict compliance leading to loss in business 
Provisions for risks adding to costs of operations 
Mean Score 
(Max 4) 
2.33 
3.23 
2.97 
2.37 
2.40 
3.53 
3.53 
1.83 
3.47 
3.40 
2.83 
S.D. 
1.18 
0.82 
0.67 
1.16 
1.30 
0.68 
0.63 
1.29 
0.51 
0.62 
0.87 
* Higher scores indicate more positive responses 
Table 33: Status of Basic understanding of the concepts and preparedness 
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Figure 15: Mean Scores for Basic understanding of the concepts and 
preparedness 
It was seen that maximum scores were obtained for the items adequacy 
of capital allocation processes (3.53±0.68) and resistance amongst personnel 
(3.53±0.63) while minimum scores were obtained for the item adequacy of 
financial resources (1.83±1.29). 
For issues such as complexity of Basel-II accord, status of business 
process re-engineering, complexity of credit adjudication process, use of third 
party/specialized personnel to analyze the market risk and provisions for risks 
adding to costs of operations, the scores ranged between 2.33 to 2.97 indicating 
that on these issues the banks need to strengthen themselves. 
On issues such as establishment of post of CRO, strict compliance 
leading to loss in business and spontaneous reaction to external events affecting 
confidence of stakeholders, the mean scores were between 3.23 to 3.47 
indicating that these issues were not of much concern to the banks. 
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Table 34 and Table 35 further explore the situation on the basis of environment 
(country) where the banks were functioning and type of ownership (foreign, 
private, public). 
Environmental Impact on Issues under Component I 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11 
Item Details 
Complexity 
Establishment of post of CRO 
Use of third party/ specialized 
personnel to analyze the 
market risk 
Status of Business Process 
Re-engineering 
Complexity of Credit 
Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of capital allocation 
processes 
Resistance amongst personnel 
Adequacy of financial 
resources 
Spontaneous reaction to 
external events affecting 
confidence of stakeholders 
Strict compliance leading to 
loss in business 
Provisions for risks adding to 
costs of operations 
Environment 
India (n=10) 
Mean 
3.000 
3.300 
2.900 
2.500 
2.500 
3.600 
3.600 
1.300 
3.500 
3.600 
3.400 
SD 
0.816 
0.483 
0.568 
1.080 
1.080 
0.516 
0.516 
0.823 
0.527 
0.516 
0.516 
UAE 
(n=20) 
Mean 
2.000 
3.200 
3.000 
2.300 
2.350 
3.500 
3.500 
2.100 
3.450 
3.300 
2.550 
SD 
1.214 
0.951 
0.725 
1.218 
1.424 
0.761 
0.688 
1.410 
0.510 
0.657 
0.887 
Significance 
of 
difference 
iii.li 
2.343 
0.311 
-0.380 
0.439 
0.293 
0.373 
0.405 
-1.650 
0.250 
1.259 
2.788 
"p" 
0.026 
0.758 
0.707 
0.664 
0.772 
0.712 
0.689 
0.110 
0.804 
0.218 
0.009 
*Scores ranged from 0 to 4 on Likert scale; higher scores indicate more positive responses 
"p" values in bold indicate significant differences between the two 
environments 
Table 34: Countrywise differences in mean scores related to Basic 
understanding of the concepts and preparedness 
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Figure 16: Comparison of Mean Scores for Basic understanding of the 
concepts and preparedness in two different environments (India and UAE) 
In India, as well as in UAE, adequacy of financial resources was the 
most important issue, with scores 1.300±0.823 and 2.100±1.410 respectively. 
Though the situation was slightly better in UAE as compared to that in India, 
but the difference between the two environments was not significant 
statistically (p=0.110). 
The issues with least concern, in banks in both the environments were 
adequacy of capital allocation processes and resistance amongst personnel with 
a mean score of 3.600±0.516 and 3.600±0.516 respectively in India and 
3.500±0.761 and 3.500±0.688 in UAE, showing statistically no significant 
difference between the two environments for both the issues (p=0.712 and 
p=0.689 respectively). 
The issues where the difference existed in the two environments were 
complexity and provisions for risks adding to costs of operations, and for both 
the issues, the mean scores of UAE banks were significantly lower as 
compared to that of Indian banks (p=0.026 and p=0.009 respectively). 
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Taking a mean score of 3 to be a good indicator of acceptability, it was 
seen that while Indian banks had good scores for items, complexity, 
establishment of post of CRO, adequacy of capital allocation processes, 
resistance amongst personnel, spontaneous reaction to external events affecting 
confidence of stakeholders, strict compliance leading to loss in business and 
provisions for risks adding to costs of operations, i.e. 7 out of 11 items. 
However, the UAE banks were not far too beyond, on six issues they scored 
more than 3, i.e. establishment of post of CRO, use of third party/specialized 
personnel to analyze the market risk, adequacy of capital allocation processes, 
resistance amongst personnel, spontaneous reaction to external events affecting 
confidence of stakeholders and strict compliance leading to loss in business. 
The findings indicate that though, UAE banks have got a relatively 
better pool of personnel as they attract the talent from all across the world, they 
were not able to cope with the complexity of the Basel-II accord effectively. 
This might be attributed to the high reliance on the automated and structured 
banking processes practiced in UAE banks as compared to Indian banks. It is a 
fact that structuring makes things easier to do and perform. As the structuring 
of processes is still an undergoing phenomenon in both the environments, the 
UAE banks had a relatively lower scores on this issue. On the other hand, the 
Indian banks are accustomed to work under stress with high turnout of 
customers, sometimes when the machines fail, the men work, which is a usual 
phenomenon in Indian banks. 
On the issue of provisions for risks adding to costs of operations, the 
lower scores of UAE banks could be attributed to their limited customer base, 
in India, the banking operations are many times higher as compared to UAE 
banks (in terms of number of transactions), thus the costs of operations per unit 
transaction might be considered as the economies of scales. 
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The issues such as status of business process re-engineering, complexity 
of credit adjudication processes and adequacy of financial resources with low 
mean scores in both environments indicating that the Basel-II accord is still 
visualized as a financial burden by the banking community in large and the 
type of changes in banking industry make it complex for them to re-engineer 
their business processes in line with the Basel-II accord. As the Basel-II accord 
calls for a continuous ongoing exercise on the issues related to capital 
allocation, banks in both the environment deem it as a complex exercise which 
might have effects on the long-term strategies of the banks. With the capital 
allocation becoming a dynamic and volatile process driven by market, the long-
term strategies that need high capital allocation might be affected, as believed 
by the bankers in both the environments. 
Though in both the countries, high scores have been obtained for the 
issues related to establishment of post of CEO, it does not indicate that the 
Basel-II accord is being implemented in its true spirits, rather it merely 
indicates that till now the less concerning issues have been addressed, while a 
lot has to be done as regards the defining and re-engineering various processes 
involved in the operations. 
Ownership Impact on Issues under Component I 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Item Details 
Complexity 
Establishment of post of 
CRO 
Use of third party/ 
specialized personnel to 
analyze the market 
Status of Business 
Process Re-engineering 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
2.600 
4.000 
4.000 
3.600 
SD 
0.548 
0.000 
0.000 
0.548 
Government 
(n=15) 
Mean 
1.800 
2.933 
2.667 
1.867 
SD 
1.320 
0.961 
0.488 
1.060 
Private 
(n=10) 
Mean 
3.000 
3.300 
2.900 
2.500 
SD 
0.816 
0.483 
0.568 
1.080 
Significance 
of difference 
iipii 
3.873 
3.891 
14.583 
5.676 
y 
0.033 
0.033 
0.000 
0.009 
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5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Complexity of Credit 
Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of capital 
allocation processes 
Resistance amongst 
personnel 
Adequacy of financial 
resources 
Spontaneous reaction to 
external events affecting 
confidence of 
stakeholders 
Strict compliance leading 
to loss in business 
Provisions for risks 
adding to costs of 
operations 
3.600 
2.400 
2.600 
3.400 
3.000 
2.600 
3.400 
0.548 
0.548 
0.548 
0.548 
0.000 
0.548 
0.548 
1.933 
3.867 
3.800 
1.667 
3.600 
3.533 
2.267 
1.387 
0.352 
0.414 
1.345 
0.507 
0.516 
0.799 
2.500 
3.600 
3.600 
1.300 
3.500 
3.600 
3.400 
1.080 
0.516 
0.516 
0.823 
0.527 
0.516 
0.516 
3.692 
20.588 
12.300 
6.426 
3.025 
7.118 
10.376 
0.038 
0.000 
0.000 
0.005 
0.065 
0.003 
0.000 
Table 35: Ownership differences in mean scores related to Basic 
understanding of the concepts and preparedness 
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Figure 17: Comparison of Mean Scores for Basic understanding of the 
concepts and preparedness for three different ownerships (Foreign, 
Government and Private) 
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Interesting findings were obtained on comparison of mean scores for 
items under Component 1. It was seen that for item Complexity, the mean 
scores of Government banks were found to be lowest (1.800±1.320) followed 
by foreign bank (2.600±0.548) and then private banks (3.00±0.8I6). 
Statistically, there was a significant difference in the mean scores of banks with 
different ownerships (F=3.873; p=0.033). Similarly on the issues related to 
adequacy of financial resources government owned banks had significantly 
lower scores as compared to private sector or foreign banks (F=6.426; p=0.005). 
However, for the items like establishment of post of CRO, use of third 
party/specialized personnel to analyze the market risk, status of business 
process re-engineering, complexity of credit adjudication processes, the foreign 
banks had significantly higher scores as compared to private and government 
owned banks. Interestingly all these issues are related to efficiency of a bank. 
Low scores of foreign banks on issues such as adequacy of capital 
allocation processes, resistance amongst personnel, strict compliance leading to 
loss in business, etc. might be due to lesser autonomy of the ward bank on the 
decision making over capital allocation, the lengthy processes involved in 
addressing these issues. The low scores of foreign banks on item resistance 
amongst personnel indicates that the employees working in foreign bank have 
less feeling of job security while the apprehension amongst these banks on item 
strict compliance leading to loss in business indicates that these banks usually 
do not stick to the norms of the host country and are often accused of violating 
the banking norms'. Foreign banks are often faced with a dilemma of working 
in a strange environment, with the rules of business generally governed by the 
host country's regulating authority, pressure to earn profits despite odds from 
the parent bank and lack of commitment with the host country's financial and 
economic interests. For them being efficient is easy as they are smaller in size, 
have no obligation at all towards social banking or priority sector banking as 
the national banks have, and for the sake of theii gains they are ready to bend 
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the rules by sometimes daring to flounder the rule or by talcing advantage of 
some ambiguity in the rules. 
In contrast, government owned banks had significantly higher scores for 
the items adequacy of capital allocation processes, resistance amongst 
personnel and Strict compliance leading to loss in business as compared to that 
in private sector and foreign banks. 
Most of the issues except adequacy of financial resources depend on the 
efficiency of the bank. In fact, government retention of an ownership stake in 
an institution meant de facto control by government, decision making subject to 
political objectives, and lack of government respect for investors' property 
rights following privatization. A model is presented in which political loans are 
a constraint on banks subject to government control. It is found that banks 
controlled by government, despite charging lower loan rates, experienced 
disproportionately bad loan performance, and were inefficient compared to 
privately controlled banks. Clark et al. in their study on Bank privatization in 
developing countries found that although bank privatization usually improves 
bank efficiency, gains are greater when the government fully relinquishes 
control, when banks are privatized to strategic investors, when foreign banks 
are allowed to participate in the privatization process and when the government 
does not restrict competition. 
As regards the less resistance amongst staff and personnel in 
government banks as compared to private or foreign banks, the same can be 
attributed to a feeling of job security amongst government owned banks. 
Thus the differences amongst ownership on items in Component 1 are 
more pronounced than those reflected in the environment they work in. 
Table 36 to Table 38 discuss the items of component 2 and their 
dependence on environment and type of ownership in detail. 
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S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Mean Item Scores for Component II ( 
Item Details 
Status of IT solutions in use 
Relevance of Credit Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of Risk management processes 
Relevance of Risk management processes 
Relevance of capital allocation processes 
Increase in liabilities of staff on personal level 
Increase in personal discretion 
Disclosure of information affecting competence 
Reduction of risk with specified provisions 
Environment not suitable for development of 
credit derivative markets 
Successful implementation as a safeguard against 
financial crises 
n=30) 
Mean 
Score 
(Max 4) 
3.567 
2.500 
1.433 
2.400 
2.467 
2.500 
2.233 
2.333 
2.733 
2.133 
1.767 
S.D. 
0.504 
1.167 
1.104 
1.070 
1.106 
1.456 
1.455 
0.922 
1.202 
1.383 
1.431 1 
*Higher scores indicate more positive responses 
Table 36: Status of Perceptions related to Relevance of Basel II, its impact 
and benefits 
•jtatii'; ol IT Rdcvancc of \dequao of Rdevancc of Rdcvance of increase in Increase m Disd<Bun. of RcducWm of Fnvironmcnr Successful 
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\d)udicaii()n manigtioent man^emcni processes on personal level discretion atFecmg speofied devefcpincni of as a safe^ard 
onxrsscs processes processes competence provis«)ns credit denvanvc agamsi fmanoal 
maiter; cnses 
Figure 18: Comparison of Mean Scores for Basic understanding of the 
concepts and preparedness for three different ownerships (Foreign, 
Government and Private) 
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A perusal of Table 36 shows that among items of component II, only 
item No. 1, i.e. status of IT solutions in use had mean score over 3, among the 
other items, item No. 3 showed least score (1.433±1.104) thereby indicating 
that it was the most important issues under this component that needs to be 
resolved. Actually, risk management process is a dynamic and ongoing 
phenomenon that changes with the changes in environment. A bank always has 
to function under various kinds of risks that keep on changing form and 
magnitude. Risk management process is the process of bank's preparedness to 
manage different kinds of risks, either circumstantial or environmental. As 
soon as the tool for managing a certain risk is evolved, another risk comes up, 
thereby making the objective ever eluding and constantly running in pace with 
the developments to reach it. Further on the alert list is the item no. 11, 
successful implementation as a safeguard against financial crises (1.767±1.431). 
This question was asked in context with the recent crises faced by American 
banking industry. American banks riding over a successful experience of 
decades touched their nadir within a period spanning less than 3 weeks despite 
having one of the most efficient risk management systems. Actually, there is an 
all round percepfion amongst the banking industry, consequent to the fall of 
American banking indusiry, that risk cannot be measured and compensated 
even with the use of most sophisticated tools. Today, the world is changing 
faster than ever in history, economic forces realign and political equations 
change, new laws and regulations are framed, putting a pressure on the banking 
industry. It's a sword with two cutting edges, at the one hand the growing 
financial markets attract the banks to take more risks while on the other it is 
pressed for making the investments risk-insulated. With Basel-II 
recommendations coming in, the era of going scot-free for the lapses and 
earning rewards for everything shiny and bright seems to be a part of history. 
Now, the responsibility is fixed more sharply than ever yet the pressure of 
performing well is also unprecedented thus making the banking industry a tight 
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ropewalk, and here one feels that the risks becoming into disasters can never be 
ruled out. The financial markets are very volatile, the great fall of Asian tigers 
in the early late 90's took place in less than a week. 
Low scores on count of increase in liabilities of staff on personal level, 
increase in personal discretion, relevance of credit adjudication, risk 
management and capital allocation processes, etc. show that banking industry is 
too confused to adjust itself to the financial disciplines. There are few takers 
who accept that Basel-II will minimize the role of personal discretion, instead 
most of the responds feel that with Basel-II accord being implemented, the role 
of personal discrefion will assume a higher seat. In this context, one of the 
respondents explained, that if the actual guidelines are taken into practice, there 
would be no business at all, and when one has to do business, he will have to 
decide what to do, where to do, when to do and how to do, the guidelines can 
help, but finally it's the personal perception of the situation that will help in 
deciding whether to take a risk or not. He also pointed out that with 
involvement of so many procedure and processes, people will start 
manipulating the things. In his opinion no system is foolproof. 
Low scores on item eenvironment not suitable for development of credit 
derivative markets point out that there is a need on part of regulatory body and 
governments to resolve this issue. In the light of lack of clear guidelines from 
regulatory on credit derivative markets especially in India, it is not surprising 
that low scores were obtained for this item. The onus of creating an 
environment conducive to growth of financial markets lies mainly on the 
regulators as banking industry is one of the most regulated industries world 
over.Thus under component II, we find most of the items calling for an urgent 
need of attention. Basically most of the items in this component are based on 
the perceptions of the banking industry. Table 37 tries to explore the impact of 
environment on these issues: 
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Environmental Impact on Issues under Component II 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Item Details 
Status of IT solutions in use 
Relevance of Credit 
Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of Risk management 
processes 
Relevance of Risk management 
processes 
Relevance of capital allocation 
processes 
Increase in liabilities of staff on 
personal level 
Increase in personal discretion 
Disclosure of information 
affecting competence 
Reduction of risk with specified 
provisions 
Environment not suitable for 
development of credit derivative 
markets 
Successful implementation as a 
safeguard against financial 
crises 
Environment 
India 
(n=IO) 
Mean 
3.800 
3.100 
0.600 
1.300 
3.500 
0.600 
0.600 
1.600 
2.000 
1.300 
0.500 
SD 
0.422 
0.738 
0.516 
0.823 
0.527 
0.516 
0.516 
0.516 
1.563 
0.823 
0.527 
UAE 
(n=20) 
Mean 
3.450 
2.200 
1.850 
2.950 
1.950 
3.450 
3.050 
2.700 
3.100 
2.550 
2.400 
SD 
0.510 
1.240 
1.089 
0.686 
0.945 
0.510 
0.999 
0.865 
0.788 
1.432 
1.314 
Significance 
of difference 
» f * t i 
1.868 
2.106 
-3.419 
-5.811 
4.802 
14.363 
-7.244 
-3.689 
-2.585 
-2.544 
-4.369 
"p" 
0.072 
0.044 
0.002 
<0.00I 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.001 
0.015 
0.017 
<0.001 
*Scores ranged from 0 to 4 on Likert scale; higher scores indicate more positive responses 
"p" values in bold indicate significant differences between the two environments 
Table 37: Comparison of Difference in Perceptions related to Relevance of 
Basel II, its impact and benefits in two different environments (India and 
UAE) 
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Figure 19: Comparison of Mean Scores for Perceptions related to 
Relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits in two different 
environments (India and UAE) 
Statistically, no significant difference was seen between two 
environments as regards status of IT solutions in use. Respondents from both 
the countries scored heavily on this count. In India, the mean score was 
3.800±0.422 whereas in UAE it was 3.450±0.510. In the recent past, Banking 
Industry has become much dependent on information technology. Following 
some reluctance, when the Indian Banking adapted to the technological 
changes, the response was overwhelming. While discussing this issue, we must 
not forget that the two banks from India, included in this study, were private 
players, who entered following the liberalisation phase and right from the very 
beginning had a strong reliance on the information technology. In fact, these 
banks were the pioneers in adapting to the latest information technology for 
banking operations. UAE banks, in this respect were more responsive, and had 
always responded positively to technological changes. In UAE, the banking 
trade unions were also not so strong as in India, where the technological 
changes were protracted owing to long deferments owing to pressure from 
trade unions. 
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However, for all the other variables, significant differences were seen 
between the banks working in two environments. Among Indian banks scores 
were higher on issues such as relevance of credit adjudication process and 
relevance of capital allocation processes. In India, consumer banking is 
relatively a new phenomenon, and over the years, the private banks have 
mostly relied to penetrate the market through this single domain alone. 
Consumer financing is not an easy task in a developing country like India, with 
the liberalisation of economy, the consumer market has grown manifold in 
India, giving rise to the aspirations of Indian middle class. The growing 
uncertainties in life have given birth to desire to consume, desire to live the life 
today and forget about the future. Under such circumstances, the credit 
adjudication processes followed by banks in general, and private banks in 
particular have always been under clouds, in order to minimize the risks 
associated with credit adjudication, Indian banks, mainly private banks which 
are poised to pass over the phase of penetration, more justified and prudent 
credit adjudication process, based on some objective criteria, in Basel-II, 
private banks fmd a solution to this problem and finally change their style of 
credit adjudication which was mainly discretionary before the accord. In 
contrast, in UAE where the economy is relatively stabilized and prosperous, the 
credit adjudication processes become a hurdle rather than a convenience. 
On the issue of relevance of capital allocation processes too Indian 
banks score significantly higher (3.500±0.527) over UAE banks (1.950±0.945) 
(p<0.001), thus indicating relatively higher acceptance of capital allocation 
processes as suggested by Basel-II accord. In this regard, once again the 
question of ability to take risk takes the saddle. UAE banks, with a sustained 
growth and huge capital base, and government backing (three of the four banks 
enrolled from UAE were government banks) feel that such capital allocation 
processes will give them fewer chances to compete. The capital allocated 
towards risk management is deemed as a non-performing assets by the banking 
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industry, though it minimizes the risk related insecurities yet they are not 
welcome as they sometime undermine the returns. With structured capital 
allocation, the era of efficiency in work and role of intellectual perception at 
decision-making will be at the back seat, banking will become just like 
managing civic bodies, this is the view reflected by one of our respondents. 
Another respondent added, "in every business there is a great role of individual 
perception of the risks, if the crises could be averted just by risk management, 
then General Motors would not have seen the doom's day". 
The UAE banks' willingness to take more risks as compared to that of 
Indian banks becomes evident with the comparison of scores for adequacy of 
risk management processes in Basel-II, while UAE banks (1.850±0.516) feel 
that these processes are more adequate as compared to Indian banks 
(0.600±1.089), Indian banks want to play on the safer side, and find these 
processes to be still not adequate. Taking 3 to be cut-off for good acceptability, 
banks in both the environments fail to achieve the magic figure. 
On the issue related to relevance of risk management processes, increase 
in liabilities of staff on personal level, increase in personal discretion, 
disclosure of information affecting competence, reduction of risk with specified 
provisions, environment not suitable for development of credit derivative 
markets and successful implementation viewed as a safeguard against financial 
crises, the Indian banks seem to be more apprehensive and insecure. This might 
be due to a long history of being a protected and developing economy of India 
as compared to open and relatively autonomous economy of UAE. Although 
liberalisation of economy has been initiated way back in early 1990s, the 
Indian banks are relatively new to open economy. When it comes to 
competence, the private banks had to compete with the state-owned banks 
which had a very conservative oudook and style of functioning. With Basel-II 
becoming universally applicable to both private and public sector banks, the 
private banks in India seem to lose their upper edge. 
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Thus, it becomes evident from the preceding discussion that in different 
environment, the acceptabihty of Basel-II, perception regarding the various 
safeguards provided therein and the interpretation of various processes, 
responsibilities and their outcome is different. Table 38 tries to explore the 
Component II items in view of different types of ownerships. 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Ownership Impact 
Item Details 
Status ofIT solutions in 
use 
Relevance of Credit 
Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of Risk 
management processes 
Relevance of Risk 
management processes 
Relevance of capital 
allocation processes 
Increase in liabilities of 
staffon personal level 
Increase in personal 
discretion 
Disclosure of information 
affecting competence 
Reduction of risk with 
specified provisions 
Environment not suitable 
for development of credit 
derivative markets 
Successful 
implementation as a 
safeguard against financial 
crises 
on Issues under Component I 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
4.000 
3.800 
2.400 
3.400 
2.400 
3.400 
1.600 
2.600 
3.600 
0.600 
0.600 
SD 
0.000 
0.447 
0.548 
0.548 
0.548 
0.548 
0.548 
0.548 
0.548 
0.548 
0.548 
Government 
(n=15) 
Mean 
3.267 
1.667 
1.667 
2.800 
1.800 
3.467 
3.533 
2.733 
2.933 
3.200 
3.000 
SD 
0.458 
0.900 
1.175 
0.676 
1.014 
0.516 
0.516 
0.961 
0.799 
0.941 
0.845 
Private 
(n=10) 
Mean 
3.800 
3.100 
0.600 
1.300 
3.500 
0.600 
0.600 
1.600 
2.000 
1.300 
0.500 
SD 
0.422 
0.738 
0.516 
0.823 
0.527 
0.516 
0.516 
0.516 
1.563 
0.823 
0.527 
Significance 
of difference 
"F" 
8.438 
17.806 
7.319 
19.215 
12.953 
99.716 
99.470 
6.641 
4.089 
24.510 
45.000 
"p" 
0.001 
<0.001 
0.003 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.005 
0.028 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Table 38: Comparison of Difference in Perceptions related to Relevance of 
Basel II, its impact and benefits by three different ownerships (Foreign, 
Government and Private) 
159 
chapter-4 
45 
4 
35 
3 
at 
8 25 
<n 
c 
ra 2 
4) 
S 
1 5 
1 
05 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Component Item Nos. 
Figure 20: Comparison of Mean Scores for Perceptions related to 
Relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits for different ownerships 
(Foreign, Government, Private) 
Amongst government banks, the threshold of 3 was crossed for status of 
IT solutions in use (3.267±0.458), increase in liabilities of staff on personal 
level (3.467±0.516), increase in personal discretion (3.533±0.516), 
environment not suitable for development of credit derivative markets 
(3.200±0.941) and successful implementation as a safeguard against financial 
crises (3.000±0.845). Of these, on the item status of IT solution in use despite 
crossing the threshold the government owned banks have significantly lower 
score as compared to private and foreign banks. This may be attributed to lack 
of autonomy amongst the government sector banks, as information technology 
itself is dynamic and fast changing, in order to keep pace with the technological 
changes, one has to take fast decisions, in case of government banks, owing to 
desire of exercising greater control and political interference and indecisiveness. 
Amongst different types of ownership significant differences were seen 
for all the items (p<0.05). 
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Foreign banks had maximum scores for status of IT solutions in use 
while minimum score among foreign banks were obtained for the items 
Environment not suitable for development of credit derivative markets and 
Successful implementation as a safeguard against financial crises. This could 
be simply explained on the basis of excellent IT infrastructure of the foreign 
banks. In order to keep themselves connected to their parent banks, the foreign 
banks have got excellent infrastructure for information technology. Apart from 
them, it is easier for them to use such solutions given the fact that they usually 
cater to a selected segment and have very few branches, that too at places 
where both the IT infrastructure is developed and IT personnel are available. 
As regards the low scores of foreign banks on environment not suitable for 
development of credit derivative, it can be said that in the recently developed 
economies or developing economies trading of credit derivatives has not been 
practised too much. Usually the central banks of these countries restrict or do 
not allow such trading owing to lack of monitoring and control mechanism, and 
apprehension of malpractices in such trading. On the other hand foreign banks, 
usually hailing from developed and economically wealthier nations with free 
markets have experienced no such restriction in their parent countries, hence 
they seek greater freedom and opportunity to trade, as they know that having 
experience of doing business in these relatively new businesses they have got 
an edge over the native banks of that country. However, low scores on the issue 
successful implementation as a safeguard against financial crises is simply an 
indication of the varied risks that a foreign bank is exposed to. In fact, a 
business in a different nation than that of the native organisation, is exposed to 
environmental changes of not the particular country where it is working but 
also that of its parent nation. One can see how Daewoo Motors failed in India 
despite having an environment conducive of growth of auto industry merely 
because of environmental impact of the parent country' 
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Foreign banks crossed the threshold of mean score of 3 for many items 
such as relevance of credit adjudication, relevance of risk management 
processes, increase in liabilities of staff on personal level, reduction of risk with 
specified provisions, etc. This may be because of better management practices, 
risk control measures and systematic work procedures. Once again, this may be 
because of the fact that a foreign bank that starts functioning in a foreign land, 
has to develop effective and management control over the branches that are 
miles apart, and to make their venture risk-free they make adequate 
arrangements for all those risks which can be calculated. The Basel-II accord, 
is basically, idea conceived and developed by western nations, where the 
Banking industry is very strong, have developed various measures and 
processes, learning from their long history of banking, that is why they are 
either familiar with most of the risk management processes or are atleast more 
open to welcome these. 
However, for the other items such as increase in liabilities of staff on 
personal level (3.467±0.516), increase in personal discretion (3.533±0.516), 
owing to lack of compulsion to meet targets, the government banks feel that 
these changes will definitely reduce the liabilities of staff on personal level and 
their personal discretion will remain unquestioned if they simply follow the 
rulebook of Basel-II. Thus one can see that despite failing to meet the targets, 
the government banks offer greater job-security whereas in private/foreign 
banks, one thinks that he will not only have to comply with the Basel-II but at 
the same time the Damocles sword will be looming over their heads for 
meeting the organisational targets. Thus in case of rulebook follow up of Basel-
II, one will have an impending threat of losing business, and there he/she will 
have to use personal discretion over the rulebook which will in turn result in 
greater personal responsibility. 
The private banks cross the threshold of 3 for only three items, status of 
IT solutions in use, relevance of credit adjudication processes and relevance of 
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capital allocation processes. In fact for the last item they score maximum 
among the three types of ownerships. However, the private banks score too low 
for the items like adequacy of risk management processes, relevance of risk 
management processes, increase in liabilities of staff on personal level, increase 
in personal discretion, disclosure of information affecting competence, 
reduction of risk with specified provisions, environment not suitable for 
development of credit derivative markets and successful implementation as a 
safeguard against financial crises. This situation paints an opportunistic picture 
of the private players who want to enjoy the benefits while when it comes to be 
responsible, they take their feet back. The private sector banks have often been 
violating or manipulating the banking norms, sometimes to the extent that they 
have to face penal actions. For example right at the time of preparing this 
manuscript, penalties were imposed by Reserve Bank of India (the regulatory 
authority of Indian banks) over ING Vysya, HDFC Bank and IDBI for 
violating the know-your-customer (KYC) norms, breaching prudent banking 
practices and not adhering to directives and guidelines for granting loans 
against shares/IPOs. They are less open to disclose the information and the 
pressure of meeting targets is so much intense over the employees that they 
sometimes override the procedures in order to bring more business. 
Thus it is evident that for different types of ownerships too the Basel-II 
accord holds different meanings in terms of acceptability, preparedness and 
perceived benefits. 
Table 39 to Table 41 discuss the mean scores for items covered under 
component III, inter-environment and inter-ownership style comparisons in 
detail. 
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Mean Item Scores for Component III (n=30) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Item Details 
Development of a strategy and mechanism for 
risk management and capital allocation across 
all levels of bank 
Process to estimate the Risk Weighted Assets 
Need of statistical modeling for 
implementation 
Status of Credit Adjudication processes 
Readiness to handle Pricing processes in terms 
of manpower 
Adequacy of software 
Adequacy and competence of current staff 
Disclosure of information leading to loss in 
reputation 
Status of preparedness for the selected 
approach 
Timeframe for adopting selected approach 
Provisions for risks having adverse effect on 
operations 
Clear guidelines from regulatory body on 
regulatory discretion under suggested approach 
Mean Score 
(Max 4) 
3.033 
2.233 
1.833 
1.300 
2.933 
2.567 
2.900 
3.667 
2.833 
3.433 
3.300 
2.833 
S.D. 
0.556 
1.006 
1.206 
0.651 
1.258 
1.165 
0.662 
0.479 
0.913 
1.305 
0.750 
0.834 
*Higher scores indicate more positive responses 
Table 39: Implementation Status and acceptability 
1 2 5 
I 
Component Items 
Figure 21: Mean Scores for Implementation Status and acceptability 
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For component III, out of 12 items, only 4 could cross the mean 
threshold of 3. These items were development of a strategy and mechanism for 
risk management and capital allocation across all levels of bank (3.033±0.556), 
disclosure of information leading to loss in reputation (3.667±0.479), 
timeframe for adopting selected approach (3.433±1.305) and provisions for 
risks having adverse effect on operations (3.300±0.750). Amongst items on the 
lower rung were status of credit adjudication processes (1.300±0.651), need of 
statistical modeling for implementation (1.833±1.206), process to estimate the 
risk weighted assets (2.233±1.006) and adequacy of software (2.567±1.165). 
Items that were too close to borderline included clear guidelines from 
regulatory body on regulatory discretion under suggested approach 
(2.833±0.834), status of preparedness for selected approach (2.833±0.913), 
adequacy and competence of cun-ent staff (2.900±0.662) and readiness to 
handle pricing processes in terms of manpower (2.933±1.258).Table 40 further 
explores the issue in terms of environments. 
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s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Environmental Impact on 
Item Details 
Development of a strategy and 
mechanism for risk management 
and capital allocation across all 
levels of bank 
Process to estimate the Risk 
Weighted Assets 
Need of statistical modeling for 
implementation 
Status of Credit Adjudication 
processes 
Readiness to handle Pricing 
processes in terms of manpower 
Adequacy of software 
Adequacy and competence of 
current staff 
Disclosure of information leading to 
loss in reputation 
Status of preparedness for selected 
approach 
Timeframe for adopting selected 
approach 
Provisions for risks having adverse 
effect on operations 
Clear guidelines from regulatory 
body on regulatory discretion under 
suggested approach 
[ssues under Component 
Environment 
India 
(n=10) 
Mean 
3.000 
1.800 
1.300 
1.300 
3.500 
2.700 
2.700 
3.600 
3.200 
4.000 
3.400 
2.700 
SD 
0.667 
0.919 
0.823 
0.483 
0.527 
0.823 
0.823 
0.516 
0.422 
0.000 
0.516 
0.823 
UAE (n=20) 
Mean 
3.050 
2.450 
2.100 
1.300 
2.650 
2.500 
3.000 
3.700 
2.650 
3.150 
3.250 
2.900 
SD 
0.510 
0.999 
1.294 
0.733 
1.424 
1.318 
0.562 
0.470 
1.040 
1.531 
0.851 
0.852 
III 
Significance 
of difference 
l U M 
-0.228 
-1.724 
-1.775 
0.000 
1.813 
0.437 
-1.178 
-0.532 
1.597 
1.740 
0.510 
-0.613 
y 
0.821 
0.096 
0.087 
1.000 
0.081 
0.665 
0.249 
0.599 
0.122 
0.093 
0.614 
0.545 
*Scores ranged from 0 to 4 on Likert scale; higher scores indicate more positive responses 
"p" values in hold indicate significant differences between the two environments 
Table 40: Comparison of Mean scores in two different environments 
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Component Item No. 
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Figure 22: Comparison of Mean Scores for Implementation Status and 
acceptability in two different environments (India and UAE) 
No statistically significant difference between two environments was 
seen for any of the items in Component III (p>0.05), thus signifying that for 
both the environments similar items hold importance. This component mainly 
dealt with the intellectual preparedness, adaptation to new capital allocation 
approaches and availability of regulatory guidelines. Thus, it seems that despite 
there being too much talk about the Basel-II, the willingness to implement 
them is not visible in either of the two environments. 
Table 41 studies the impact of ownership type on the items of 
Component IIT 
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S.No. 
1. 
2. 
J . 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Ownership Impact 
Item Details 
Development of a 
strategy and 
mechanism for risk 
management and 
capital allocation 
across all levels of 
bank 
Process to estimate the 
Risk Weighted Assets 
Need of statistical 
modeling for 
implementation 
Status of Credit 
Adjudication processes 
Readiness to handle 
Pricing processes in 
terms of manpower 
Adequacy of software 
Adequacy and 
competence of current 
staff 
Disclosure of 
information leading to 
loss in reputation 
Status of preparedness 
for selected approach 
Timeframe for 
adopting selected 
approach 
Provisions for risks 
[laving adverse effect 
on operations 
Clear guidelines from 
regulatory body on 
regulatory discretion 
under suggested 
approach 
on Issues under Component III 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
3.000 
3.000 
3.000 
1.600 
4.000 
3.600 
3.000 
3.600 
3.600 
4.000 
3.400 
2.400 
SD 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.548 
0.000 
0.548 
0.000 
C.548 
0.548 
0.000 
0.548 
0.548 
Government 
(n=15) 
Mean 
3.067 
2.267 
1.800 
1.200 
2.200 
2.133 
3.000 
3.733 
2.333 
2.867 
3.200 
3.067 
SD 
0.594 
1.100 
1.373 
0.775 
1.373 
1.302 
0.655 
0.458 
0.976 
1.685 
0.941 
0.884 
Private 
(n=10) 
Mean 
3.000 
1.800 
1.300 
1.300 
3.500 
2.700 
2.700 
3.600 
3.200 
4.000 
3.400 
2.700 
SD 
0.667 
0.919 
0.823 
0.483 
0.527 
0.823 
0.823 
0.516 
0.422 
0.000 
0.516 
0.823 
Significance 
of difference 
npii 
0.050 
2.660 
4.015 
0.692 
7.926 
3.625 
0.669 
0.276 
6.722 
3.273 
0.253 
1.431 
"p" 
0.951 
0.088 
0.030 
0.509 
0.002 
0.040 
0.520 
0.761 
0.004 
0.053 
0.778 
0.257 
Table 41: Comparison of Mean scores for Implementation and 
acceptability for different ownerships 
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Figure 23: Comparison of Mean Scores for Implementation Status and 
acceptability for three different types of ownerships (Foreign, Government 
and Private) 
Statistically significant differences among groups were seen for the 
items need of statistical modeling for implementation (p=0.03), readiness to 
handle pricing processes in terms of manpower (p=0.002), adequacy of 
software (p=0.040) and status of preparedness for selected approach (p=0.004). 
It was seen that foreign banks had significantly higher mean scores (3.000±0.0; 
4.000±0.0; 3.600±0.548 and 3.600±0.548 respectively) for all of these items. 
Thus on intellectual framework and adaptation to new approaches foreign 
banks were more prepared. 
In fact, apart from two items i.e. status of credit adjudication processes 
and clear guidelines from regulatory body on regulatory discretion under 
suggested approach, for all the other items, foreign banks reached or even 
crossed the threshold mean score of 3, thereby indicating a good preparedness. 
Among private banks, the threshold mean score of 3 could not be 
achieved for 6 items process to estimate the risk weighted assets, need of 
statistical modeling for implementation, status of credit adjudication, adequacy 
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of software, adequacy and competence of current staff and clear guidelines 
from regulatory body on regulatory discretion under suggested approach. 
However, for government owned banks, for seven items, viz. process to 
estimate the risk weighted assets, need of statistical modeling for 
implementation, status of credit adjudication processes, readiness to handle 
pricing processes in terms of manpower, adequacy of software, status of 
preparedness for selected approach and timeframe for implementation of 
selected approach the threshold mean score of 3 could not be achieved. 
Thus, it was seen that for intellectual framework and adaptation to new 
approaches foreign banks while private banks and government banks lagged 
behind in that order. 
Mean Item Scores for Component IV (n=30) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Item Details 
Status of Issues related to Credit Adjudication 
processes 
Adequacy of Pricing processes 
Relevance of Pricing processes 
Ability to structure and objectively define the 
processes 
Correctness of measuring risk and provisions 
against it 
Mean 
Score 
(Max 4) 
1.43 
2.50 
1.90 
2.57 
1.97 
S.D. 
0.68 
1.11 
1.32 
1.19 
1.16 
*Higher scores indicate more positive responses 
Table 42: Pricing and S^ r^ategy for Implementation 
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Figure 24: Mean Scores for Pricing and Implementation Strategy 
As far as mean scores for pricing and implementation strategy were 
concerned, for none of the items threshold was crossed. Maximum mean score 
obtained was 2.57±1.19 for the item "ability to structure and objectively define 
the processes" while minimum score was obtained for the item Status of Issues 
related to Credit Adjudication processes (1.43±0.68). 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Environmental Impact on Issues under 
Item Details 
Status of Issues related to Credit 
Adjudication processes 
Adequacy of Pricing processes 
Relevance of Pricing processes 
Ability to structure and objectively 
define the processes 
Correctness of measuring risk and 
provisions against it 
Component IV 
Environment 
India 
(n=10) 
Mean 
1.10 
1.60 
2.10 
2.00 
2.00 
SD 
0.74 
1.17 
1.66 
1.56 
1.56 
UAE 
(n=20) 
Mean 
1.60 
2.95 
1.80 
2.85 
1.95 
SD 
0.60 
0.76 
1.15 
0.88 
0.95 
Significance 
of 
difference 
"t" 
1.197 
3.817 
0.579 
1.921 
0.109 
MpH 
0.056 
0.001 
0.300 
0.065 
0.914 
*Scores ranged from 0 to 4 on Likert scale; higher scores indicate more positive responses 
"p" values in bold indicate significant differences between the two environments 
Table 43: Comparison of Mean scores in two different environments 
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status of Issues Adequacy of Pricing Relevance of Ability to structure Correctness of 
related to Credit processes Pricing processes and objectively measuring risk and 
Adjudication define ttie provisions against it 
processes processes 
Component items 
Figure 25: Mean Scores for Pricing and Implementation Strategy in 
different environments 
For different items under the component Pricing and Implementation 
Strategy, threshold could not be crossed in either of the two environments. 
However, a statistically significant difference between two environments was 
seen for the item adequacy of pricing processes where the mean score of Indian 
banks was 1.60±1.17 while that of UAE banks was 2.95±0.76. Both in UAE as 
well as in India, minimum scores were obtained for the item Status of Issues 
related to Credit Adjudication processes. In fact credit adjudication process is 
very difficuh to be defined objectively. Many a times the adjudicator instead of 
relying on the objective criteria laid for the process, relies on his personal 
perception and hence there is always a dubiousness over the strictness to follow 
the credit adjudication processes in verbatim. 
In Indian banks, maximum positive scores were obtained for relevance 
of pricing processes (2.10±1.66), this might be due to recent introduction of 
various value added services in the banking sector, for which banks do charge 
the prices. However, as regards adequacy of these prices were concerned, UAE 
banks scored better, even significantly higher as compared to Indian banks. As 
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such it implies that the pricing processes in Indian context need an 
augmentation. 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Ownership Impact on 
Item Details 
Status of Issues related 
to Credit Adjudication 
processes 
Adequacy of Pricing 
processes 
Relevance of Pricing 
processes 
Ability to structure and 
objectively define the 
processes 
Correctness of 
measuring risk and 
provisions against it 
Issues under Component I \ 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
1.80 
2.40 
1.60 
3.00 
2.40 
SD 
0.84 
0.55 
0.55 
0.00 
0.55 
Government 
(n=15) 
Mean 
1.53 
3.13 
1.87 
2.80 
1.80 
SD 
0.52 
0.74 
1.30 
1.04 
1.01 
Priv 
(n=] 
Mean 
1.10 
1.60 
2.10 
2.00 
2.00 
ate 
10) 
SD 
0.74 
1.17 
1.66 
1.56 
1.56 
r 
Signiflcance 
of 
difference 
ftpff 
2.283 
8.965 
0.235 
1.842 
0.491 
"p" 
0.121 
0.001 
0.792 
0.178 
0.618 
Table 44: Comparison of Mean scores for pricing and implementation 
strategy for different ownerships 
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Figure 26: Mean Scores for Pricing and Implementation Strategy for 
different ownership types 
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The mean scores for pricing and implementation strategy for different 
ownerships revealed a statistically significant difference among different types 
of ownerships for the item adequacy of pricing processes, where government 
banks (3.13±0.74) scored significantly higher as compared to foreign banks 
(2.40±0.55) and private banks (1.60±1.17). Amongst foreign banks the 
threshold of 3 was achieved for the item ability to structure and objectively 
define the processes whereas amongst government banks it was achieved for 
the item adequacy of pricing processes. The private banks did not achieve the 
threshold for any of the items under consideration. 
4.5 Part V: Hypothesis Testing 
HI. Readiness of Banks for implementation of Basel II is related to 
environment 
Yes 
No 
Banks ready for implementation of Basel II 
Indian Banks (n=10) 
Observed 
0 
10 
Expected 
2.33 
7.67 
UAE Banks (n=20) 
Observed 
7 
13 
Expected 
4.67 
15.33 
^Criteria = Mean Total score for scale >3, x2 - 4.565; p=0.033 
Only 35% of banks in UAE and none in India are ready for 
implementation of Basel-II, significantly higher proportion of banks in UAE 
are ready for implementation of Basel II (p=0.033). 
Hypothesis accepted. 
Alternate hypothesis "Readiness for implementation of Basel II is unrelated to 
environment" is rejected. 
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HI. A. Understanding of Basel II is related with Environment 
Satisfactory 
Not satisfactory 
Banks having common understanding of Basel II 
Indian Banks (n=10) 
Observed 
6 
4 
Expected 
5.33 
4.67 
UAE Banks (n=20) 
Observed 
10 
10 
Expected 
10.67 
9.33 
*Criteria = Mean Total score for subscale I >3 
X2 = 0.268; p=0.608 
In India, 6 (60%) banks and in UAE, 10 (50%) banks had the common 
understanding of Basel II. However, no statistically significant difference 
between two environments could be deduced (p=0.608). 
Hypothesis rejected. 
Alternate hypothesis - "there is no significant difference in the understanding 
of Basel II between the two environments". 
Hl.B. Perceptions related to Relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits are 
related with environment 
Satisfactory 
Not satisfactory 
Sufficient Positive Perceptions related to Relevance 
of Basel-II, its impact and benefits 
Indian Banks (n=10) 
Observed 
— 
10 
Expected 
— 
10 
UAE Banks (n=20) 
Observed 
— 
20 
Expected 
— 
20 
*Criteria = Mean Total score for subscale II >3 
No comparison was possible as one of the two states was missing. 
In both the environments none of the respondents had sufficient positive 
perceptions related to relevance of Basel-II, its impact and benefits. 
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Hypothesis rejected. 
Alternate hypothesis - "perceptions related to relevance of Basel II, its 
impact and benefits in different environments is not related with environment" 
is accepted. 
Hl.C. Implementation status and acceptability is dependent on the environment. 
Satisfactory 
Not satisfactory 
Implementation Status and Acceptability of Basel II 
Indian Banks (n=10) 
Observed 
1 
9 
Expected 
4 
6 
UAE Banks (n=20) 
Observed 
11 
9 
Expected 
6 
12 
*Cnteria = Mean score for subscale III >3 
X2 = 5.625; p^O.018 
There was a significant difference (p=0.018) in the implementation 
status of Basel-II implementation status an acceptability with UAE banks 
showing more satisfactory implementation and acceptability as compared to 
Indian banks (p=0.018). 
Hypothesis accepted. 
Alternate hypothesis "Implementation status and acceptability is 
independent of the environment" is rejected. 
HI .D. Pricing and Implementation strategy is dependent on the environment 
Satisfactory 
Not satisfactory 
Pricing and Implementation strategy 
Indian Banks (n=10) 
Observed 
3 
7 
Expected 
1 
9 
UAE Banks (n=20) 
Observed 
0 
20 
Expected 
2 
18 
*Criteria = Mean score for subscale IV > 3 
X2 = 6.667: p^O.OlO 
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It was seen that Indian banks had significantly higher number of banks 
with satisfactory scores for pricing and implementation strategy as compared to 
those in UAE. 
Hypothesis accepted 
Alternate hypothesis that "pricing and implementation strategy is 
independent of environment" is rejected. 
H2. The ability to bear the cost of implementation of Basel II is different in 
different environments 
S.No. 
1. 
Item related to costs 
Adequacy of financial 
resources 
Environment 
India i 
Mean 
1.300 
n=IO) 
SD 
0.823 
UAE (n=20) 
Mean 
2.100 
SD 
1.410 
Significance 
of difference 
i i^i i 
-1.650 
"p" 
0.110 
Statistically no significant difference between two different 
environments was seen as regards the adequacy of financial resources to 
implement Basel II (p=0.110). 
Hypothesis rejected. 
Alternate hypothesis "The ability to bear the costs of implementation of 
Basel II is not related with environment" is accepted. 
H3. Relevance and adequacy of risk management processes is different in 
different environments. 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
Item related to 
relevance and 
adequacy of risk 
management 
Adequacy of Risk 
management processes 
Relevance of Risk 
management processes 
Environment 
India (n=10) 
Mean 
0.600 
1.300 
SD 
0.516 
0.823 
UAE (n=20) 
Mean 
1.850 
2.950 
SD 
1.089 
0.686 
Significance of 
difference 
"t" 
-3.419 
-5.811 
"p" 
0.002 
<o.ooi 1 
.77 
There was a statistically significant difference as regards the adequacy 
and relevance of risk management processes in both the environments with 
UAE banks showing significantly higher score as compared to Indian banks 
(p=0.002and<0.001). 
Hypothesis accepted. 
The alternate hypothesis "Relevance and adequacy of risk management 
processes is similar in different environments" is rejected. 
H4. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information is 
different in two environments 
H4.A. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information on 
competence is different in two environments. 
S.No. 
1. 
Item related to 
disclosure of 
information affecting 
competence 
Disclosure of 
information affecting 
competence 
Environment 
India 
Mean 
1.600 
^n=10) 
SD 
0.516 
UAE (n=20) 
Mean 
2.700 
SD 
0.865 
Signij 
ofdifi 
rixti 
-3.689 
Icance 
erence 
"p" 
0.001 
There were significant differences between two countries on the issue 
related to disclosure of information affecting competence (p=0.001). 
Hypothesis accepted. 
The alternate hypothesis "The perception regarding the effect of 
disclosure of information on competence is not different in two environments" 
is rejected. 
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H4.B. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information on 
reputation is different in two environments. 
S.No. 
1. 
Item related to 
disclosure of 
information leading to 
loss in reputation 
Disclosure of 
information leading to 
loss in reputation 
Environment 
India i 
Mean 
3.600 
n=10) 
SD 
0.516 
UAE (n=20) 
Mean 
3.700 
SD 
0.470 
Significance 
of difference 
11x11 
-0.532 
"p" 
0.599 
No significant differences between two countries on the issue related to 
disclosure of information leading to loss in reputation were seen (p=0.599). 
Hypothesis rejected. 
The alternate hypothesis "The perception regarding the effect of 
disclosure of information on reputation is not related to environment" is 
accepted. 
Thus the hypothesis No. 4 is partially accepted. 
H5. The amount of resistance to Basel II by the personnel of banks is 
different in different environments. 
S.No. 
1. 
Item related to 
resistance to Basel-II by 
the personnel 
Resistance amongst 
personnel 
Environment 
India i 
Mean 
3.600 
^n=10) 
SD 
0.516 
UAE (n=20) 
Mean 
3.500 
SD 
0.688 
Signij 
ofdifi 
Hil l 
0.405 
Icance 
erence 
i ipii 
0.689 
No significant difference in mean scores for resistance amongst 
personnel was seen between UAE and Indian banks (p=0.689). In fact in both 
the environments there were high scores indicating low resistance (high scores 
indicate positive results). 
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Hypothesis rejected. 
Alternate hypothesis "the amount of resistance to Basel II by the 
personnel of banks in different environments is not different" is accepted. 
H6. The perception that successful implementation of Basel II will avert 
financial crises is different in different environments. 
S.No. 
1. 
Item related to 
perception regarding 
successful 
implementation as a 
safeguard against 
financial crises 
Successful 
implementation as a 
safeguard against 
financial crises 
Environment 
India (n=10) 
Mean 
0.500 
SD 
0.527 
UAE (n=20) 
Mean 
2.400 
SD 
1.314 
Significance of 
difference 
Hil l 
-4.369 
i.pii 
<0.001 
The mean scores related to perception regarding successful 
implementation as a safeguard against financial crises was significantly higher 
for UAE banks as compared to Indian banks. There was a statistically 
significant difference between the two (p<0.001). 
Hypothesis accepted. 
Hence the alternate hypothesis "The perception that successful 
implementation of Basel II will avert financial crises is unrelated with 
environment" is rejected. 
H7. The readiness for implementation of Basel II is affected by type of 
ownership. 
Yes 
No 
Banks ready for implementation of Basel II 
Foreign Banks (n=5) 
Observed 
2 
3 
Expected 
1.17 
3.83 
Government Banks 
(n=15) 
Observed 
5 
10 
Expected 
3.5 
11.5 
Private Banks (n=10) 
Observed 
0 
10 
Expected 
2.3 
7.7 
*Critena = Mean Total score for scale >3, /2 = 4.658; p=0.097 
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No statistically significant difference in readiness to implement Basel II 
was seen for different types of ownerships (p=0.033). 
Hypothesis rejected. 
Alternate hypothesis "the readiness for implementation of Basel II is 
unaffected by type of ownership" is accepted. 
H7.A. Understanding of Basel II is related to ownership type 
Yes 
No 
Understanding of Basel II 
Foreign Banks (n=5) 
Observed 
5 
0 
Expected 
2.67 
2.33 
Government Banks 
(n=15) 
Observed 
5 
10 
Expected 
8 
7 
Private Banks (n=10) 
Observed 
6 
4 
Expected 
5.33 
4.67 
^Criteria = Mean Total score for subscale I>3 
X2 = 6.964; p=0.031 
Statistically a significant difference among different ownership types 
was seen as regards understanding of Basel II. It was seen that in foreign banks 
the proportion of those having satisfactory understanding of Basel-II was 
significantly higher as compared to that in Government banks and Private 
banks (p=0.031). 
Hypothesis accepted. 
Alternate hypothesis "Understanding of Basel II is unrelated to 
ownership type" is rejected. 
H7.B. Perceptions related to Relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits are 
related with type of ownership 
Yes 
No 
Perceptions related to Relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits 
Foreign Banks (n=5) 
Observed 
-
5 
Expected 
-
5 
Government Banks 
(n=15) 
Observed 
-
15 
Expected 
-
15 
Private Banks 
(n=10) 
Observed 
-
10 
Expected 
-
10 
*Criteria = Mean Total score for subscale II >3 
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No statistics could be computed as the other state was empty. 
None of the respondent banks crossed the threshold for having positive 
perceptions related to relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits. There was 
no difference amongst banks on this issue. 
Hypothesis rejected. 
Alternate hypothesis "Perceptions related to Relevance of Basel II, its 
impact and benefits are unrelated with type of ownership" is accepted. 
H7.C. Implementation status and acceptability is dependent on type of 
ownership. 
Yes 
No 
Implementation status and acceptability 
Foreign Banks (n=5) 
Observed 
5 
0 
Expected 
2 
3 
Government Banks 
{n=15) 
Observed 
6 
9 
Expected 
6 
9 
Private Banks (n=10) 
Observed 
1 
9 
Expected 
4 
6 
*Criteria = Mean Total score for subscale III >3 
X2 = 11.250: p=0.004 
Statistically significant differences in implementation status and 
acceptability of Basel II were seen among different types of ownerships of 
banks with foreign banks showing the maximum while the private banks 
showing the minimum scores. 
Hypothesis accepted. 
Hence alternate hypothesis "implementation status and acceptability is 
independent of type of ownership" is rejected. 
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H7.D. Pricing and Implementation Strategy is dependent on type of ownersliip. 
Yes 
No 
Pricing and Implementation Strategy 
Foreign Banks (n=5) 
Observed 
0 
5 
Expected 
0.5 
4.5 
Government Banks 
(n=15) 
Observed 
0 
15 
Expected 
1.5 
13.5 
Private Banks (n=10) 
Observed 
3 
7 
Expected 
1 
9 
*Critena = Mean Total score for subscale III >3 
X2 = 6.667; p=0.036 
Statistically significant differences in pricing and implementation 
strategy were seen among different types of ownerships of banks with 30% 
private banks crossing the threshold whereas none of the foreign banks or 
government banks crossed the threshold. 
Hypothesis accepted. 
Hence alternate hypothesis "pricing and implementation strategy is 
independent of type of ownership" is rejected. 
H8. Ability to bear the cost of implementation of Basel-II is related to type of 
ownership. 
S.No. 
1. 
Item 
Adequacy of 
financial 
resources 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
3.400 
SD 
0.548 
Government 
(n=15) 
Mean 
1.667 
SD 
1.345 
Private 
(n=10) 
Mean 
1.300 
SD 
0.823 
Significance 
of difference 
"P" 
6.426 
"P" 
0.005 
Statistical comparison of the three types of ownerships revealed that 
while foreign banks had adequate financial resources, government banks and 
private banks lacked them considerably, showing a statistically significant 
difference among the three types of ownerships (p=0.005). 
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Hypothesis accepted. 
Alternate hypothesis "Ownership has no effect on the ability to bear the 
cost of implementation of Basel 11" is rejected. 
H9. Relevance and adequacy of risk management processes is different for 
different types of ownerships. 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
Item 
Adequacy of 
Risk 
management 
processes 
Relevance of 
Risk 
management 
processes 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
2.400 
3.400 
SD 
0.548 
0.548 
Government 
(n=15) 
Mean 
1.667 
2.800 
SD 
1.175 
0.676 
Private 
(n=10) 
Mean 
0.600 
1.300 
SD 
0.516 
0.823 
Significance 
of difference 
tipii 
7.319 
19.215 
"p" 
0.003 
<0.001 
There was significant difference in perceptions regarding adequacy 
(p=0.003) and relevance (p<0.001) of risk management processes among the 
three groups with Foreign banks having maximum scores and private banks 
showing minimum scores. 
Hypothesis accepted. 
Alternate hypothesis "Perception regarding Relevance and Adequacy of 
risk management processes is not related to the type of ownership" is rejected. 
HIO. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information is 
different for different types of ownerships 
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HIO.A. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information on 
competence is different for different types of ownerships. 
S.No. 
1. 
Item 
Disclosure of 
information 
affecting 
competence 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
2.600 
SD 
0.548 
Government 
(n=15) 
Mean 
2.733 
SD 
0.961 
Private 
{n=10) 
Mean 
1.600 
SD 
0.516 
Significance 
of difference 
i ip t i 
6.641 
"p" 
0.005 
There was a statistically significant difference in three types of 
ownerships (p=0.005) with government banks having maximum scores while 
private banks had minimum scores. 
Hypothesis accepted. 
Alternate hypothesis "perception regarding the effect of disclosure of 
information on competence is not different for different types of ownerships" is 
rejected. 
HIO.B. The perception regarding the effect of disclosure of information on 
reputation is different for different types of ownerships 
S.No. 
1. 
Item 
Disclosure 
of 
information 
leading to 
loss in 
reputation 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
3.600 
SD 
0.548 
Government 
(n=15) 
Mean 
3.733 
SD 
0.458 
Private 
(n=10) 
Mean 
3.600 
SD 
0.516 
C t n n i f 
OlgnillCilllCC 
of difference 
itpii 
0.276 
"p" 
0.761 
There was no significant difference among the groups (p=0.76I) on the 
perception of information leading to loss in reputation, all the three groups had 
mean scores above 3. 
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Hypothesis rejected. 
Alternate hypothesis "perception regarding the effect of disclosure of 
information on reputation is similar among different types of ownerships" is 
accepted. 
HI 1.The amount of resistance to Basel II by the personnel of banks is different 
for different types of ownerships. 
S.No. 
1. 
Item 
Resistance 
amongst 
personnel 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
2.600 
SD 
0.548 
Government 
(n=15) 
Mean 
3.800 
SD 
0.414 
Private 
(n=10) 
Mean 
3.600 
SD 
0.516 
Significance of 
difference 
iipii 
12.300 
"p" 
<0.00I 
In this context private banks had minimum scores while government 
banks had maximum scores. Groupwise there was a significant difference 
among different types of ownerships (p<0.001). 
Hypothesis accepted. 
The alternate hypothesis "the amount of resistance to Basel II by the 
personnel of banks is similar for different types of ownerships" is rejected. 
HI2.The perception that successful implementation of Basel II will avert 
financial crises is different for different types of ownerships. 
S.No. 
1. 
Item 
Successful 
implementation 
as a safeguard 
against 
financial crises 
Ownership 
Foreign 
(n=5) 
Mean 
0.600 
SD 
0.548 
Government 
(n-15) 
Mean 
3.000 
SD 
0.845 
Private 
(n=10) 
Mean 
0.500 
SD 
0.527 
Significance 
of difference 
"F" 
45.000 
"p" 
<0.001 
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In this context, private banks and foreign banks had very low scores 
(0.500±0.527 and 0.600±0.548) while government banks had very high scores 
(3.000±0.845) thus showing statistically significant differences among different 
types of ownerships (p<0.001). 
Hypothesis accepted. 
Alternate hypothesis "perception that successful implementation of 
Basel II in will avert financial crises is similar for different types of 
ownerships" is rejected. 
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Chapter-5 
INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research was conducted with the problem statement of "A 
Comparative Study of Implementation of Basel II Accord and its implication in 
Indian and UA.E. Banking Sector". 
Basel II is a response to the need for reform of the regulatory system 
governing the global banking industry. 
The purpose to conduct a study on the implementation and the impact of 
Basel II in two different countries was to understand whether environmental 
differences have an implication on various related issues. 
For this purpose a study with exploratory design was conducted which 
covered secondary as well as primary data. On the basis of observations made 
the following inferences could be drawn: 
5.1 Inferences 
1. Banks are still living in a protective shell: While collecting the 
primary data for the study, the banks were reluctant to opine, share 
views, give information about their preparedness for Basel II and the 
current status in that context. At the one hand, the back office 
operations are being outsourced, the banks are keeping curtains on the 
less sensitive information despite being assured of confidentiality. As a 
matter of fact, the study was planned to be a conducted as a survey 
covering the entire study universe in both the countries, however, owing 
to reluctance of banks to participate, finally the study was finally 
conducted using convenience sampling technique only. Among those 
who responded, the aspect of Basel-II posing greatest concern for 
industry was found to be Pillar III (83.3%) which is concerned with 
sharing of information implying that it's not going to be easy to change 
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the tradition conservative approach of bankers to conceal more and 
reveal less. There are still apprehensions amongst bankers that 
disclosure of information may affect their competence (mean score 
2.333±0.922). 
2. Banking universe is open for all players: Today, ownership 
restrictions on banking operations are no more existing, both in UAE 
and India, the ownership of banks is diversified, there are private banks, 
public sector/government banks, cooperative banks while leaving room 
for the foreign banks too. The era of nationalisation of banks seems to 
be a forgotten story, now the rule is for efficiency and performance. 
3. Much demand for Improved Risk Management: Today, market 
forces govern the business - there is a solution for each demand. As 
regards the risks in the financial world, everybody wants a cover against 
it. It was observed during the course of study that even making the 
preparation for Basel II improved the risk management as it helped 
people to think about the potential areas of risk. 
4. Operational Risks: Cause of much worry: As far as the level of 
concern of the banks was concerned operational risks under Basel-II 
attracted greatest concern. This implies that the banks who participated 
in the study are still not clear about the various safeguards provided by 
the Basel II on the issues of operational risks. Being relatively a recently 
covered area under Basel II, its efficacy is not fully understood by the 
respondents. 
5. Banking is going to be more competitive: Majority of respondents feel 
that banking is going to be more competitive in future as the main 
impact of Basel-II. Given the huge costs that one has to bear for 
implementation and adaptation to Basel-II, the smaller banks are 
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apprehensive of being affected and are trying to make themselves 
competent in the changed environment. 
6. Much more to do to understand the concepts: Very low scores for the 
items related to complexity (2.33±1.18) indicate that the very basic 
concepts of Basel II are not well understood by the banks. Structuring of 
almost all the processes and business operations by banks, which usually 
were subject to discretion earlier, apprehends the banks about its 
complexity, though with the use of modem information technology tools, 
it's going to be too easy, rather than being complex. 
7. Lack of right people for the right job: Basel II seems to be a complex 
riddle for the banks which though they are determined to solve, however 
as yet they have not even identified the problem (as depicted by low 
scores for identification of processes), leave apart the task of finding the 
right person for the right job. Use of third party/specialized personnel to 
analyze the market risks is below the desired levels. 
8. Credit Adjudication - A Paradox: With the confusing risk weight 
calculations (for e.g. for a corporate house rated Below BB- the 
calculated risk weight is 150% while for an unrated corporate house the 
same is 100% which is equivalent to those rated as BB+ to BB-, then 
why will one go for ratings at the first hand?), that's why there are too 
low scores regarding the relevance of credit adjudication processes 
(2.500±1.167). Assigning objectivity to each credit seems to be distant 
dream in an economy like India - is it going to be more discretion (mean 
score 2.233±0.922) rather than objectivity that is going to rule the roost. 
9. From where the money will come?: One of the key areas of concern 
emerging in the study was adequacy of financial resources (1.83±1.29), 
with the global recession on, there is concern regarding the stressed 
resources. 
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10. Risk Management Processes still far from desired: Very poor scores 
(1.433±1.104) were obtained for the item adequacy of risk management 
processes implying that despite much brouhaha about Basel II being an 
effective tool to manage the risks, the risk management processes as 
embodied in Basel II accord are being felt to be inadequate by the banks 
in India and UAE. This may be due to environmental differences 
between the Asian and Global banking. 
11. Financial Crises - No one can predict: Asian tigers were humbled 
within a day, mighty Americans within a span of three weeks, with that 
kind of history, the burgeoning economies touching the nadir in a short 
span of time, no-one thinks that Basel II, in any case, is going to be a 
safe bet against a financial crisis. 
12. Credit Derivatives - Still a distant dream: Dealing in credit 
derivatives helps in utilization of resources as well as mobilization of 
resources, but the complexities, associated risks, restrictions by 
regulatory authorities and lack of knowledge about its practical 
implications make credit derivatives still a distant dream. 
13. Trident of Statistics, Data sufficiency and Modeling : Very low 
scores for statistical modeling for implementation (1.833±1.206), 
inadequacy of availability of data these are the main blockers in the path 
of achieving the goals of Basel II. In statistical tools, the forecasting is 
based on historic evidence, in the absence of adequate database, the 
statistical modeling will be adversely affected and will be lacking its 
effectiveness. 
14. Environment Plays a role: As regards the issues related to clarity of the 
concepts and preparedness, the mean scores for items complexity and 
provisions for risks adding to costs of operations, the Indian banks seem 
to have significantly higher positive responses as compared to the banks 
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in UAE, thereby underscoring the significance of environment, however, 
in case of issues related to relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits 
in two different environments the item wise differences were more 
pronounced showing shifting of swings from item to item in either 
direction, the mean scores for relevance of credit adjudication and 
relevance of capital allocation processes had significantly higher 
positive scores as compared to those in UAE while for items such as 
adequacy of risk management processes, relevance of risk management 
processes, increase in liabilities of staff on personal level, increase in 
personal discretion, disclosure of information affecting competence, 
reduction of risk with specified provisions, environment not suitable for 
development of credit derivative markets, UAE banks had significantly 
higher positive scores as compared to banks in India. However, on the 
issue of implementation status and acceptability no significant 
difference between the two environments, thereby implying that despite 
readiness, preparedness, impact assessments and perceived notions 
about benefits - there is still confusion while implementing the accord. 
15. Does ownership matter?: Most of the times yes! As regards basic 
understanding of concepts and preparedness the foreign banks seem to 
be have higher understanding than the government and private banks, in 
this regard government banks seem to lag much behind. On the issues 
related to relevance of Basel II, its impact and benefits too foreign banks 
take the lead while government banks and private banks assume the 
second fiddle for different items. On the implementafion and 
acceptability front too the foreign banks are on the driver's seat while 
private banks are on the pillion seat, as regards government banks they 
can be said to be following the former two on a bicycle. 
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5.2 Conclusions 
1. The study pointed out that there is lack of complete understanding on 
the main spirit of New Basel Capital Accord through the three pillars 
specified in the Accord and their implementation in the Banks across 
India and UAE is half-hearted, for which understanding of the concepts, 
financial resources, inadequacy of data and prevalent practices related to 
risk management and credit adjudication are responsible. 
2. In both the countries, regulatory authority is exercising greater controls, 
though in UAE, the grounds are not open for private banks as yet. 
Though UAE lacks a rich history of commercial banking as compared to 
India, yet the practices adapted by it and progress made by it are 
outstanding. Still banking on the burgeoning oil economy, the UAE 
banks have lesser experience of facing the market adversities as 
compared to Indian banks. The regulatory guidance of the Indian banks 
was driven for a long time by the emphasis on long time apart from 
being a part of mixed economy. However, the common things between 
these two nations' economy and banking systems may be that both 
systems are working towards achieving a stable economy. 
3. Major areas of concerns/obstacle in respect to implementing the Basel II 
in the banks with special reference to commercial banks in India and 
UAE were related to lack of clarity about basic concepts, lack of 
financial resources, apprehensions regarding dissemination of 
information leading to competitive disadvantage and doubts related to 
relevance of various provisions in the Basel II accord, inexperii^ nce of 
working with a systematic and structured approach was also one of the 
major impediments. 
4. Most of the banks in India and UAE follow the standardised approach as 
per the guidelines of the regulating authority to cover the operational 
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risk, credit risk and market risk; being it a relatively new field, they are 
not yet using the more advanced tools, for lack of experience as well as 
resources - both financial and manpower. However, in the long-term 
they are inclined to use more sophisticated and advanced tools too; Pillar 
II of Basel II accord in terms of preparedness and implementation seems 
to be have no strong hold on the ground, there are a number of laggards 
both conceptual and perceptional, as well as adequacy of resources and 
pressure of meeting the deadlines - the building blocks of the Pillar II 
are being stacked hastily without giving them a concrete basis on which 
they can strongly hold the weight of the changing banking scenario of 
tomorrow. As regards Pillar III of the Basel III accord is concerned, 
there is almost no inclination towards implementing this in its true spirit. 
The long history of concealing than revealing cannot be changed in a 
day - meeting the deadlines in this connections seems to be one of the 
most difficult tasks. It's yet immature to forecast business benefits in 
such atmosphere filled with utmost confusion and uncertainty, half 
heartedness and meeting the time frames. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS & SUGGESTIONS 
On the basis of the analysis of the primary data and review of secondary 
data, the following findings, recommendations and suggestions have been 
made. At the end of the chapter the impact of Basel-II framework 
implementation on different stakeholders and limitations of the study have been 
highlighted and finally the direction for future research has also been given. 
6.1 Findings & Recommendations 
S.No. Findings Recommendations 
1. Major Industry 
Concerns -
Complexity, Risk 
coverage and Pillar III 
l.As Basel II utilizes the advanced 
statistical modeling tools, which are 
relatively new to use, appropriate training 
should be arranged by the regulatory 
authority. 
2.The distinction between use of traditional 
methods of risk coverage and those 
proposed by Basel II should be made 
emphasizing the evidence-based 
superiority of Basel II models. 
3.Pillar III is basically concerned with 
Financial communication and market 
discipline for which Regulatory authority 
should make strict rules with constant 
audits/monitoring. 
Enhanced competition Newer areas / markets for financial 
institutions should be identified, awareness 
regarding importance of quality of service 
rather than just quantity of service should be 
created. Banks should understand the 
relevance of untraditional banking, niche 
marketing, etc. 
Low Scores on Basic 
Understanding of 
Concepts 
Foreign banks having 
Indian Banking Association should include 
Risk Assessment in Context to Basel II and 
Financial Communication and Market 
Discipline as two papers in its 
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S.No. Findings Recommendations 
relatively higher scores Associateship examinations. Similar action 
is also recommended for the appropriate 
authority in UAE (Emirates Institute of 
Banking & Financial Studies) as the 
situation was similar in both the countries. 
Inclusion of foreign bank executives as 
instructor for CAIIB and Banking Diploma 
programmes in respective countries. 
Relevance of Basel-II, 
its impact and benefits 
Private sector players 
showing relatively low 
scores. 
5. Low acceptability on 
intellectual functions, 
In training itself, use of simulated modeling, 
situational analysis, case studies should be 
exhaustively done. To promote and create 
awareness, a special periodical should be 
published, wherein the contributors should 
be encouraged to present their views on 
different' aspects of Basel-II. A toll-free 
help-desk should be established by the 
regulatory authority wherein doubts related 
to various aspects of Basel-II could be 
removed. On the branch levels. Problem 
Based Learning Model facilitated by Peer 
Group should be adapted with meetings at a 
regular interval. A reward system at 
circle/zonal levels for the branches 
providing maximum/best solutions should 
be started. 
In India, the impact in terms of enhanced 
personal responsibility and liability is much 
pronounced - it simply underlines that 
currendy in India banking sector jobs have 
become less attractive owing to enhanced 
responsibilities and low remuneration -
with increase in responsibilities and 
liabilities - proper compensation should be 
ensured. 
For private banks, a mandatory training 
programme is recommended at each level, 
compliance to which should be monitored 
strictly and should be incorporated in the 
personnel appraisal system too. 
Basel II implementation is not a programme 
dependent solely on creation of physical 
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S.No. Findings Recommendations 
adequate acceptability 
on physical facility 
creation 
Foreign banks showing 
a relatively strengthened 
position 
facilities and forgetting the intellectual 
facilities, in contrast it depends on use of 
more of intellectual abilities and thereby 
reducing dependence on physical facilities. 
Keeping in view the above observation, 
Banks should try to attract the best 
intellectual talent in their fold. 
Establishment of professional institutions 
specifically targeted for banking sector 
should be given priority. Collaboration with 
existing institutions such as those related to 
Risk Assessment and Management should 
also be enhanced with special emphasis on 
development of curricula for different levels 
of banking professionals. 
Study of the practices of foreign banks 
should also be conducted in order to learn 
from their experience. 
Low scores on Pricing 
and Implementation 
Strategy 
Relatively higher scores 
ofUAE banks on pricing 
strategy. 
Better coordination between various 
channels involved in strategic decisions will 
result in having a better pricing and 
implementation strategy. Both for pricing 
and implementation issue coordination upto 
branch level is also necessary. Use of better 
communication technology is the key. 
Structuring the pricing processes will 
reduce reliance on decisions on discretion 
basis, rather it will result in timely 
responsiveness to changing environment. 
UAE banks have better pricing strategies as 
they were thriving in a burgeoning 
economy, where they could have charged 
price for each service offered by them, an 
international exchange programme will help 
in understanding the issues involved in 
determination of a pricing strategy and them 
applying them effectively. 
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6.2 General Suggestions 
1. Creation of Awareness, clearing concepts, education regarding the 
benefits of Basel II implementation should be done more intensely by 
the appropriate authorities. 
2. All the stakeholders should be made aware that risk management should 
be viewed as an opportunity to increase shareholder value and not just as 
a loss-avoidance technique. 
3. A comprehensive plan of action to capture risks not captured under 
Pillar I should be made in order to recognize the indigenous risk 
effectively. 
4. The regulatory authority must provide detailed guidelines and facilities 
for successful implementation, not only targeted towards creation of 
physical facilities and IT solutions rather on the acceptance aspect too. 
5. As the basic understanding of Basel II is still unclear amongst the 
bankers, the steps towards implementing it might lack the right direction, 
an effort should be made to clarify the basic concepts. 
6. Basel II must be viewed as an ongoing process for improvement, which 
is not the end but a beginning in the direction of minimizing the risks 
and enhancing the total value. 
7. A centralised database should be created with mandatory updation by all 
the banks. 
8. There is a need to change the legal framework substantially for speedy 
liquidation of collaterals of defaulters. 
9. Workshop, seminars and conferences for motivating and changing the 
mindset of concerned persons should be organised to ensure the pillar III 
implementation. 
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6.3 Challenges Ahead 
I. Meeting the Deadlines: Basel 11 implementation is a time-bound 
process involving fulfilment of each stage in the given time frame. As in 
present study, it was revealed that status of preparedness for 
implementation is beyond satisfactory level in majority of banks in either 
country. Thus even if creation of physical resources for implementation 
is complete by the specified date, there are doubts that the system so 
developed will be fulfilling the very objective of the Basel II i.e. 
reducing the financial risk and making the banking safer for the common 
man. 
II. Implementation of Pillar III: Though both in India as well as in UAE, 
the banking industry is highly regulated financial industry, yet in both 
countries the traditional approach of concealing more and revealing less 
is in regular practice, thus naturally there are more doubts than 
confidence that the implementation of Pillar III will take place smoothly. 
III. Enhanced reliance on Superior Intellectual Inputs: Basel II is the 
start and not the end to better banking practices with reduced risk, 
however, in highly dynamic environment in which the banks have to 
function, the nature and magnitude of risk will be changing thus giving 
rise to requirement of high intellectual inputs who are conversant in 
assessing the changing environment and who can determine the course 
through which the banks can respond to changing environment. This 
needs both use of human intelligence as well as artificial intelligence 
(information technology). 
IV. Capital Requirement: Due to additional capital charge for operadonal 
risk and increased capital requirement for market risk, the scarcity of 
resources (of raising capital) will add to the existing competition of 
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business growth. Highly rated corporates (needing lower amount of 
capital) may exert pressure on already declining interest spread. 
V. Collection/Compilation of Data: The models under advanced 
approaches require a lot of historical data. However, with no data 
warehouses in the banks (especially public sector banks), collection of 
data is a formidable task. 
VI. Differentiation and Distinction: In the growing competitive 
environment being ruled by a common regimen of risk management, the 
burden of being different from others and distinct will be falling on the 
banks, especially small and middle banks will have to work hard to 
maintain their distinct identity. . 
VII. Litigation Processes: With the litigation processes taking too much of 
time, the liquidation of collaterals is often a big challenge for the banks. 
In a model where everything has to be weighed and counted, the 
uncertain and unending litigation might work as a factor with no 
weighted risk, hence to make the legal systems speedier and effective 
amendments in law are also a big challenge for the banks. 
VIII. Limited Rating Agencies: The risk associated with credit is often 
dependent on the rating of the borrower. While calculating a risk under 
Basel II regimen, it is one of the major criteria. However, in UAE as 
well as in India there are no/limited credit rating agencies to perform 
this task. 
IX. Market for Credit Derivative Products: For effective management of 
credit risk and to get full benefit of risk mitigation evolution of 
developed market for credit derivatives is necessary. However, both 
UAE and India do not have direct markets for credit derivative products. 
X. Technological Challenge: No single IT supplier can provide all-round 
risk management solutions. However, 100% internal development may 
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be too costly because risk management methodologies tend to involve 
complex computation. Integrating various external systems into one 
platform is the major challenge. Flexible customisation of external 
systems is important. Risk methodologies and business processes are 
evolving. The technologies adopted must be flexible for future changes. 
6.4 Impact Assessment 
The impact of Basel-II has been tried to be explored in two directions: 
I. Impact on Banking industry 
II. Impact on Environment 
I. Impact on Banking Industry 
Impact on banks has been explored in functional terms. The impact 
assessment has been done by using observational technique on the basis of 
primary as well as secondary data. The impact study has been divided into 
three parts : 
1. Impact on Human Resources 
2. Impact on Marketing 
3. Impact on Finance Function 
1. Impact on Human Resources: There would be a drastic change in 
human resource structure of the banks. From the earlier emphasis on 
having more clerks, more authoritative officers in a bureaucratic system 
will be replaced by a highly skilled executives and intelligent decision-
makers working in a transparent system. Prior to implementation, the 
roles of the personnel were not clear, their discretionary powers were 
high, thus the personnel are going to lose their discretionary powers, 
earlier the responsibilities were not clear, but now the responsibilities 
are quite clear, roles are much clearly defined, however, there is an 
apprehension amongst the workers that with the responsibilities being 
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clearly defined their job will not be secured. Thus there is an uneasiness 
amongst the banking sector. At the same time losing discretionary 
powers for some people means loss of authority. The growing emphasis 
on use of information technology and modem communication 
technology, the middle aged employees are feeling uneasy owing to 
their belief that they cannot adapt to the change. As a matter of fact, 
every change is followed by some resistance, which can be seen in the 
uneasiness of the bank employees. Apart from those who are currently 
employed the job description of the employees has also changed 
radically. Now the emphasis is more on having people with higher 
intellectual abilities. With the processes becoming structured, the older 
emphasis of having clerks for every other job has been shifted to one 
who can decide. Now the focus is not on doing alone rather the focus 
has shifted to doing it efficiently with the use of intellectual abilities of a 
person. The impact on human resources would be visible in a positive 
manner once the transition phase is over as the banks will now be having 
people with better intellectual ability and who are more ready to take the 
responsibility and then living upto it, 
2. Impact on Marketing Function: Everyone is agreed that 
implementation of Basel-Il accord will eventually lead to growing 
competition amongst the banks. Growing competition means taking the 
marketing aspect more seriously. One will have to always look for new 
markets, new offerings, newer ways to express and distinguish oneself 
from the others. Banking is not going to be same after Basel-II 
framework. You can see niche banking, "Banks for Ladies", "Banks for 
Children", "Banks just dealing with Consumer Finance", "Banks 
specializing in Asset Managemenf and so on. No wonder if next time 
you go to a bank you can get your favourite pizza too. Banks will have 
to adopt newer marketing strategies to attract new customers while at the 
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same time it will have to respond to the marketing strategies of the 
competitors in order to retain its existing base of customers. But how 
can we say that it will only happen because of Basel-II, simply because 
with the structuring of processes, adopting similar strategies to measure 
the risk, adopting similar credit adjudication processes, one cannot 
expect to distinguish oneself from the others, rather it can differentiate 
from the others not from what it does but how it does the same thing. 
3. Impact on Finance Function: With the capital adequacy being boldly 
underlined in Basel-II framework, it is obvious that the banks will be at 
first going to suffer some crunch of resources, however, with that 
particular aspect becoming the feature of entire industry, there is no 
competitive disadvantage. At first there would be some crunch in 
liquidity of banks owing to capital adequacy clauses. However, in the 
long-term with the coverage of risk with this capital, efficient 
adjudication of non-productive assets, the liquidity will be restored. 
Currently a large chunk of banks' assets is blocked in so-called non-
productive assets, which Basel-II proposes to wipe out completely. 
Eventually, the days of hardship are counted while the silver lining is 
quite evident in long term. 
II. Impact on Environment 
The impact on environment has been studied under three major heads: 
1. Impact on Regulatory Authority/Government 
2. Impact on creditors 
3. Impact on depositors and Shareholders 
1. Impact on Regulatory Authority/Government: Basel-II has defined 
the roles of regulatory authority and government more clearly. In order 
to facilitate a better environment, these two have to be always on 
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constant move. For ensuring proper liquidity and adjudication of non-
productive assets, the regulatory authority/ government will be required 
to provide enough legal framework under which the banks can reduce 
the burden of bad debts and liquidate the collaterals in order to survive 
and work competitively. In the growing competition, the regulatory 
authority/government will have to play the role of a "watchdog" to 
ensure that no malpractices take place in the name of competition. The 
regulatory authority will have to also monitor and check the compliance 
of Basel-II framework, especially the aspects related to Pillar III. 
2. Impact on Creditors: The creditors will have to have better credentials 
than ever, however, having better credentials this time will also prove to 
be advantageous. The credit processes being structured, well-defined, 
objectively screened and being transparent would ultimately result in a 
better deal for the creditors. The days of credit adjudication taking 
months are going to be counted. Now one will oneself knowing one's 
credit worthiness. Finally, the creditors are also going to gain. 
3. Impact on Depositors & Shareholders: With the risks being 
minimized, operations being smooth and information being available 
transparently, it is the depositors who are ultimately going to get benefit. 
With the short span of transition from older system to Basel-II, where 
the depositors and shareholders might have to face some dark phases 
owing to strain on capital and change in procedures, finally the Basel II 
framework is going to provide them more returns. 
6.5 Limitations of Study 
There have been few limitations to the study which are described as 
given below: 
I. The reluctance of bankers to participate in the study had been a limiting 
factor in conducting this study as a survey, and the same has to be done only 
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using sampling technique only. Inadequate representation of all types of 
ownerships in both the environments is also a limiting factor. 
2. The study has been academic in nature. Hence, the sample size chosen has 
been one based on feasibility. The study could been more extensive. 
3. The sample size chosen for the study could be a limitation. 
4. Lack of availability of published books in UAE libraries has been a 
handicap. 
5. Time and cost have been limiting factors. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Though transition phase does not seem to be smooth, it does not mean 
that there is no desire to change and reach to a better situation. Despite some 
laggards, in principle the Banks are readying themselves'to be more responsive 
in a fast changing world. We can only expect a better banking environment in 
the years to come. 
6.7 Direction for Future Research 
It therefore seems an ideal time to gather additional empirical data and 
start assessing the real impact of introducing Basel II on developing 
economies; this would, for example, give elements to evaluate whether (or 
which) of the problems listed above, or more broadly in the literature, are 
emerging as really important. This would then provide a strong base to make 
policy proposals for both modifying Basel 11, its implementation in developing 
economies, and - where this is not feasible - calibrate the need for 
compensatory policy actions. This may provide even additional empirical basis 
for elements of a proposal for a development and financial stability friendly 
Basel III. With this new empirical evidence and proposals for a Basel III, 
researchers, civil society and developing country regulators could more 
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forcefully demand international changes, as well as take more targeted policy 
actions. 
To limit the scope of the analysis, it could focus on two or three 
developing economies with different characteristics (e.g. relating to scale of 
presence of foreign banks, economic size, others). Data could be obtained from 
a variety of sources - the BCBS itself, national Central Banks or bank 
regulators, IMF, or in some cases even the banks themselves. Institutions like 
the Association and the IMF have offered to provide data. 
Related research could examine the political economy of trying to 
achieve change in Basel II. This research could compare successful attempts of 
changes (like the improvement treatment for SMEs achieved after lobbying by 
certain developed country governments) with attempts that have not yet yielded 
sufficient fruit (such as trying to introduce benefits of international 
diversification, supported by academics and several developing countries or 
measures to smooth pro-cyclicality). The study would be carried out jointly by 
an economist(s) involved both in the analysis of the issue and in the lobbying 
and a political economist who could carry out the analysis of bargaining power, 
political context etc. It could draw on personal experience of the researchers in 
the dialogue with BCBS, country regulators and banks, review available 
written material and in-depth interviews with key actors in the negotiations, 
several of which are known to the researcher. The results of the study would 
not just be of academic interest, but, by linking quality of outcome within Basel 
II to representation on the BCBS, could provide a powerful analytical and 
lobbying tool for modifying the governance of the Basel Committee Ba'^ king 
Supervision. More ambitiously, it could help provide a model for analysing the 
link between quality of decision-making in international financial institutions 
or committees with the bargaining process and especially with the underlying 
governance structure of those institutions. 
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Chapter-7 
BASEL II ACCORD AND ECONOMIC 
MELTDOWN 2008-2009 
Basel II is a definite improvement over Basel I. Its implementation will 
improve the standards of risk management practices across most of the banks 
subject to its provisions. It adopts a more sophisticated approach to risk 
management and to how credit derivatives and securitised assets are treated. 
But it is not a panacea, and whether it could have prevented or lessened the 
impact of the recent crisis is very debatable. 
Most important for banks is that they ensure that the key elements of 
their Basel II risk management governance structures, policies, processes and 
systems are robust, integrated, and able to incorporate both the economics 
lessons and regulatory implications of the credit and liquidity crunch, the credit 
crunch has made very evident areas for further improvement in Basel 2, but 
many of these should have been identified far earlier. Basel 2's ratings and 
models need to be used wisely, they are not a one-shot solution; Pillar II is 
critical and needs to be implemented effectively; regulators need sufficient 
resource to deal with complexity and courage to make judgements; and capital 
and liquidity regulation need to be properly integrated. Properly implemented 
and resourced Basel 2 remains an opportunity not a threat. 
Many economists are now predicting that this "Great Recession" of 
2008/09 will be the worst global recession since the 1930s. The IMF made its 
customary forecast for global growth in the World Economic Outlook 
published in October 2008. By early November, the IMF had revised its 
forecast for global growth downwards - from 3.9 per cent to 3.7 per cent for 
2008, and from 3.0 per cent to 2.2 per cent for 2009. There are two inferences 
that follow from this. First, that the global situation has deteriorated rapidly, in 
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a space of less than two months. Second, that 2009 is going to be a more 
challenging year than 2008. 
The global credit crisis has threatened to undermine the three pillars of 
Basel II - with potentially serious implications for the South African banking 
regulator. Many of the world's major commercial and investment banks have 
had to write-down huge losses caused by exposure to "toxic assets" on their 
balance sheets. A large number of such banks have since been forced to 
replenish their balance sheets with funding from governments in order to avoid 
an economic crisis. It is a crisis that has exposed fundamental fault lines in the 
regulation of the banking system in countries that had not properly 
implemented Basel II. 
In a bid to strengthen the regulation and supervision of internationally 
active banks in light of weaknesses revealed by the ongoing global financial 
markets crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a package 
of consultative documents to strengthen the Basel II capital framework, in 
January 2008. 
The proposed changes to capital requirements cover trading book 
exposures, including complex and illiquid credit products, certain complex 
securitisations in the banking book like collateralised debt obligations of asset 
backed securities and exposures to off-balance sheet vehicles like asset-backed 
commercial paper conduits. 
The committee is also proposing standards to promote more rigorous 
supervision and risk management of risk concentrations, off-balance sheet 
exposures, securitisations and related reputation risks. 
Through the supervisory review process, the committee is promoting 
improvements to valuations of financial instruments, the management of 
funding liquidity risks and firm-wide stress testing practices. 
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In addition, the Committee is also proposing enhanced disclosure 
requirements for securitisations and sponsorship of off-balance sheet vehicles, 
which should provide market participants with a better understanding of an 
institution's overall risk profile. 
"The capital requirements for the trading book be implemented in 
December 2010 while the other improvements, including those related to risk 
management and disclosures, be introduced by the end of 2009," proposed the 
committee. 
These proposed changes are part of the committee's broader work 
programme, as set out in its 20 November 2008 press release, to strengthen in a 
fundamental way bank capital adequacy, risk management and supervision. 
Nout Wellink, chairman of the Basel Committee and President of the 
Netherlands Bank, said that "the proposed enhancements will help ensure that 
the risks inherent in banks' portfolios related to trading activities, 
securitisations and exposures to off-balance sheet vehicles are better reflected 
in minimum capital requirements, risk management practices and 
accompanying disclosures to the public." 
In particular, this includes assessing ways to mitigate procyclicality, for 
example, by promoting capital buffers above the regulatory minimum that can 
be drawn upon during periods of stress. These efforts are in support of the 
April 2008 recommendations of the Financial Stability Forum and the G20's 
November 2008 action plan. Wellink underscored that "the committee intends 
to coordinate and implement this work programme in a manner that strengthens 
financial confidence and avoids aggravating current market conditions. 
It will not increase required global minimum capital ratios during 
periods of economic and financial stress. 
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The Committee notes that adequate capital buffers above the regulatory 
minimum are designed to absorb losses and support continued lending to the 
economy." 
Comments on the revisions to the Basel II market risk framework and 
the guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book 
should be submitted by March 13, 2009. 
Comments on the proposed enhancements to the Basel II framework 
should be submitted by April, 17,2009, said the committee. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE 
SUMMARY 
The Basel Capital Framework, called the International Divergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, was first developed in 1988 by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and was subsequently revised in 
2003. 
The main objective of the framework has been to establish standards for 
ensuring appropriate risk management and capital adequacy in internationally 
active banks. 
The Revised Capital Framework, or Basel II, has three pillars. 
Pillar I: Minimum Capital Requirements 
Pillar II: Supervisory Review 
Pillar III: Market Discipline 
The original framework focused on credit risk in developing minimum 
capital requirements. The revised capital framework enhances the approach to 
credit risk and adds market and operational risk as factors used in calculating 
capital adequacy. The addition of two pillars broadens the framework's 
approach to banks' risk management. 
Appendix I contains a summary of the changes made in and implications 
of the revised framework. 
The objective of this questionnaire is for a comparative study of 
Implementation of Basel II Accord and its Implication in Indian and UAE 
Banking Sector. 
Institutions are requested to complete the following survey and submit 
to the attention of 
Shaista ALVI 
PO Box 7233 
Dubai 
UAE 
The due date for the receipt of completed survey is September 30"", 2007. 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS SURVEY. 
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BANK INFORMATION 
1. Name of Bank: 
2. Contact Details: 
(Please indicate the details of the contact person for this questionnaire) 
Name: 
Position: 
Telephone: 
Email Address: 
3. To which of the following types of bank categories does your bank belong? 
Choose only one option 
D Locally owned bank 
D Subsidiary of foreign bank 
D Branch of a foreign bank 
D Offshore or international bank 
4. Where is your parent bank/head office located? 
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Part I: INDUSTRY 
1. Which of the following aspects of Basel-II do you think pose the 
greatest concern tor 
Least 
r , r 
r . r 
r . r 
r , r 
r . r. 
r , r 
2'"-
2 ' ' 
2 ' ' 
2 ^ 
2 ' ' 
2'^ 
S""' 
3 ^ 
3 '^ 
3^-
3 ^ 
3 ' -
industry.'' 
Most Concern 
c 4 5 Complexity 
r 4 5 Credit risk 
4 5 Operational risk 
C 4 5 Timing of transition 
f 
4 5 Pillar 11: supervisory review 
4 5 Pillar III: disclosure requirements 
2. What do you think will be the main impact of Basel-II on your banking 
sector ? 
r 
r 
r 
r 
No significant impact 
May lead to industry consolidation 
May increase competition and possibly market segmentation 
May reduce market share of banks releative to other financial 
institution 
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1. How would you rate the Basel-II accord in terms of complexity: 
a) Too complex and difficult to implement 
b) Too complex but understandable 
c) Complex at first hand but systematic and scientific 
d) Manageable 
e) Is very easy once you are acquainted with the processes involved 
2. Has your bank established an executive-level leadership to initiate the 
identification of risk components and the integration of the risk 
management process across business units? (Has the bank established 
the position of Chief Risk Officer with a reporting line to the 
CEO/Board and whose role has been defined with sufficient clarity) 
a) We have not initiated as yet 
b) The same is in process 
c) The same has been made functional recently (not more than 6 
months) 
d) The same has been made functional as per Basel-II timeframe 
e) There already was such system existing in our bank 
I. Has the bank developed a strategy and mechanism for risk management 
and capital allocation, which stretches across all levels of a bank? 
a) Not as yet 
b) The same is in process 
c) The same has been made functional recently (not more than 6 
months) 
d) The same has been made functional for more than one year 
e) There already was such system existing in our bank (two years and 
beyond) 
Have the statistical modeling algorithms and calculations been defined 
to estimate the Risk Weighted Assets? 
a) Not as yet 
b) The same is in process 
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c) The same has been made functional recently (not more than 6 
months) 
d) The same has been made functional for more than one year 
e) There already was such system existing in our bank (two years and 
beyond) 
5. Have the bank started analyzing the market risk through the use of third-
party agencies or is there a specialized cell in bank itself to analyze the 
market risk? 
a) Not as yet 
b) The same is in process 
c) The same has been made functional recently (not more than 6 
months) 
d) The same has been made functional for more than one year 
e) There already was such system existing in our bank (two years and 
beyond) 
6. What do you feel about the amount of statistical modeling that needs to 
be carried out to implement the desired level of the three approaches to 
Basel-II implementation : 
a) Yet to be assessed 
b) Inadequate 
c) Adequate but are not functional as yet 
d) Adequate yet still to prove themselves 
e) Adequate and have a proven track record 
7. What's the status of business process re-engineering (identifying the 
processes, streamlining, altering and overhauling them to bring in line 
with Basel-II requirements) in your organisation? 
a) No such process has begun 
b) The identification work is over but the restructuring has not started 
c) Identification work is over and restructuring is going on 
d) All the processes have been identified and streamlined 
e) The bank already had all the processes streamlined before Basel-II 
accord 
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8. How do you rate the IT solutions being used by the bank? 
a) Bank is not using IT solutions at all 
b) Some branches are making use of IT 
c) Only few branches do not make use of IT solutions 
d) All the branches make use of IT solutions 
e) All the branches make use of IT solutions which are redesigned as per 
the re-engineered processes 
9. How far do you rate the adequacy of credit adjudication processes as per 
the Basel-II norms? 
a) Less than 25% 
b) 25-50% 
c) 50-75% 
d) Upto 90% 
e) 100% 
10. Have the problems/complaints related to credit adjudication been 
enhanced drastically in the recent past? 
a) Totally agree 
b) Almost agree 
c) Partially agree 
d) Disagree 
e) Strongly disagree 
11. Do you feel that credit adjudication processes have got a relevance in 
the environment your bank works in? 
a) Not at all 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
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12. Do you feel that credit adjudication processes as proposed by Basel-II 
are too complex for the personnel to handle? 
a) Totally agree 
b) Almost agree 
c) Partially agree 
d) Disagree 
e) Strongly disagree 
13. How far do you rate the adequacy of pricing processes in your bank as 
per the Basel-II norms? 
a) Less than 25% 
b) 25-50% 
c) 50-75% 
d) Upto 90% 
e) 100% 
14. Do you feel that pricing processes as evolved by Basel-II have got a 
relevance in the environment your bank works in? 
a) Not at all 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
15. Do you feel that the pricing processes are well managed and handled by 
the current personnel of the bank? 
a) Not at all 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
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16. How far do you rate the adequacy of risk management processes in your 
bank as per the Basel-II norms? 
a) Less than 25% 
b) 25-50% 
c) 50-75% 
d) Upto 90% 
e) 100% 
17. Do you feel that risk management processes as evolved by Basel-II have 
got a relevance in the environment your bank works in? 
a) Not at all 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
18. Do you feel that the personnel involved in risk management process are 
competent enough to handle the job successfully? 
a) Totally agree 
b) Almost agree 
c) Partially agree 
d) Disagree 
e) Strongly disagree 
19. How far do you rate the adequacy of capital allocation processes in your 
bank as per the Basel-II norms? 
a) Less than 25% 
b) 25-50% 
c) 50-75% 
d) Upto 90% 
e) 100% 
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20. Do you feel that capital allocation processes as evolved by Basel-II have 
got a relevance in the environment your bank works in? 
a) Not at all 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
21. Do you feel the software that you are using for your operations currently 
is adequate to meet the grown needs as per the Basel-II accord? 
a) Not at all 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
22. Do you feel that the bank has competent IT professionals to look after 
the grown software needs as per the Basel-II accord? 
a) Not at all 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
23. Do you feel that all the processes as defined in the Basel-II accord can 
be structured and made objective? 
a) Not at all 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
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24. Do you feel that the Basel-II accord has enhanced the liabilities of the 
staff on the personal level? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
25. Do you agree that Basel-II accord instead of decreasing the personal 
discretion has enhanced the discretion of the staff involved? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
26. Do you feel that it is too difficult for the bank to implement Basel-II 
with the current personnel? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent . 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
27. Do you feel a resistance brewing amongst the personnel of the bank with 
implementation of Basel-II? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
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28. Do you feel that the disclosure of information related to capital structure, 
risk management and overall risk profile will affect the bank 
competitively? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
29. Do you feel that the disclosure of information as detailed above can lead 
to a loss of reputation of the bank? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
30. Do you feel that there are enough financial resources available with 
bank to meet the structural changes in the banking operations as per the 
norms of Basel-II 
a) Not at all 0 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
31. Do you feel that the risk can be measured and compensated correctly? 
a) Not at all 0 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
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32. Do you feel that reacting promptly to the external events will affect the 
image of the bank adversely? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
33. Do you feel that reacting promptly to the external events will hurt the 
confidence of stakeholders adversely? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
34. Do you feel that strict compliance to Basel-II will affect the business of 
bank adversely? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
35. Has the bank started work on a particular Approach for operational risk 
management? 
a) Not as yet 0 
b) The same is in process 
c) The same has been made functional recently (not more than 6 
months) 
d) The same has been made functional for more than one year 
e) There already was such system existing in our bank (two years and 
beyond) 
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36. If no, then what's the time frame in which the bank proposes to adapt the 
same. 
a) Can't say 0 
b) Within next two years 
c) Within next one year 
d) Within next six months 
e) The system is already functional 
37. Do you feel that steps like improved portfolio management will reduce 
the risks? 
a) Not at all 0 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Total 
38. Do you feel that making provisions for each risk will affect the 
operations adversely? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Totally 
39. Do you feel that making provisions for each risk will increase the cost of 
operations? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Totally 
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40. Do you feel that making guidelines from the regulator on matter 
involving regulatory discretion under a particular approach are clear? 
a) Not at all 0 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Totally 
41. Do you feel that legal and regulatory framework and status of secondary 
market for bonds/loans etc. is a major impediment in development of 
credit derivative markets? 
a) Not at all 4 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Totally 
42. Do you feel that successful implementation of Basel-II can rule out a 
crisis situation as encountered in American Banking Industry recently? 
a) Not at all 0 
b) Upto a limited extent 
c) Upto a large extent 
d) Almost totally 
e) Totally 
Scoring: For Q. No. 1 to 17, 19-23,30-31,35-37,40 & 42: 
a) = 0; b) = l; c) = 2; d) = 3; e) = 4 
For Q. No. 18, 24-29, 32-34, 38-39, 41 
a) = 4; b) = 3; c) = 2; d) = l; e) = 0 
Higher score indicates higher positive response. 
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APPENDIX A I: 
Elements of the Revised International Divergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards (Basel II Capital Framework) 
Pillar I: Minimum Capital Requirements 
Element 
Changes 
Implications 
Regulatory 
Capital 
No changes made to 
the definition and 
components of 
regulatory capital. 
The risk-asset-ratio, 
calculated as total 
capital base divided by 
risk weighted assets 
must be equal to 8% 
or more 
Regulatory capital as indicated on 
Prudential Returns to determine capital 
adequacy remains the same. 
The categories are: 
Tier 1: Permanent shareholders' equity 
(issued and fully paid ordinary 
shares/common stock and perpetual 
non-cumulative preference shares) and 
disclosed reserves (share premiums, 
retained profit, general reserves and 
legal reserves). 
Tier 2: Undisclosed reserves. 
Revaluation reserves, general 
provisions, hybrid capital instruments 
and subordinated term debt. 
Deductions from Tier 1: Goodwill and 
increase in equity resulting from 
securitisation exposure. 
Deductions (50% from Tier 1, 50% 
from Tier2): investments in 
unconsolidated banking and financial 
subsidiary companies, Investments in 
other banks and financial institutions, 
significant minority investments in 
other financial entities. 
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Risk 
Weighted 
Assets 
Credit Risk: 
(1) the standardised 
approach 
Credit risk is measured in a standardised 
manner, Supported by external credit 
assessments. 
100% risk weighting is assigned to assets 
for which there is no external risk 
weighting. Past-due loans carry 150% risk 
weighting when specific provisions are less 
than 20% of the outstanding loan. 
(2) the internal ratings-
based (IRB) 
approaches: 
foundation and 
advanced 
Internal ratings system approved by 
supervisor is used. Based on measures of 
unexpected losses (UL) and Expected losses 
(EL). Banking book exposures classified as 
(a) corporate, (b) sovereign, (c) bank, (d) 
retail and (e) equity. 
Minimum requirements for IRB approaches 
focus on a bank's ability to rank order and 
quantify risk in a consistent, reliable and 
valid fashion. 
Operational Risk: 
(1) the basic indicator 
approach 
Banks must hold capital equal to the 
average over the previous three years of a 
fixed percentage of positive annual gross 
income. 
(2) the standardised 
approach 
Banks' activities are divided into eight 
business lines. The capital charge for each 
business line is calculated by multiplying 
gross income by a factor assigned to that 
business line 
(3) the advanced 
measurement 
approaches 
Subject to supervisory approval, internal 
operational risk measurement system is used 
to assign risk weightings 
Market Risk: 
(1) Interest Rate Risk 
There are two separately calculated charges: 
specific risk of each security and charge to 
the interest rate risk in the portfolio. 
(2) Foreign Exchange 
Risk 
The risk measurement system should 
incorporate factors corresponding to the 
individual foreign currencies in which the 
bank's positions are denominated. 
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Pillar II: Supervisory Review 
Pillar II is based on four key principles: 
(1) Bank's own assessment of capital adequacy 
(2) Supervisory review process 
(3) Capital above regulatory minimum 
(4) Supervisory intervention 
Pillar III: Market Discipline 
Provides a strong incentive for banks to conduct business in a safe, sound and 
Efficient manner and to maintain a strong capital base. 
Reliable and timely information allows banks to perform well founded 
counterparty risk assessments. 
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APPENDIX AII: 
Capital Base Calculations 
1. Tier I Capital 
1.1 Shareholders Equity 
1.2 Minority Interests 
1.3 Other (on a case by case basis) 
2. Deductions 
2.1 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets 
2.2 Other (on a case by case basis) 
3. Tier 2 Capital (<= 100% of Tier 1) 100% 
3.1 Unsecured Subordinated Debt (<= 50% of Tier 1 capital) 50% 
3.2 Hybrid Debt/Equity Instruments 
3.3 General Loan Loss Reserves (<= 1.25% RWA*) 1.25% 
3.4 Other (on a case by case basis) 
4. Total Tier 1 and 2 Capital 
5. Deductions 
5.1 Affiliated Bank and Other Financial Institutions 
5.2 Locked-in Connected Loans (on a case by case basis) 
5.3 Other (on a case by case basis) 
6. Adjusted Total Capital Base 
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APPENDIX B: 
Profile of the Participating Banks 
1. Axis Bank 
Axis Bank was the first of the new private banks to have begun operations in 
1994, after the Government of India allowed new private banks to be 
established. The Bank was promoted jointly by the Administrator of the 
specified undertaking of the Unit Trust of India (UTI - I), Life Insurance 
Corporation of India (LIC) and General Insurance Corporation of India (GIG) 
and other four PSU insurance companies, i.e. National Insurance Company Ltd., 
The New India Assurance Company Ltd., The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. 
and United India Insurance Company Ltd. 
The Bank today is capitalized to the extent of Rs. 359.00 crores with the public 
holding (other than promoters) at 57.60%. 
The Bank's Registered Office is at Ahmedabad and its Central Office is located 
at Mumbai. The Bank has a very wide network of more than 827 branches and 
Extension Counters (as on 31st March 2009). The Bank has a network of over 
3595 ATMs (as on 31st March 2009) providing 24 hrs a day banking 
convenience to its customers. This is one of the largest ATM networks in the 
country. 
The Bank has strengths in both retail and corporate banking and is committed 
to adopting the best industry practices internationally in order to achieve 
excellence. 
Basel Update 
The Bank has implemented the Revised Framework of the International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (or Basel II) last 
year. In terms of RBI guidelines for implementation of Basel II, capital charge 
for credit and market risk for the financial year ended 31st March 2009 is 
required to be maintained at the higher of the prudential floor prescribed by 
Basel II and 90% of the level under Basel I. In terms of regulatory guidelines 
on Basel II, the Bank has computed capital charge for operational risk under 
the Basic Indicator Approach and the capital charge for credit risk has been 
computed under the Standardized Approach. As on 31st March 2009, the 
Bank's Capital Adequacy Ratio under Basel 11 was 13.69% against the 
minimum regulatory requirement of 9%. The following table sets forth the risk-
based capital, risk-weighted assets and capital adequacy ratios computed as on 
31st March 2008 and 2009 in accordance with the applicable RBI guidelines 
under Basel I and Basel II. 
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AS O N 31 M i W C H 
Tfer 1 Capital - Stiaraholdsrs' Funds 
20O* 
mawl I I B a * * l 1 
10,162.98 10.175.42 
Appendix 
(Rs. in crores) 
2aom 
Basal I I B M * ! 1 
4^826.99 8,822.52 
Her II Capital 
Out o f wh ich 
~ Bonds qualHying as l i a r H capital 
• Upper Tier II capital 
- Other el lalbla fo r Tier II capital 
4,864.66 4.8C4.66 
3,054.80 3,054.80 
1.370.78 1.370 78 
439.08 439.08 
31,063.90 3.0812.75 
1,572.90 1.S72.90 
1,148.38 1,148.38 
342.62 361.47 
Total Capital qual i fy ing fo r compulat ion of 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Total Rlslc-Welghted Assets and Contlngertdes 
Total Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
Out o f above 
- Tier 1 Capital 
-Tier II Capital 
15,027.64 
1,09,787.49 
13.69K 
9 26M 
4.43K 
15,040.08 
1.08^110.01 
13.911fc 
9.41 K 
4.50K 
11,830.89 
84.990.65 
1 3 9 9 K 
t0 .39H 
3 60K 
11.905.27 
86,719.66 
13.73«L 
10.1791 
3.S6K 
Financial Review 
Cuirsn^ i in A s Of 
Mil lmn." ot Indian Rupees 
Revenue? 
'Jther Revenues 
TOTAL REVENUES 
Coet oT Goods Sold 
GROSS PROFIT 
Selling General & Admin Expenses ^otal 
i-Ilhet Operating Expenses 
OTHER OPERATIIIG EXPEHSES. TOTAL 
OPERATING INCOME 
EBT. EXCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS 
Cithef Unusual Items Total 
EBT, INCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS 
Income Tax Expense 
Earnings irom Continuing Operations 
NET INCOME 
NET INCOME TO COMMON INCLUDING EXTRA 
ITEMS 
NET INCOME TO COMMON EXCLUDING EXTRA 
ITEMS 
A|>i 02 Apr 0? Apt 02 Apr 02 4Vear 
200« 2007 2008 3009 Trend 
Reclass i f ied Rec lass i f ied 
7,296 3 
-2 625 2 
1,435 6 
4,850.8 
4.850.8 
10,0991 
-2,6761 
15.453.4 22.107.7 
2,275 9 
4,850 8 6,542 5 
4^ 850.8 6.542.5 
6.542.5 
6.542.5 
29,1593 
-9,396 8 " " ~ | 
56.5644 
1,289 8 - 2,247 0 
15,45J.4 20,817.9 ~ 54,317.4 
6,704 9 8,627 9 14,869 5 20,355 0 
4,890 0 6,136 0 
8.140.5 
7.312.9 
7.312.9 
-
7.312.9 
2,4621 
10,903.8 
9.914w1 
9.914.1 
-1,1201 
9.914.1 
3,371 6 
19.759.5 
16.348.1 
16.348.1 
-
-
26,491.0 
27.826.4 
27.826.4 
--
27,826.4 
18,129 3 
18,129.3 
18.129.3 
18,129.3 
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Currency in 
h^illions '""f Indian Rupees 
A: of Api 0? Apr 02 Api 02 Apr 02 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Reclassified ReclBssified 
4-Year 
Trend 
Assets 
"ash and Equivalents 
TOTAL CASH AMD SHORT TERM IIIVESTMEHTS J6,41«.4 
Pestncted Cash 
Clher Current Asset; 
TOTAL CURREHT ASSETS 
Gross Property Plant and Equipmert 
ii.ccumulated Depreciation 
MET PROPERTY PLANT AIID EOUIPMEHT 
Long-Term Investments 
Loans Receivable, Long Term 
Deferred Ta> Assets, Long Term 
Crfher Long-Term Assets 
36,418 4 
36,41S.4 
--
3,970 9 
40.3«9.J 
9,130 5 
-5,453 3 
5,677.1 
215,273 5 
223,142 3 
7,355 0 
5,473 9 
30,940 3 
30.940.3 
38,242 8 
7,471 1 
76,654.1 
11,285 3 
-4,507 0 
6.778.4 
268,871 6 
368,764 6 
1,598 0 
9,893 1 
-
-
-
9,656 4 
134.711.6 
-
-
-
-
--
-
15,0261 
71,4167 
71,416.7 
78,777 3 
13,793 9 
163,987.9 
18,1169 
-7,2931 
10,823.9 
462,717 5 
815,567 7 
4,570 3 
19,304 4 
• • I 
TOTAL ASSETS 497,311.2 732,559.8 1,476,971.6 ^ ^ _ 
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LMBDJIIES « EQUITY 
Accounts Payable 
Accrued Expenses 
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt/Capital Lease 
Other Current Liabilities, Total 
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 
Long-Term Debt 
Other Non-Current Liabilities 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
Common Stock 
Additional Paid in Capital 
Retained Earnings 
Comprehensive Income and Other 
TOTAL COMMON EQUITY 
TOTAL EQUITY 
401,135 3 
645 2 
~ 
1,1122 
402,892.7 
44,695 3 
20,866 9 
468,454.9 
2,786 9 
13,554 6 
11,652 6 
8621 
28,856.3 
28,856.3 
587,850 2 
1,772 7 
28,841 4 
14,577 9 
633,042.3 
58,128 8 
7,414 5 
698,585.5 
2,816 3 
13,956 3 
16,232 8 
968 9 
33,974.3 
33,974.3 
-
-
24,055 0 
25,259 8 
927,285.8 
66,478 7 
14,3591 
--
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,173,576 6 
2,385 8 
72,722 8 
23,567 9 
1,272,253.1 
82,475 9 
20,285 6 
1,375,014.6 
3,5901 
59,1151 
36,495 7 
2,756 2 
101,957.1 
101,957.1 
• • - 1 
. l _ l 
- • • • 
• 11 
.a l l 
• I I I 
l . l l 
• •_l 
l l J 
-._• 
• • - 1 
• • - 1 
• • - 1 
• • - 1 
Source: business week 
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2. HDFCBank 
HDFC Bank Limited provides various financial products and services. It 
operates in three segments: Personal Banking, NRI Banking, and Wholesale 
Banking. The Personal Banking segment provides savings, and current and 
fixed deposit accounts. It also offers personal, home, two wheeler, new car, 
used car, gold, education, healthcare, commercial vehicle, working capital, 
construction equipment, and warehouse receipt loans. In addition, this segment 
provides safe deposit lockers; credit, debit, and prepaid cards; mutual funds, 
general and health insurance, bonds, and equities and derivatives products; and 
forex and payment services. The NRI Banking segments deposit products 
include rupee savings accounts, rupee current accounts, rupee fixed deposits, 
foreign currency deposits, and accounts for returning Indians. Its loan products 
comprise home loans, loans against securities, loans against deposits, and gold 
credit cards. The Wholesale Banking segment offers funded services, which 
consist of working capital finance, short term finance, bill discounting, and 
export credit; and non-funded services, such as letters of credit, bank 
guarantees, and collection of documents to corporations, and small and medium 
enterprises. It also various services to banks, financial institutions, mutual 
funds, stock brokers, insurance companies, commodity businesses, and trusts. 
As of March 31, 2008, it had a network of 761 branches and 1,977 automated 
teller machines in 327 cities in India. The company was founded in 1994 and is 
based in Mumbai, India. 
Basel Update 
While the Bank, to begin with, will migrate to the above approaches 
defined in the Reserve Bank of India guidelines, the initiatives undertaken are 
geared towards enabling the Bank comply with the standards set out for the 
more advanced capital approaches under Basel II. These initiatives include 
augmentation of the risk management systems in terms of architecture, 
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capabilities, technology, etc., in areas such as ratings systems, borrower 
segmentation, exposure consolidation, risk mapping, risk estimation, capital 
computation, etc. 
The Bank has been investing appropriately in augmenting its risk 
management systems and capabilities. The implementation of the Basel II 
framework is in harmony with the Banks objective of adopting International 
best practices in risk management. The Bank's total Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR) as at March 31, 2009 (computed as per Basel 1 guidelines) stood at 
15.1% as against 13.6% as of March 31, 2008. The Bank adopted the Basel 2 
framework as of March 31, 2009 and the CAR computed as per Basel 2 
guidelines stands at 15.7% as against the regulatory minimum of 9.0%). Tier-I 
CAR was 10.6% as of March 31,2009. 
The Bank raised Rs.2,875 crores of Tier II bonds during the year ended 
March 31, 2009. The Bank's capital adequacy ratio is calculated in accordance 
with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) guidelines. As per RBFs prudential 
norms on Capital Adequacy under the Basel I framework (Basel I), the Bank is 
required to maintain a Capital to Risk - weighted Asset Ratio of a minimum 9%, 
for both credit risk and market risk. RBI has also issued its prudential 
guidelines on 'Capital Adequacy and Market Discipline - Implementation of 
the New Capital Adequacy Framework' (Basel II). The Bank has migrated to 
the new framework effective March 31, 2009. Under the Basel II guidelines, 
the Bank is required to maintain a minimum Capital to Risk-weighted Asset 
Ratio of 9% on an ongoing basis for credit risk, market risk and operational 
risk, with a minimum Tier I capital ratio of 6%). Further, th3 minimum capital 
mamtained by the Bank as on March 31, 2009 is subject to a prudential floor, 
which is the higher of the following amounts: 
(a) Minimum capital required as per the new framework (Basel II) 
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(b) 100% of the minimum capital required to be maintained as per the Basel I 
framework. 
The Bank's capital adequacy ratio, calculated in accordance with the 
RBI guidelines under both Basel I and Basel II frameworks, is as follows: 
(Rs. Lacs) 
Tier 1 capital 
Tier II capital 
Total capital 
Risk weighted assets 
Minimum capital required @ 9^0 CRAR 
Capital Adequacy Ratios 
Tier 1 
Tier 2 
Total 
Amount of subordinated debt (Tier II capital) raised 
during the year 
Basel! 
March 31,2009 
13,690,28 
6,604,92 
20,295,20 
134,530,75 
12,107,77 
10.18% 
4.91% 
15J09% 
2,875,00 
March 31, 2008 
11,062,96 
3,548,37 
14,611,33 
107,447,99 
9,670,32 
10.30% 
3 30% 
13 60% 
-
BaselH 
March 31, 2009 
13690,28 
6,604,92 
20,295,20 
129,382,68 
11,644,44 
10 58°* 
5.11% 
15 69''* 
2375,00 
The Bank's capital funds as on March 31, 2009 are higher than that 
required under the Basel I and Basel II framework. 
The difference between Risk Weighted Assets under the Basel I and 
Basel II framework is a net impact of the following key changes : 
• Under the Basel II framework, risk weights are applicable to claims on 
corporates with corresponding to their external rating or the lack of it 
ranging from 20% to 150%, compared to a unifomi 100% under Basel I. 
• Exposures qualifying for inclusion in the regulatory retail portfolio under 
Basel II attract a risk weight of 75%, against 100% under Basel I. 
• In the Basel II framework, non-market related off-balance sheet items in 
the nature of undrawn or partially undrawn fund-based facility and 
irrevocable commitments to provide off - balance sheet facilities are 
included in risk weighted assets after applying a credit conversion factor. 
These are not risk-weighted under Basel I. 
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Financial Review 
hilillion^ ot Indian Rupees 
Fev'enuei 
Cfrier Revenues 
TOTAL REVEIIUES 
Cost OT Good: Sold 
GROSS PROFIT 
Selling L-eneral & Arimin Expenses, Total 
Other I jper ating E • pense: 
OTHER OPERATIIIG EXPEHSES. TOTAL 
OPERATING niCOME 
Income i Lo; 11 on Eauitv Investments 
EBT. EXCLUDIIiG UNUSUAL ITEMS 
EBT. IIICLUDIIIG UNUSUAL ITEMS 
Income Ta< Expense 
Minority Interest in Earnings 
Earning-: Trorr; Continuing Operations 
NET niCOME 
NET INCOME TO COMMON INCLUDING EXTRA 
ITEMS 
As 01 Api 0? Apt 02 Api 0? Apr 02 4-Vear 
2008 2007 2008 2009 Trend 
Restated Restated Restated 
11,556 Q 15,880 3 23,853 1 34,397 4 , 1 1 1 
-7,2509 -9,2514 -14,8469 -18,7985 " ' l l 
29,766.5 41,297.4 61.J00.« S9,705.4 i -
1,288 9 1,8701 3,096 6 
29.766.5 40,00>.5 59,430.8 86.608.8 
12,958 0 16,552 9 25,898 4 39,708 4 a « l i 
4,189 9 6,897 9 10,494 9 13,687 7 , i i | 
17.147.9 23,450.8 36,393.2 53,396.1 ^ ^ ^ J 
12.618.6 16.557.7 23.037.6 33.212.6 '_ 
825 - I 
12.701.1 16.557.7 23.037.6 33.212.6 _ _ i | 
12.701.1 16.557.7 23.037.6 33.212.6 
3,660 2 5,015 6 
-25 3 -32 5 -67 0 -63 5 " H 
8,315 6 11,509 6 15,950 8 22,489 9 
8.815.6 11,509.6 15,950.8 22,489.9 a i i f 
8,815.6 11,509.6 15.950.8 22.489.9 
a m ar tr~^ •KT,-_»a«ei«FEEi.J»:a 
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Currenr-v in 
^l1llllnni nt Indian Rupe^i 
Assets 
C^sh and Equivalents 
Short-TeMTi Inveitment? 
Asot 
* ^ ' - ^ * i j ^ 
Apt 02 Api 02 Api 0? 
200e 2007 200S 
Restated Restated Restated 
Apr 02 4-Tear 
2M» Trend 
51,^-«Mf""1&-
28,204 9 33,817 5 21,70:; 4 48,605 5 
13,3215 12,623 0 10,445 5 9,355 8 
TOTAL CASH AHD SHORT TERM IHVESTMEIITS 41.526.4 4«.440.5 32.148.9 55,961.3 
RertrictedCash 27,9390 44,3597 116,1X19 119,4102 
Lther Current Ai^ets 
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 
i j tois Proper1\' Plant and Equi(.irTient 
'iccumulated Depieciation 
MET PROPERTY PLAHT AHD EOUIPMEHT 
Long-Term Investments 
Loans Receivable Long Term 
Deterred Tav Assets, Long Term 
Cither Long-Term Assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 
9,217 6 15,926 8 17,948 3 27,158 0 
7».733.0 106.727.0 166.228.1 202.529.6 
15 772 9 19158 5 24,054 7 39,754 3 
-7 058 3 -9,283 2 -12,092 2 -22,4315 
8.714.6 9.875.3 11.962.5 17.322.8 
253,906 7 305,670 4 492,880 1 587,1515 
350,623 0 469,447 8 634,268 9 990,273 7 
596 2 1,553 5 3,8321 8,628 2 
13,4397 19,6085 22,7592 28,1218 
736.013.2 913.082.5 1.331.930.9 1.834.027.6 
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LIABILITIES S EQUITY 
Account: Payable 
Accrued E'pense? 
Current Porlion ot Lonii-Terrri [leM'Capital Lease 
i.tther Current Liabilities Tcital 
TOTAL CURREHT LIABILITIES 
Long-Term Debt 
Minorit'i Interest 
Clher Non-Curtent Liabilities 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
Corrimon Stock 
ArJditional Paid in Capital 
Retained Earnings 
i'omprehen'i''e Income and Cther 
TOTAL COMMON EOUITV 
TOTAL EOUITV 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AMD EQUITY 
557,4714 682,642 7 1,006,3U 7 1,426,448 0 j_ _ 
5,263 4 17,036 9 16,745 0 33,229 4 
27,713 5 27,804 3 45,749 4 - | g | 
22 759 7 39,397 1 35,096 8 34,202 6 
61«.20«.0 76M81.0 1.103.904.9 1.493.879.9 
17,6913 33,175 6 32,690 6 92,536 4 
253 6 286 369 3 433 5 
48 387 2 48,056 79,614 3 96,232 5 
6S2.740.1 S4<.37S.t 1.216.S79.4 1,683.082.3 
31314 3,193 9 3,544 3 4,253 8 
23 767 1 28,245 5 64,794 7 65,438 0 
26 132 4 34,992 6 46,395 9 65,282 7 
242 2 271 616 6 15,970 8 
$3,273.1 «4.703.7 115.351.6 150.945.3 
53.273.1 64.703.7 115.351.6 150.945.3 
736.013.2 913,082.5 1.331.930.9 1.834,027.6 
Source: business week 
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3, Emirates National Bank of Dubai 
The bank was created in October 2007 by the merger of two big Dubai 
based banks. The resultant ENBD is a behemoth and dwarfs all other banks in 
the country and is the biggest in the region based on asset-size (AED 253.8 bn) 
with a loan and deposit market share of 23.4% and 19.3% respectively as of 
year-end 2007. The main drivers of the merger were to: 
• enhance the size of the balance sheet to pursue bigger business deals 
• merge two complementary business lines, with little overlap 
• encourage consolidation as the UAE continues its efforts to adhere to the 
WTO requirements of further opening the market to foreign banks 
The combined bank has been able to meet some critical integration 
milestones including common strategic plan, co-location of teams, integrated 
ATM networks, joint fund raising, joint sourcing and human resources. Going 
forward, ENBD has laid out an aggressive timeline to complete the integration, 
including: corporate client management, single treasury unit, integrating 
electronic retail channels, integrating credit card networks, and rebranding of 
the combined entity. The scheduled integration completion date is Q2 2009. 
Basel update 
During 2008 ,group risk control continued a number of edge initiative in 
the area of measurement and management of credit ,market and operational risk 
as well as commenced on Group wide economic capital .These measures are 
providing competitive advantage to the businesses and preparing of overall 
Basel ii compliance .The bank successfully completed the parallel runs for 
Pillar 1 under the auspices of UAE Central Bank and published the first Pillar 
ii risk assessment report in time .The bank has also progressed in the Pillar iii 
'Risk' disclosure in conjunction with the other related departments. 
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The masterscale development was accompanied with the assignment of 
Basel ii compliant definition of default harmonized across all portfolios. The 
group is in process of developing internal rating models and scorecards for the 
remaining conventional and Islamic portfolio .These models will be forming 
the integral basis of adequate risk management , limit setting ,portfolio 
allocation and risk adjusted pricing to steer the entire credit portfolio resulting 
in a huge added value for the group. 
Quantification of Economic Capital for all material risk was initiated in 
2008 leveraging the Pillar I developments.Economic Capital is key component 
of ICAAP .The comprehensive Economic capital framework enables the bank 
to achieve a higher integration of business capital and risk planning 
Tier I Capital 
Issued capita. 
Share premium reserve 
Legal and statutory reserve 
Other reserves 
Retained earnings 
Minority interest 
Total tier I Capital 
Less - Goodwill and Intangibles 
Lass; Treaswy shares 
Total " 
Tier II Capital 
Cumulative ^ n g e s in fair value 
Subordinated debt 
Total 
Total regulatory capital 
2008 
AEDOOO AEDWO 
5,052.523 
12,270.124 
1,629,205 
4.193,062 
9S.776 
26,566.075 
(6,133.331) 
(46,175) 
-20.38l , | i9 
(757,979^ 
5,113,000 
4,355,021 
24.735.590 
4,393,498 
12,270,121 
1,260,205 
3.917,410 
2,497,919 
1,903 
24,341,059 
(6,178,627) 
(46,175) 
18,116,257-' 
863,890' 
^ 3,672,750 
4,536,540 
22,652.897 
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Appendix 
Lurrencry in 
Millions cpt United Arab Emirates Dirhjm;-
Fevenuei 
I'Ahet Revenues 
TOTAL REVEIIUES 
GROSS PROFIT 
Selling General S Admin Expenses, Total 
Other Opetating Eipenses 
OTHER OPERATING EXPEHSES. TOTAL 
OPERATING INCOME 
Cither Mon-Operating Income (Expenses) 
EBT. EXCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS 
EBT. INCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS 
Minoritv Interest in Earnings 
Earnings ttom Continuing Operations 
NET INCOME 
Asot Jan 02 Jan 02 Jan 02 Jan 02 4-Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 Trend 
Restated Restated Restated 
1,391 4 1,837 8 2,976 5 3,702.8 
-605 -1666 -6177 -1,6525 " f 
2.502.9 J . in . l 5.139.2 7.8840 
2.502.9 J.171.1 5.139.2 7,8840 
774 3 1,1418 1,927 3 3,355.7 
141 0 422 0 751 3 
7743 1,282.8 2.349.3 4106.9 
1.728.6 1.888.3 2.789.9 3,777.1 
-19 0 -95.9 * ! 
1,728.6 1.888.3 2,770.9 3,681.2 
1.728.6 1,888.3 2.770.9 3,681.2 
3 5 -0 2 -0 4 -0 7 
1,7321 1,8381 !,770 5 3,680 5 
1,732.1 1,888.1 2.770.5 3,680.5 
MET INCOME TO COMMON INCLUDING EXTRA 
ITEMS 1,732.1 1,888.1 2,770.5 3,680.5 
NET INCOME TO COMMON EXCLUDING EXTRA 
ITEMS 1.732.1 1.888.1 2.770.5 3,680.5 
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'- unt f ] IL1^ HI 
Miihon5 of United Arab Emirates Dirhams 
f^i' Ul JMI V^ Jdl l V^ JMI Vi JMI V^ 
2006 2007 200S 2009 
Restated Restated Restated 
t- r far 
Trend 
Assets 
Cath and Equtvalents 
Short-Term lnve;tmerrtr 
Trading Asset Securities 
TOTAL CASH AIID SHORT TERM IHVESTMEHTS 
iZHtiet Receivables 
TOTAL RECEIVABLES 
'n.'entijfv 
Prepaid Expenses 
Pesti icted Cash 
C4hef Curtent Assets 
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 
Otoss Prooertv Plant and Equipment 
Accumulated Depreciation 
NET PROPERTY PLAHT AHD EOUIPMEHT 
Ooodv.'itl 
Long-Term Inves-trnents 
Loans Receivable, Long Term 
Deterred Charges, Long Term 
C4het Long-Term ,".ssets 
TOTAL ASSETS 
382 5 638 8 1,493 3 1,780 6 
50 0 3,865 0 16,708 2 4,524.7 
5,177 9 6,999 0 6,093 4 
4J2.5 9,701.5 25,200.5 12,398.8 
42 
4.2 
50 1 SO 1 
36 3 961 
618 5 
618.5 
541 6 
744 2 
7442 
328 7 
1635 3 2,254 8 11,834 8 10,4018 
1,249 9 2,0t1 8 4 755 5 5,264 3 
J.4041 14,118.6 42,950.9 29,137,9 
5184 762 0 2,398 6 3,385 7 
-275 5 -323 7 -415 9 -5931 
242.9 438.4 1.982.7 2,792.6 
5 466 1 5,522 7 
7,476 1 11,983 8 26,644 1 24,689 4 
46,542 4 68,600 3 174,538 3 214,684 7 
73 54 
1,747 5 742 9 1,5210 4,989 8 
59.412.9 95.878.1 253,815.6 282,413.7 
' • l | 
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LIABILmES S, EQUITY 
Account; Payable 
Jiccruert Expenses 
jhurt-Term BortO'^  ings 
rurtent Portion ot Long-Term DeM/Capital Lease 
Current Income Ta^es Payable 
Cither Current Liabilities, Total 
TOTAL CURREHT LIABILITIES 
Lunij-Term Debt 
Minorit'i' Interest 
Cthet t^ Jon-Curtent Liabilities 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
Common Stock 
Additional Paid in Capital 
Retained Earnings 
Tteasur\' Stock 
Corriprehensi"e Income and Cither 
TOTAL COMMOH EQUITY 
TOTAL EQUITY 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AMD EQUITY 
41,608 3 69,496 7 185,850 8 211,299 6 
472 7 873 0 1,836 5 1,688 6 
3551 5,610 0 3,260 4 
1,345 0 695 0 5,837 0 
149 149 146 172 
1,780 0 1,020 8 6,208 2 8,976 3 
-W.875.9 73,105.5 200,315.1 231,079.1 
7,189 3 11,240 5 27,804 6 24,332 4 
13 16 
597 5 2,654 1 
19 96 8 
657 1 1,240 3 
51,««J.9 87,001.7 228,658.8 256.748.5 
1,7938 2,3319 4,3935 5,0525 
12,2701 12,2701 
5,3080 6,2013 7,6755 9,1467 
-46 2 -46 2 ~ | | 
647 1 343 3 863 9 -758 0 - - " - , 
7,7-18.9 8.876.5 25.156.9 2S.665.1 
7.7-tt.9 8,876.5 25.156.9 25,665.1 
59,412.9 95,878,1 253,815.6 282.413.7 
Source: business week 
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4. Union National Bank 
Union National Bank (UNB), the seventh largest bank in the UAE and 
third largest in Abu Dhabi, was established in November 1982 as a Public Joint 
Stock Company. One of the fastest growing domestic banks in the UAE, it has 
the unique distinction of being the only company in the country owned by two 
governments - that of Abu Dhabi and of Dubai. Headquartered in Abu Dhabi 
and listed on the Abu Dhabi Securities Market, UNB has a wide array of 
offerings for both corporate and retail clients, which include lending, deposits, 
treasury services, investment services, e-banking. and investment banking 
services. These services are provided through an extensive network of 47 
branches and over 100 ATMs throughout the UAE. 
The bank has three subsidiaries: Union Brokerage Company (UBC), Al 
Wifaq Finance Company, and Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank 
(ACMB). UBC is one of the oldest brokerage firms in the UAE to provide 
investment services, while Al Wifaq offers Sharia compliant financial, 
commercial and investing services. UNB acquired a 94.8% stake in ACMB in 
the third quarter of 2006. The acquisition gives UNB an edge in commercial 
banking operations with nine branches in Egypt. 
Basel update 
The Basel I capital adequacy ratio,as implemented by the Central Bank 
of UAE was 11.8% as at 31 December 2008 ( 31 December 2007: 15.2%) well 
above the minimum regulatory requirement of 10% set by the Central Bank. As 
a part of the initiative by the Government of Abu Dhabi to further strengthen 
the capital position of Abu Dhabi banks , the bank will in 2009 issue Tier I 
capital notes to the Government of Abu Dhabi with a principal amount AED 2 
billion. 
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Capital B.ise 
Tier I Capital 
Equity attnbtttable to equity ^rcaoldcrs of the Bask 
Minority^inteiesf ^ "" '* 
Less goodwill 
Tier n CipitiiJ — 
Eligible cumulative cbaoges la fau value 
Collective unpainaent allonaace cs loans and adiances 
Total capital base (a) 
2008 
AED'OOO 
J 742W53 
i 169,775 
' } 7^3,762 
) - ' 
« 
' 328;,917 
^ *"3!28,917 
. 7,762^79 
2007 
AED'OOO 
6.558,225 
137.584 
1262J16S) 
6,433.543 
3,982 
3.9S2 
6,437,525 
-^ «c-: 
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Lurrericii in 
Millionr ot United Aiab Emiiatsi Oithamf 
f- e 'enue; 
-•fhef Revenues 
TOTAL REVEIIUES 
.nst of Goods Sold 
GROSS PROFIT 
Celling General a Admin E> pensee, Trtal 
'Aher Ooerating E ^penses 
OTHER OPERATIHG EXPENSES. TOTAL 
OPERATIHGIHCOME 
EBT. EXCLUDIIIG UNUSUAL ITEMS 
Olhet Unusual Items, Total 
EBT. WCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS 
Income Ta-< Expense 
Minofrt'/ Merest in Earningc 
Earnings from Continuing Operations 
NET INCOME 
NET IHCOME TO COMMON INCLUDING EXTRA 
ITEMS 
IIET INCOME TO COMMON EXCLUDING EXTRA 
ITEMS 
As of Jan 02 Jan 02 Jan 02 Jan 02 4 Year 
2006 2007 200« 200$ Trend 
Reclassified Restated 
1,0035 6322 604 7 506 1 
-239 1 -124 4 -141 -203 9 I ' " ! 
1,455.1 1.396.4 1,«80.4 1,709.9 
52 103 )86 206 
1.449.9 1.386.1 1.661.8 1.779.3 
253 0 329 S 434 1 545 3 
42 8 471 45 3 74 5 
295.8 376.6 479.4 619.7 
1.1S4.0 1,009.5 1.182.4 1.159.5 
1.154.0 1,009.5 1.182.4 1.159.5 
290 2 ^ 
1.1S4.0 1,009.5 1.182.4 1.449.8 
3 0 8 6 
-03 -17 -109 -364 " f 
1,1532 1,0078 1 1634 1,404 8 
1.1SJ.2 1,007.8 1.168.4 1.4048 
1.153.2 1.007.8 1.168.4 1,4048 
1.153.2 1,007.8 1.168.4 1,4048 
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i-ucfena^  in 
Millions of United ^rab Emirate? Dirhams 
Asot 
Assets 
Cash and Equivalents 
Trading As-:et Securities 
TOTAL CASH AUD SHORT TERM IHVESTMEHTS 
Other Receivables 
TOTAL RECEIVABLES 
Restricted Cash 
ether Current Assets 
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 
Gross Properly Plant and Equipment 
Accumulated Depreciation 
MET PROPERTY PLAHT AMD EOUIPMEHT 
Goodwill 
Long-Term Investments 
Loans Receivable Long Term 
Deterred Ta^ Assets, Long Term 
Other Long-Term Assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 
Jan 02 Jan 02 Jan 02 Jan 02 4-Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 Trend 
Reclassified Restated 
8,357 8 7,492 7 12,574 8 7,510 2 
146 7 2281 149 7 114 0 
8,5046 7.720.8 12.724.5 7.«242 ^ 
393 5 
393.5 
2,774 3 2,487 6 1,006 7 1,446 4 
665 6 683 4 992 7 1,196 5 
11.9445 11,265.2 14723.9 10,267.1 
3431 
•209 4 
133.7 
463 6 
-232 0 
231.5 
548 9 
-269 3 
279.6 
662 6 
-317 9 
3646 
_ - ^ _ 
•III 
252 5 262 3 262 3 
2,002 7 2,116 0 2,426 3 2,500 7 
20,702 9 27,4991 37,378 6 50,429 3 
41 
148 5 200 4 382 0 1,4013 
34932.2 41,571.4 55,456,7 65^25,3 
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LIABILITIES 8 EQUITY 
Accounts Payable 
Accrued Expenses 
Short-Term Borrowings 
'lutrent Portion of Long-Term Debt/Capital Lease 
Cither Current Liabilities, Total 
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 
Lonq-Terrri Debt 
Minoritv interesit 
ir>thet Non-Current Liabilities 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
Common Stock 
Retained Earnings 
Comprehensive Income and Other 
TOTAL COMMOH EQUITY 
TOTAL EQUITY 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AMD EQUITY 
25,786 7 
216 3 
301 0 
1,128 2 
554 4 
27.986.6 
1,469 2 
09 
243 0 
29.6»».7 
1,250 0 
3,962 5 
~ 
5.2J2.5 
5,232.5 
30,046 1 
311 4 
393 5 
1291 
409 6 
31.289.8 
3,855 4 
100 7 
398 4 
35,644.3 
1,562 5 
4,363 9 
07 
5,927.1 
5.927.1 
40,254 4 
389 6 
423 0 
754 9 
752 4 
42.574.2 
5 677 3 
137 6 
500 5 
48,889.7 
1,562 5 
4,982 3 
22 3 
6.567.1 
6.567.1 
49,472 6 
351 0 
125 
1,033 2 
724 6 
51.593.9 
5,272 0 
169 8 
663 3 
57,699.0 
1,875 0 
5,755 2 
-103 9 
7,526.3 
7,526,3 
^ ^ ^ . 
- . -^ . . 
- - - . 
- ^ _ . . 
- . - - ^ 
~.^^^ 
W - - . W 
1 
- - - ^ 
34,932,2 41,571,4 55,456,7 65,225.3 
Source: business week 
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5. Commercial Bank of Dubai 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. is a United Arab Emirates-based 
public joint stock company that offers consumer and corporate banking 
services, and treasury and investment services. The Bank's consumer banking 
services are current and savings accounts, fixed rate deposit accounts, personal 
loans, vehicle and mortgage loans, credit and debit cards, foreign exchange, 
money transfer and the Shahrazade program (a banking service program 
designed for women), as well as other related services, such as safe deposit 
lockers and telephone banking services. The corporate banking services cover 
loans, overdraft facilities, letters of credit and guarantee, and the Najah 
program for entrepreneurs, including such services as current accounts, term 
loans, discounted bills and trade finance. The treasury and investments 
manages the Group's investment portfolio. The Bank has a wholly owned 
subsidiary, CBD Financial Services LLC. It operates through a network of 28 
branches in the United Arab Emirates. 
Basel update 
The Groups lead regulator the Central Bank of the UAE, sets and 
monitors regulatory capital requirements. The group objective when managing 
the capital are as follows: 
• Safeguard the Group ability to continue as a going concern and increase 
returns for shareholders and 
• Comply with regulatory capital requirements set by the Central Bank of 
the UAE 
In implementing current capital requirements the group calculated the 
capital Adequacy ratio in accordance with the guidelines issued by Central 
bank of the UAE prescribing the ratio of the total capital to total risk -weighted 
assets. The groups regulatory capital adequacy ratio, set by the Central bank if 
the UAE at the minimum level of 10% is analysed in two ties as below. 
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, 3fp'ec,j20fta|ji y3hP«:.^2007; 
Tier J cap|f 
Share capitallf'W^L 
Total ^ * • •mi l -C^^ f^^ J- •" 
P 4 
Tier 2 capim^ 
Fair value r^etve 
I>c(liiction&|^oin T ie r l & Tier 2 
Investments tii subsfdiaf ies 
Tola! capital ba5e'^ (a) 
Risk Weiglite4 Assets: 
On balance sheet ' 
Off balance sheet 
Risk weighted assets (b) 
4,436.7^8' 
28,362;2S8 
5,716^50* 
34.079 JOS 
f { ?05,8 
4.113.780" 
21.304.701 
4.378.046 
25.682,747 
Capital adequacy ratio (%) |(a)/(b)*1001 13.02% 16.0% 
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Curreni;y in 
Mill ion; of United Atab Emiratei Dirhams 
Revenues 
(Dther Revenues 
TOTAL REVBfUES 
GROSS PROFIT 
Selling Oeneral 3- Admin Expenses, Total 
iDther Operating Expenses 
OTHER OPERATIIIG EXPENSES. TOTAL 
OPERATING INCOME 
EBT. EXCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS 
Other Unusual Items Total 
EBT, INCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS 
Earnings rrom Continuing Opefations 
NET INCOME 
NET INCOME TO COMMON INCLUDING EXTRA 
ITEMS 
NET INCOME TO COMMON EXCLUDHIG EXTRA 
ITEMS 
As of Jan 02 Jan 02 Jan 02 Jan 02 
2006 2007 2008 200S 
Restated Restated Reclassified 
328 7 
-9 9 
225.9 
S50.8 
550.8 
550.8 
550 8 
550.8 
265 5 
-17 7 
7r«.r «83.6 
776.7 883.6 
225 9 278 8 
278.8 
604.8 
6048 
-3 4 
601.4 
601 4 
601.4 
550.8 601.4 
484 8 117 2 
-24 1 -62 1 
1.J48.2 
1,348.2 
407 0 
0 7 
407.7 
940.5 
940.5 
1,218.2 
1,218.2 
487 6 
-40 7 
446.9 
771.4 
771.4 
550.8 601.4 
935.9 
935 9 
935.9 
935.9 
935.9 
771.4 
771 4 
771.4 
771.4 
771.4 
4-Yeai' 
Trend 
-I 
II 
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Currenc\' in ^S of 
^tltilll-.n5 nf United Arab Emirates Drrhams 
t 
Assets 
Cash and Equivalents 
Short-Te»Ti Investments 
Trading Asset Seatritiet 
TOTAL CASH AHD SHORT TERM IIIVESTMHITS 
i!>ther Receivables 
TOTAL RECEfVABLES 
Pestrirted Cash 
Cither Current Assets 
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 
Gross Properlv Plant and Equipment 
•!iccurriulated Depreciation 
IIET PROPERTY PLANT AHD EOUIPMENT 
i-ong-Term Investments 
^oansRecervable Long Term 
Jan 02 
200$ 
Restated 
3,134 8 
--
--
3.134.8 
62 7 
62.7 
691 0 
538 0 
4,42«.5 
492 5 
-147 2 
345.6 
1,138 0 
9,374 0 
Jan 02 
2007 
Restated 
2,995 9 
-
-
2.995.9 
71 2 
71.2 
864 7 
662 4 
4,5941 
553 7 
-171 9 
381.* 
1,055 2 
12,673 7 
Jan 02 
2008 
Reclass i f ied 
4,713 6 
51 1 
2981 
5,042.8 
1129 
112.9 
1,194 7 
900 5 
7.251.0 
52! 3 
-205 6 
415.6 
1,992 3 
20,77" 1 
Jan 02 
2009 
1,508 0 
-
55 5 
1,563.5 
1121 
112.1 
1,820 3 
1,228 5 
4,5244 
725 0 
-243 2 
475.8 
2,177 8 
28,579 3 
4-Year 
Trend 
_ „ „ _ 
M^ ^ 
. . - ^ ^ 
^ _ - ^ 
- ^ ^ ^ 
^^ . . „ 
^^^> 
« - - ^ 
_^^>. 
• I l l 
^ - - _ 
TOTAL ASSETS 15.2840 18.7048 30.436.0 35,757.3 
270 
Appendix 
LMBIUTKS S EQUITY 
Account? Payable 
Accrued Expenses 
Short-Term Borro>?';ings 
'yther Cut tent Liabilities, Total 
TOTAL CURREHT LIABILITIES 
Long-TetmDebt 
Penswn & Cithet Post-Retirement Benetits 
'Other Non-Cut rent l^abilrties 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
'"orrimon Stock 
PelainecJEafnings 
Comprehensive Income and Othet 
TOTAL COMMOIIEOUITY 
TOTAL EQUITY 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AIID EQUITY 
10,736 7 13,864 6 
35 3 100 9 
1,1S4 3 336 4 
471 8 592 7 
12.398.0 14,894.7 
31 8 
32 9 
12.462.7 14,894.7 
627 5 1,052 1 
1,320 4 2,438 6 
873 4 319 4 
2.821.3 3.810.1 
2.821.3 3,810.1 
21,466 6 25,987 4 
••SSO 2112 
3,241 9 2,361 2 
815 6 1,0251 
25,«77.1 29,S84.9 
1,469 2 
25,677.1 31,054.1 
1129 5 1,4118 
2,844 9 2,918 5 
784 5 372 9 
4,758.9 4,703.2 
4,758.9 4,703.2 
15.2840 18,704.8 30.436.0 35,757.3 
Source: Business week 
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6. ABN AMRO (RBS-Dubai) 
ABN AMRO was acquired by the consortium of Fortis, RBS and 
Santander in October 2007. On 3 October 2008, the Dutch state announced that 
it has bought Fortis Bank Nederland, including its interests in ABN AMRO. As 
of 24 December 2008, the Dutch state replaced Fortis as a stakeholder in RFS 
Holdings, which continues to manage ABN AMRO. RBS-bound businesses are 
not affected by this change. 
Basel Update 
ABN AMRO's transitional agreement and current compliance with the 
Basel II capital adequacy framework ABN AMRO Holding N.V. and its 
consolidated subsidiaries are fully owned by RFS Holdings B.V. which is 
controlled by The Royal Bank of Scotland Group pic, incorporated in the 
United Kingdom. Consequently,ABN AMRO is under the supervision of the 
United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA) as its home regulator, and 
the DNB as its host regulator, for Basel II compliance. For all other matters the 
DNB remains the home regulator. 
Subsequent to its acquisition by RFS Holdings, ABN AMRO received 
approval for a transitional period from the DNB and the FSA with regards to 
compliance to Basel II capital rules. ABN AMRO has agreed with these 
regulators to continue to report figures on the basis of Basel I until December 
2009. In accordance with this, specific minimal requirements have been set for 
the Tier 1 and Total capital ratios, including the requirement to treat the capital 
deductions in the same manner as required by Basel II. 
These ratios measure capital adequacy by comparing the Group's 
eligible capital with its balance sheet assets, off-balance sheet commitments 
and market and other risk positions at weighted amounts to reflect their relative 
risk. The market risk approach covers the general market risk and the risk of 
open positions in currencies and debt and equity securities. 
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ABN AMRO is fully consolidated for regulatory reporting within the 
RBS Group. Pillar III information for ABN AMRO is included within the RBS 
Group Pillar III disclosures. Detailed Pillar III reports which include ABN 
AMRO are available at www.rbs.com . In accordance with this, revised 
minimum requirements have been set for the Tier 1 and total capital ratios, 
including the requirement to treat capital deductions in the same manner as 
required under Basel II. The minimum Tier 1 ratio required is 9% and the 
minimum total capital ratio is 12.5%. 
The table below summarises the capital position of the ABN AMRO 
Holding N.V., complying with Pillar III disclosures for a significant subsidiary 
of an EU parent. 
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^ unencv in ^G of 
frylilltonf of Bfitish Pounds 
Revenues 
C4her Revenue; 
TOTAL REVEHUES 
GROSS PROHT 
Selling Cieneial & Admin Expenses, Total 
Cjfher Operfrtiny Expenses 
OTHER OPERATniG EXPEIISES. TOTAL 
OPERATIHG ItlCOME 
EBT. EXCLUDIIIG UliUSUAL ITEMS 
Met get a Kestrurturing Charges 
Imiiaitment of '-oodwill 
Other Unusual Items, Total 
EBT. UlCLUDIIiG UliUSUAL ITEMS 
Incorrii; Tax E<pense 
f"1inotit\' lntefe;t in Earnings 
Earnings Iforn Continuing Ciperations 
EARIIIIIGS FROM DISCOUIITniUED OPERATIONS 
MET ItlCOME 
Jan 0? 
2006 
Restated 
17,825 0 
-1,707 0 
?«,036.« 
26.036.0 
15,301 0 
1,841 0 
17.842.0 
8.39-I.0 
8.394.0 
-455 0 
-
7.936.0 
I',373 0 
-57 0 
5,501 0 
5,501.0 
Jan 02 
2007 
Reclassif ied 
18,342 0 
-1,S7S0 
27.5CO.O 
27.560.0 
16,804 0 
1,922 0 
18,726.0 
8.8340 
8.8340 
-134 0 
-
486 0 
9,186.0 
2,689 0 
-104 0 
6,393 0 
6.393.0 
JanO? 
2008 
Restated 
20,202 0 
-1,968 0 
30.303.0 
30.303.0 
18,458 0 
2,193 0 
20.651.0 
9.652.0 
9.652.0 
-106 0 
-
268 0 
9.832.0 
2,044 0 
-163 0 
7,625 0 
-76.0 
7.549.0 
Jan 02 
2009 
9,665 0 
-8,072 0 
20.268,0 
20.268,0 
24,525 0 
2,386 0 
26,911.0 
-6,643.0 
-6,643.0 
-1,357 0 
-32,581 0 
-86 0 
-40.667.0 
-2,323 0 
10,832 0 
-27,512 0 
3,971.0 
-23,541.0 
4 - \ eat 
Ttend 
— 1 
-..__ 
_..^_ 
_.._^ 
- b . . ^ 
• 
• 
• " 1 
1 
1 
" ' " • • • 
1 
•'"'• 
tIET lilCOME TO COMMON INCLUDING EXTRA 
ITEMS 5.392.0 6,202.0 7.303.0 -24137.0 - " ^ 
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uurrencv in fi,s o ' 
Millions nt British Founds 
Assets 
Cash and Equivalents 
Short-Teim Investments 
Trading Asset Securities 
TOTAL CASH AMD SHORT TERM IIIVESTMEIITS 
Prepaid E-fpensec 
Restricted Cash 
iJther Current Assets 
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 
Gross Propertv Plant and Equipment 
-ccurtiulated Depreciation 
IIET PROPERTY PLAHT AMD EOUIPMEHT 
C-oodwill 
Long-Term Investments 
Loans Receivable, Long Term 
Deferred Ta/ Assets, Long Term 
Deterred Charges, Long Term 
CJther Lony-Tetm Assets 
Jm 02 
2006 
Restated 
52,549 0 
--
83,584 0 
136.143.0 
1,274 0 
303 0 
2,107 0 
139.827.0 
18,943 0 
-5,237 0 
13.706.0 
18,823 0 
50,424 0 
440,256 0 
-
1,006 0 
112,3100 
Jan 0? 
2007 
Reclassified 
71,651 0 
-
98,230 0 
169,8S1.0 
946 0 
369 0 
118,846 0 
290,042.0 
18,801 0 
-5,266 0 
13,535.0 
17,889 0 
45,859 0 
484,260 0 
156 0 
1,066 0 
18,309 0 
Jan 02 
2008 
Restated 
60,950 0 
318,298 0 
228,217 0 
607,465.0 
1,988 0 
436 0 
326,810 0 
936.701.0 
20,914 0 
-5,600 0 
15.314.0 
42,953 0 
116,793 0 
686,506 0 
3,1190 
1,976 0 
32,095 0 
Jan 02 
2009 
91,560 0 
98,084 0 
133,334 0 
322.978.0 
1,949 0 
393 0 
997,809 0 
1,323,129.0 
19,625 0 
-4,544 0 
15,081.0 
15,562 0 
147,560 0 
845,804 0 
7,062 0 
1,825 0 
42,238 0 
4-Year 
Trend 
u _ . 
«^ 
— . - ( — . * • 
*»_> — ». 
4_ ^ — * _ 
. J — — _ 
_.*-.^ 
_ ^  » ^ 
III! 
.-—*__ 
*.——_ 
_; .__ 
— ^ 
— 
— .. 
TOTAL ASSETS 776,827.0 871.432.0 1,840,829.0 2,401,652.0 
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A^endix 
LIABILITIES & EQUITY 
Ac count J Pavabie 
Accrued Expenses 
Short-Term Borro'^ 'Vings 
Lurrerit Portion of Long-Term Debt.'Caoital Lease 
Current Income Taxes Payable 
OVnst Curterrt Liabilities, Total 
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 
Long-Term Debt 
Minoritv Interest 
Unearned Revenue, Non-Current 
Pension S Other Post-Retirement Bem-fits 
Deferred Ta Liability Mon-Cuirent 
ilther Non-Current Liabilities 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
Preferred Stock Convertible 
TOTAL PREFERRED EQUITY 
Common Stock 
'idditional Paid in Capital 
Retained Earnings 
Treasury Stock 
Comptehensiv'e Income and Other 
TOTAL COMMON EQUITY 
TOTAL EQUITY 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AtlD EQUITY 
405,664 0 405,086 0 772,635 0 820,614 0 
3,875 0 4,422 0 8,386 0 7,532 0 
110,769 0 153,035 0 376,566 0 220,390 0 
802 0 
952 0 789 0 1,630 0 585 0 
43,8090 128'250 218,4440 
522.062.0 607,141.0 1.287,392.0 1,267,565.0 
52,536 0 70,238 0 157 480 0 205,420 0 
2,586 0 5,709 0 38,6910 21,979 0 
3,333 0 3,377 0 6,289 0 7,640 0 
3,735 0 1,992 0 460 0 2,032 0 
1,695 0 3,264 0 5,400 0 4,165 0 
153,082 0 137,653 0 290 696 0 832,138 0 
739.029.0 829,3740 1,786.-108.0 2,340,939.0 
804 0 
2.363.0 
799 0 
-7 0 
11,5201 
7150 11 0 909 0 
1.831.0 1.383.0 1.8340 
815 0 2,530 0 9,898 0 
11,777 0 12,482 0 18 395 0 28,544 0 
11,346 0 15,487 0 21,072 0 7,542 0 
-115 0 -6! 0 -104 0 "i"i 
11,558 0 11,1020 12,9990 
35.435.0 40,227.0 53,038.0 58,879.0 
37,798.0 42.058.0 54421.0 60.713.0 
776,827.0 871.432.0 1.840.829.0 2,401,652.0 
Source: business week 
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